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Abstract 
 
Rabab Hasan Ahmed Hasan Ebrahim 
Dividend Policy, Stock Liquidity and Stock Price Informativeness 
Keywords: Dividend policy, stock liquidity, systematic liquidity risk, cost of 
capital, stock price informativeness. 
Dividend policy, its determinants, and its impact on firm value are of 
significant academic interest, and many theories and explanations have been 
posited on the subject over the years, but there has not been a universal 
agreement. This thesis examines the links between dividend policy, various 
aspects of stock liquidity and price informativeness. We study a sample of 
UK firms over the period from 1996–2013. We show that, on average, stocks 
of dividend payers have significantly lower bid–ask spread and a lower 
illiquidity ratio than their counterparts of non-dividend payers. We also find 
that stocks of high-dividend payers are more liquid than those of firms that 
pay low or no dividends. These findings are consistent with the predictions of 
asymmetric information that posit that paying dividends reveals inside 
information to the market and hence decreases the level of asymmetric 
information, leading to higher stock liquidity. In the subsequent analysis, we 
suggest and examine a new channel through which dividend policy can 
impact firm value. Specifically, we show that dividend payers are less 
exposed to shocks in the aggregate market liquidity than non-dividend 
payers. Similarly, we find that the systematic liquidity risk is negatively 
associated with amount of dividends. Finally, in the context of signalling and 
agency costs models, we show that dividends are negatively related to stock 
price informativeness and that this relationship is stronger for firms with lower 
stock liquidity. The findings imply that dividend policy can both affect and be 
affected by stock markets. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Rationale of thesis 
Stock liquidity plays a crucial role in many finance areas. Many studies have 
examined the importance of liquidity to the different financial market players, 
including regulators who consider stock liquidity as one of the key 
determinants of any market’s financial stability. Stock liquidity facilitates the 
flow of funds between capital suppliers and demanders, resulting in higher 
trading activity, and therefore influences the financial stability of any market 
and consequently the stability of the whole economy. Furthermore, liquidity is 
important to both investors and firms, as it determines their cost of buying 
and selling and hence assures the ease and speed of trading a security 
without considerable changes in prices.  
Given its crucial importance, several studies have examined the link between 
corporate policies and various aspects of stock liquidity.1 This great interest 
can generally be attributed to the general belief that changes in corporate 
policies can impact the behaviour of market players, the functioning of stock 
market liquidity, asset pricing, and market efficiency. 
Dividend policy is one of the firm’s main corporate policies. It can be defined 
as the decision made by the managers concerning the size and pattern of 
profits distributed to the firm’s shareholder.2Over the years, many 
researchers have addressed different issues relating to dividend policy and 
proposed numerous theories to explain why firms pay dividends to 
shareholders and what the implications of such a decision are. From a 
managerial point of view, dividends can be used as a means to reduce 
agency problems by distributing excess-free cash flows (Jensen 1986) or to 
                                                             
1 Several studies have examined the impact of corporate policy on liquidity. Maloney and 
Mulherin (1992) and Lin et al. (2009) examine changes in liquidity around the execution of a 
stock split. Barclay and Smith (1988), Brockman and Chung (2001) and Ginglinger and 
Hamon (2007) examine changes in liquidity after announcements of open-market share 
repurchases. Andres et al. (2014) examine the effect of capital structure on stock liquidity. 
2 The main focus of this thesis is cash dividends. This would be a limitation as the firm 
dividend policy may consist of other types of payouts, such as stock dividends or share 
repurchases. We mention this limitation in the limitation section (see page 209).   
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convey information to the market that only good-quality firms are able to pay 
dividends (Bhattacharya 1979). However, investors may view dividends as a 
source for regular income which helps them to avoid any irrational trading 
(Shefrin and Statman 1984). 
Dividend policy has been investigated extensively over the last few decades 
in an attempt to explain why firms pay dividends and what the effect of 
dividend policy on the market is, leading to the development of several 
theories. Generally, these theories can be divided into two groups: the 
irrelevance theory and the relevance theories. The irrelevance theory of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) suggests that under perfect market conditions, a 
firm’s dividend policy does not have any impact on its market value. It has 
been supported by several subsequent studies including Black and Scholes 
(1974), Miller (1986), and Bernstein (1996). The relevance theories (e.g., 
asymmetric information theory and agency costs theory), however, assert 
that dividend policy has an impact on a firm’s market value. Despite 
extensive empirical investigation, there is no consensus in the literature on 
whether dividend policy affects firm value. The asymmetric information 
theory (Bhattacharya 1979; John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985) 
and agency costs theory (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986) suggest that 
dividend payments positively affect firm value. For example, the asymmetric 
information argument implies that dividends convey information about the 
future prospects of the firms. Due to their information content, dividends are 
perceived as a signal of a firm’s financial strength. Many studies find 
evidence consistent with this argument (Aharony and Swary 1980; Abeyratna 
et al. 1996; Bali 2003; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011). The 
agency costs argument suggests that separation of management and 
ownership results in agency costs that can be mitigated by dividends. 
Consistent with the view that dividends reduce agency costs, several studies 
document a positive relationship between dividend policy and the stock price 
(see, e.g., Rozeff 1982; La Porta et al. 2000).  
However, despite the voluminous research on dividend policy, prior empirical 
studies have focused mainly on the impact of dividend policy on firm 
performance and have paid little attention to a potential link between 
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dividends and stock liquidity. This thesis contributes to the literature by 
investigating the link between dividend policy and the various aspects of 
stock liquidity. It consists of three empirical chapters, each examining a 
certain question. The first empirical chapter examines the relationship 
between dividend policy and different aspects of stock liquidity. The second 
empirical chapter investigates the effect of dividend policy on systematic 
liquidity risk. The third empirical chapter analyzes the relationship between 
dividend policy and stock price informativeness and how stock liquidity can 
affect this relationship. 
The literature on dividend policy proposes several channels through which 
dividend decisions affect stock liquidity. According to the asymmetric 
information theory, since dividends reveal information to the market 
(Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985), information asymmetry should 
decrease and hence the bid–ask spreads should narrow. Moreover, the 
agency model implies that dividends can be used as a tool to reduce the 
agency costs because paying dividends means that the firm will visit the 
capital market more frequently, leading to increased monitoring by suppliers 
of capital (Easterbrook 1984). However, those new capital suppliers will not 
provide funds without obtaining information about the potential use of those 
funds (Rozeff 1982). As a result, new information will be released to the 
market, resulting in reduced information asymmetry levels and hence lower 
trading costs. With regards to the clientele theory of dividends, it suggests 
that investors usually select firms with payout policies that fit their 
preferences, and this creates clienteles for both high and low dividends 
(Dhaliwal et al. 1999; Allen et al. 2000; Hotchkiss and Lawrence 2007). 
According to this theory, institutional investors prefer higher dividends 
relative to individual investors (Grinstein and Michaely 2005). Given that 
institutional investors are more effective in gathering information about the 
firms in which they invest, the level of information asymmetry between firm 
insiders and outsiders is lower for firms that pay dividends (Amihud and Li 
2006; Puckett and Yan 2011). Additionally, many studies find that 
institutional investors trade more frequently and in large quantities (Agarwal 
2007; Rubin 2007; Brockman et al. 2009). Therefore, if dividends attract 
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institutional investors, who can produce high information quality and trade 
large quantities, dividend-paying firms should have lower trading costs and 
higher trading activity, and therefore higher stock liquidity, than their non-
dividend-paying counterparts. 
Existing empirical evidence on the effects of dividend policy on stock liquidity 
is inconclusive and in some cases outdated. Some studies have argued that 
dividend policy leads to a narrower bid–ask spread which increases stock 
liquidity (Howe and Lin 1992; Mitra and Rashid 1997). However, Brooks 
(1994) and Barclay and Smith (1988) show that the relationship between 
dividend policy and bid–ask spread is at best weak. With regards to the 
trading activity aspect of stock liquidity, several studies, including Richardson 
et al. (1986), Gurgul et al. (2003), and Dasilas and Leventis (2011), find that 
trading volume increases with dividend increases and declines with dividend 
reductions.  
Recently, the liquidity literature has shifted focus from studying individual 
stock liquidity to the concept of systematic liquidity risk. Chordia et al. (2000) 
suggest that liquidity is a source of non-diversifiable risk that should be 
reflected in expected asset returns. Following that, many studies, including 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Liu 
(2006), provide significant evidence that systematic liquidity risk is priced. 
Given this recent development in the liquidity literature, we argue that given 
that liquidity is priced, an increase (decrease) in stock liquidity associated 
with dividends may result in lower (higher) liquidity risks, which in turn will 
lower (higher) the cost of equity. This thesis examines the valuation effect of 
dividend policy through stock liquidity as well as systematic liquidity risk.  
Dye and Sridhar (2002) note that in contrast to the usual view of the 
information flows between capital markets and firms being one way (from 
firms to the capital markets), information also flows from capital markets to 
firms. Hence, corporate dividend policy can both affect and be affected by 
capital markets. Therefore, this thesis also links the dividend policy to the 
concept of stock price informativeness. Recently, great attention among 
finance researchers has been paid to investigate whether the stock market 
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can affect firm corporate decisions through the informational content of stock 
prices (Chen et al. 2007a; Bakke and Whited 2010; Frésard 2012; Ben-Nasr 
and Alshwer 2016). Understanding whether and how information flows from 
the stock market to firms is of vital importance to enable better assessment 
of the impact of financial markets on the firm. The basis behind this is that 
information does not flow freely among firms and investors, and hence 
various types of information that are not known by managers can be 
aggregated into the stock prices through the trading activities of different 
investors (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 1985; Chen et al. 2007a; Kim 
and Cheong 2015). As a result, market prices may incorporate some specific 
information that can help managers in allocating the corporate resources 
more efficiently, thus they may contribute to increase firm value. Accordingly, 
the stock market can have a real impact on corporate policies if managers 
discover information in the market with the aim of making better decisions.3 
A growing body of literature in finance suggests that managers care about 
outside investors' information contained in stock prices and use that 
information when making corporate decisions. Numerous studies document 
the fact that managers observe information from stock prices and use this 
information when they decide on, e.g., corporate investment (Durnev et al. 
2004; Luo 2005; Chen et al. 2007a; Bakke and Whited 2010), cash savings 
(Frésard 2012), and labour investment (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 2016). 
However, to the extent that prices reflect information about a firm’s 
fundamentals, this information should also affect other corporate decisions 
that managers have to make (Frésard 2012). We contribute to this strand of 
literature by examining the extent to which managers use the information 
incorporated into stock prices in their dividend policy decisions.  
1.2. Findings and contributions to literature 
This thesis contributes to the existing literature by examining the links 
between dividend policy, stock liquidity, systematic liquidity risk, and price 
                                                             
3 See Bond, et al. (2012) for a comprehensive survey on the real effects of the stock markets 
from the informational role of market prices. 
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informativeness. The contributions and the findings of each empirical chapter 
can be summarized as follows: 
1.2.1. Dividend policy and stock liquidity 
In Chapter 3, the first empirical chapter of the thesis, we investigate the 
relationship between dividend policy decisions and level of stock liquidity. 
Existing empirical evidence on the effects of dividend policy on stock liquidity 
effects is mixed. For example, Howe and Lin (1992) show that dividend 
policy has a negative effect on bid–ask spread. They attribute their results to 
the information asymmetry theory. They argue that dividends reduce the 
level of information asymmetry and hence the bid–ask spread. However, 
Brooks (1994) and Barclay and Smith (1988) show that the relationship 
between dividend policy and bid–ask spread is at best weak. With regards to 
the trading activity aspect of stock liquidity, several studies, including 
Richardson et al. (1986), Gurgul et al. (2003), and Dasilas and Leventis 
(2011), find that trading volume increases with dividend increases and 
declines with dividend reductions. Overall, existing empirical evidence on the 
consequences of dividend policy decisions in terms of stock liquidity is not 
conclusive and in some cases is outdated. This study also notices that most 
of the studies on the relationship between dividend policy and stock liquidity 
use data from the US market. Their results, however, cannot be readily 
extended to other countries where stock markets can have different market 
structure and liquidity characteristics. We fill this void in the literature by 
examining the impact of dividend policy on stock liquidity using a UK sample. 
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. We contribute to 
the literature on the link between stock liquidity and corporate finance. For 
example, many studies show that stock liquidity is influenced by stock 
repurchases (Brockman and Chung 2001; Ginglinger and Hamon 2007; 
Hillert et al. 2016), asset liquidity (Gopalan et al. 2012; Charoenwong et al. 
2014), stock split (Goyenko et al. 2006; Huang et al. 2015), and corporate 
governance (Rubin 2007; Poon et al. 2013; Prommin et al. 2014). We 
contribute to this literature by identifying dividend policy as another influential 
determinant of liquidity. Given the few prior studies that examine the liquidity 
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impact of dividend policy and their conflicting results, more empirical studies 
are warranted. Previous studies mainly investigate the relationship between 
dividend policy and stock liquidity by examining the changes in a certain 
measure of stock liquidity following dividend announcements (Richardson et 
al. 1986; Mitra and Rashid 1997; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 
2011). However, our study uses regression analysis, which allows examining 
the impact of dividends on stock liquidity after controlling for other known 
determinants of liquidity and potential endogeneity bias.   
Previous studies focus typically on the effect of dividend policy on a single 
aspect of stock liquidity, such as trading costs, which are measured by bid–
ask spread (Howe and Lin 1992; Mitra and Rashid 1997), or trading activity, 
which is measured by trading volume (Richardson et al. 1986; Bozos et al. 
2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011). However, stock liquidity reflects several 
aspects. Kyle (1985) and Lesmond (2005) argue that because liquidity is 
very difficult to define and even more difficult to estimate, a list of measures 
is necessary to capture the different aspects of liquidity. Given the 
uncertainties surrounding liquidity estimation, we use proportional bid–ask 
spread, turnover ratio and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio to capture the 
impact of dividend policy on trading costs, trading quantity and price impact 
dimensions of liquidity, respectively. 
Further, our study complements earlier studies of the impact of dividend 
policy on firm value. Higher stock liquidity that is associated with dividend 
payments can result in lower rate of return and higher firm valuation.4 
Finally, to the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first of its kind 
that examines the role of dividend policy decisions in determining stock 
liquidity in the UK. It is vital that we research this area given that the London 
Stock Exchange (LSE) is the second most active equity market in the world 
after the USA. 
The main findings of this chapter can be summarized as follows. Stocks of 
dividend payers tend to have significantly lower bid–ask spread and a 
                                                             
4 The impact of liquidity on rate of return has been documented widely (see, e.g., Amihud 
and Mendelson 1986; Brennan et al. 1998; Amihud 2002). 
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illiquidity ratio than their non-dividend payers’ counterparts. Likewise, stocks 
of firms that pay high dividend amounts have lower bid–ask spread and a 
lower illiquidity ratio compared to those that pay a low dividend amount. 
These findings are consistent with the predictions of the asymmetric 
information theory of Bhattacharya (1979), which suggests that dividends 
convey information to the market and hence decrease the level of 
asymmetric information, which leads to higher stock liquidity. These findings 
are also in line with the model of Easterbrook (1984), which posits that 
dividend-paying firms are more likely to visit the capital market, leading to 
more monitoring and hence more information being released to the market. 
However, the turnover ratio is found to be affected negatively by dividend 
policy. This result hinges upon the view that stocks that pay dividends tend to 
be purchased and retained by the investors, and thus their transactions 
occur less frequently (Hotchkiss and Lawrence 2007; IOSCO Emerging 
Markets Committee report December 2007). Our main results are robust to 
different model specifications and estimation methods.  
In our further analysis, which examines whether the relationship between 
dividend policy and stock liquidity is affected by the size of the firm, we find 
that compared to firms with no or low dividends, dividend-paying firms and 
firms with high dividends have significantly higher levels of stock liquidity, 
especially when they are larger. These findings are again consistent with 
information asymmetry theories, as large firms often face lower degrees of 
asymmetric information, which may explain their greater level of stock 
liquidity. 
1.2.2. Dividend policy and systematic liquidity risk 
In Chapter 4, the second empirical chapter of the thesis, we investigate the 
relationship between dividend policy and systematic liquidity risk. The 
relationship between dividend policy and firm value is a crucial area of 
research in the field of corporate finance. The positive value effects of 
dividend policy decisions are well documented in the literature. For example, 
many studies find strong evidence that decisions to increase dividends can 
result in positive abnormal returns (Abeyratna et al. 1996; McCluskey et al. 
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2006; Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011) as well as positive abnormal volume (Gurgul 
et al. 2003; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011). DeAngelo et al. 
(1996), Nissim and Ziv (2001), Braggion and Moore (2011), and Liu and 
Chen (2015) find that dividend policy can predict subsequent accounting 
earnings. Recently, risk has been proposed as one of the important factors in 
explaining the well-known value effects of payout policies (Grullon et al. 
2002; Eije et al. 2014). We build on this literature and investigate whether 
dividend policy has an impact on systematic liquidity risk, a form of risk that 
has been shown to be priced by investors both in the US and across the 
world (e.g., Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Lee 2011; Li et al. 2014; Ho and 
Chang 2015) but has not yet been investigated in the context of dividend 
policy decisions.  
There are reasons why dividend policy may affect systematic liquidity risk. 
First, several studies show that dividend payments are associated with 
higher stock liquidity. For example, it has been documented that stocks of 
dividend payers have lower bid–ask spread than stocks of non-payers (Howe 
and Lin 1992) and that the spread declines following dividend increases 
(Mitra and Rashid 1997). Gurgul et al. (2003) and Dasilas and Leventis 
(2011) find that trading volume increases (decreases) following dividend 
increases (decreases). Several studies find a positive association between 
individual stock liquidity and stock market returns (see, e.g., Amihud and 
Mendelson 1986; Chalmers and Kadlec 1998) and that liquidity is a source of 
non-diversifiable risk that should be reflected in expected asset returns (see, 
e.g., Chordia et al. 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001; Huberman and Halka 
2001; Brockman and Chung 2002). Thus, if dividend policy affects stock 
liquidity, it should also affect the resilience and the vulnerability of stock 
prices to shocks in market liquidity. In other words, if dividend payouts 
improve the liquidity environment, they should reduce the systematic liquidity 
risk and the cost of equity. Second, dividend payments reduce uncertainty 
and adverse selection (see, e.g., Grullon et al. 2002; Hoberg and Prabhala 
2009; Fuller and Goldstein 2011; Eije et al. 2014), and thus could reduce 
liquidity risk by reducing the sensitivity of a firm’s share price to the non-
diversifiable component of risk. For example, during times of market liquidity 
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drops, there is generally selling pressure on equities (Pástor and Stambaugh 
2003; Ng 2011). Non-dividend-paying stocks and stocks that pay a low 
amount of dividends could experience more negative returns if buyers offer 
lower prices to sellers of these stocks because of the higher uncertainty 
and/or greater probability of adverse selection associated with them. 
Furthermore, when the aggregate market liquidity is low, the liquidation cost 
of stocks becomes higher. Therefore, investors are more likely to invest in 
dividend-paying firms and firms that pay high dividends because dividend 
payments help them avoid the high trading costs (Banerjee et al. 2007; Kuo 
et al. 2013).5 Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) argue that when the aggregate 
liquidity is low, assets with high sensitivity of returns to aggregate liquidity 
result in a reduction in investor wealth. Therefore, dividends are expected to 
reduce the sensitivity of stock returns to aggregate liquidity. 
This chapter makes at least two contributions. First, we contribute to the 
growing literature linking systematic liquidity risk to corporate finance (e.g., 
Lin et al. 2009; Ng 2011; Cao and Petrasek 2014; Mazouz et al. 2014) by 
investigating the impact of dividend policy decisions on the systematic 
liquidity risk. In this context, only one study has been found in the USA – 
Banerjee et al. (2007) – which shows that systematic liquidity risk declines 
following dividend initiations. Our study, however, differs from Banerjee et 
al.’s (2007) study in two ways. First, their study focuses on only dividend 
initiations, i.e., the decision as to whether the firm pays a dividend (and not 
how much to pay). This is a considerable drawback, because the empirical 
research on dividend decisions suggests that firm managers are more likely 
to face decisions related to the level of dividends than decisions to either 
introduce dividends for the first time or eliminate existing dividends (Li and 
Lie 2006). Second, the results of Banerjee et al.’s (2007) study are based on 
a univariate analysis in which they compare the pre- and post-initiation 
liquidity risk using a sample of firms that initiate dividends and do not control 
                                                             
5 When liquidity is low, trading friction is high throughout financial markets which means that 
investors have to pay high trading commissions and they either have to provide a price 
concession for an immediate execution or they have to wait until optimal execution of their 
trades. Stocks that pay cash dividends allow investors to satisfy their liquidity needs with 
less or no trading and thus enable them to avoid trading friction (Banerjee et al. 2007). 
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for the known determinants of systemic liquidity risk. Since systematic 
liquidity risk is not expected to have the same effect on all firms, the 
exclusion of the control variables may give rise to an omitted variables bias. 
We alleviate this potential bias by applying panel data analysis and including 
the commonly known determinants of liquidity risk. This is necessary to 
understand whether, and why, individual firms display varying sensitivity to 
market liquidity. Second, we contribute to the literature on the valuation 
effects of dividend policy (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas 
and Leventis 2011; Liu and Chen 2015). Recent literature in finance 
suggests that liquidity risk is a non-diversifiable systematic risk that affects 
stock returns.  Many studies find that expected stock returns are positively 
related to the sensitivities of returns to fluctuations in aggregate liquidity 
(Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Liu 2006) 
Liquidity risk is also significant and priced in different markets, suggesting 
that it is a persistent risk that affects firm value (Lee 2011). To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to introduce systematic liquidity risk as an 
important factor by which dividend policy can affect firm value.6 
We find that non-dividend paying firms exhibit significantly higher systematic 
liquidity risk than their dividend-paying counterparts. We also find that the 
systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers is significantly negatively 
associated with the amount of dividend payments. These findings remain 
robust after controlling for endogeneity due to the possibility that the relations 
between dividend policy and systematic liquidity risk are endogenously 
determined and it could be as an outcome of omitted variables. The findings 
also continue to hold as we use alternative proxies for liquidity and 
alternative models to estimate liquidity risk. Further analysis reveals that 
compared to non-dividend-paying stocks, dividend-paying stocks have a 
significantly lower systematic liquidity risk, especially when they are small 
and have more growth opportunities. When liquidity declines, investors are 
more likely to sell off stocks that are associated with higher asymmetric 
                                                             
6 We do not empirically document the linkage between liquidity risk and firm value in this 
thesis. Instead, we rely on the large body of empirical evidence in market microstructure that 
documents the linkage between liquidity risk and returns and hence firm value (see e.g., 
Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Liu 2006). 
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information (Ng 2011). Small- and high-growth stocks are often associated 
with higher asymmetric information because they tend to have a lower 
amount of information (Smith and Watt 1992; Leary and Michaely 2011).  
The findings of this chapter suggest that systematic liquidity risk is 
significantly associated with dividend policy decisions. These findings are 
consistent with the predictions of asymmetric information theory, which 
suggests that dividend payments are associated with lower asymmetric 
information and hence higher liquidity (e.g., Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and 
Rock 1985). Our result is also in line with the arguments of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), and Liu (2006) who 
suggest that since liquidity is priced, an increase in liquidity will lead to lower 
liquidity risk and, hence, lower expected returns. Our findings are also 
consistent with the flight-to-quality phenomenon (Acharya and Pedersen 
2005; Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009) in which adverse liquidity shocks 
force investors to sell off assets that are associated with higher uncertainty, 
asymmetric information and trading costs, leading to decline in asset prices. 
Banerjee et al. (2007) argue that during periods of low market liquidity, the 
demand of investors for dividend-paying stocks, and thus the value of such 
stocks relative to non-paying stocks, is higher.  
1.2.3. Dividend policy, stock price informativeness and stock liquidity 
In the third empirical chapter (Chapter 5), we investigate the relationship 
between amount of dividend paid and stock price informativeness and how 
stock liquidity affects this relationship. Existing literature provides extensive 
evidence on the link between stock prices and managerial corporate 
decisions (Durnev et al. 2004; Luo 2005; Chen et al. 2007a; Bakke and 
Whited 2010; Frésard 2012; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 2016). This evidence has 
motivated us to test the impact of stock price informativeness on dividend 
decisions. This chapter argues that stock price informativeness may impact 
dividend payments in two ways. First, stock prices contain information about 
future investment and growth opportunities, discount rates and financing 
opportunities, which may affect dividend decisions (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller 
and Rock 1985; Fama and French 2001; Nissim and Ziv 2001; Grullon et al. 
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2002; Hoberg and Prabhala 2009; Abor and Bokpin 2010; Wang 2010; 
Ardestani et al. 2013). It is predicted that at a high level of stock price 
informativeness, firm managers are less likely to distribute a high level of 
dividend payments to provide positive signals about firms’ prospects and 
future cash flows as investors are already well informed. Second, more 
informative stock prices are associated with better monitoring of managers 
(Holmström and Tirole 1993; Ferreira et al. 2011; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 
2016), hence reducing the agency costs between managers and investors. 
Consequently, the role of dividends in controlling agency costs is reduced, 
leading to a decrease in dividends (Liu 2002; Jiraporn and Ning 2006; Chae 
et al. 2009; Esqueda 2016). Overall, a negative relationship between stock 
price informativeness and dividend payments is predicted. 
This chapter contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, while 
existing studies have identified several determinants of dividend policy, little 
attention has been paid to whether and how capital markets affect dividend 
policy. This chapter contributes to the literature by adding stock price 
informativeness to the list of the determinants of dividend policy. Second, 
some existing studies highlight the existence of an informative feedback 
going from the stock market to different corporate decisions, such as 
investments (Chen et al. 2007a; Bakke and Whited 2010), cash savings 
(Frésard 2012) mergers and acquisitions (Luo 2005), and labour investments 
(Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 2016). This chapter adds to this research by 
investigating whether managers’ decisions regarding the amount of 
dividends are influenced by the information content of prices. Recently, De 
Cesari and Huang-Meier (2015) found that changes in quarterly dividends 
are positively related to abnormal returns and that this relationship is 
stronger when stock returns are more likely to convey new private 
information to managers. Our study differs from De Cesari and Huang-Meier 
(2015) in that their focus is on how the sensitivity of dividend changes to 
abnormal returns depends on the stock price informativeness. We, however, 
focus on the direct effect of stock price informativeness on dividend policy by 
studying its effects on amount of dividend paid. We propose that the content 
of stock price information affects firms’ choice of dividends as a signalling 
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device and as a monitoring mechanism. Based on the signalling model and 
agency costs model, we argue that the amount of information incorporated 
into prices affects firms’ choice of dividends as a signalling device and as a 
monitoring mechanism. This adds a new explanation for using payout 
policies for signalling purposes (Bernheim and Wantz 1995; DeAngelo et al. 
2000; Grullon et al. 2002; Hail et al. 2014) as well as contributing to the 
literature on the interaction between dividends and other monitoring 
mechanisms (Grinstein and Michaely 2005; Grullon and Michaely 2012; Al-
Najjar and Belghitar 2014; Hoberg et al. 2014; Chang et al. 2016). To the 
best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine whether dividends 
are affected by the level of stock price informativeness based on signalling 
and agency models.  
Finally, we argue that stock liquidity may play a role in the impact of stock 
price informativeness on dividend amount. More specifically, the association 
between stock price informativeness and amount of dividends is likely to be 
stronger in illiquid firms. Our argument is motivated by the evidence of the 
greater importance of dividends for firms with illiquid stocks than liquid 
stocks. Firms with illiquid stocks are more likely to pay dividends than liquid 
stocks (Banerjee et al. 2007; Kuo et al. 2013). Moreover, firms with illiquid 
stocks are associated with higher levels of asymmetric information (Welker 
1995; Richardson 2000), and hence the need for dividends to reduce it is 
more valuable in these firms. Therefore, we further contribute to the literature 
by examining the effect of stock liquidity on the price informativeness-
dividend relationship. 
We report a negative relationship between stock price informativeness and 
amount of dividend paid, suggesting that firm managers are more likely to 
maintain a relatively low level of dividends when stock price informativeness 
is high because investors are already well informed of firms’ future cash 
flows and prospects. This finding also implies that given that more 
informative stock prices lead to a better monitoring of managers (Ferreira et 
al. 2011), managers are less likely to use dividends as a mechanism to 
reduce agency costs, leading to a lower dividend payment. We further find 
that the effect of price informativeness on dividends is only observed in small 
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firms, which is consistent with the argument based on the signalling model. 
Further, the negative relation price informativeness and dividends is only 
seen in firms with low growth and those with low leverage ratio, consistent 
with the argument based on the agency costs. 
We find that our results are robust to the use of alternative estimates of firm-
specific return variations as measures of stock price informativeness. Our 
finding also remains robust when we control for endogeneity issues resulting 
from unobservable heterogeneity, simultaneity and the possibility that the 
stock price informativeness is a function of dividends, as firms with high 
levels of dividend payments could have greater stock price informativeness. 
Actually, the result remains qualitatively unchanged when we use the firm 
fixed-effects model, change-in-variables approach and dynamic Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) model. 
We also address the role of stock liquidity in the relationship between stock 
price informativeness and amount of dividend paid. We find that the negative 
relationship between stock price informativeness and dividends is stronger 
for firms with illiquid stocks, confirming our conjecture that the effect of stock 
price informativeness on the role of dividends as an informational tool and a 
monitoring mechanism is stronger in firms that are exposed to more 
asymmetric information and trading frictions. 
1.3. Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides 
some background on dividend policy and stock liquidity. It discusses the 
main theories of dividend policy, defines liquidity, discusses its dimensions 
and explains its measures. Chapter 3, the first empirical chapter, examines 
the impact of the dividend policy on stock liquidity. Chapter 4, the second 
empirical chapter, investigates the effect of dividend policy on systematic 
liquidity risk. Chapter 5, the third empirical chapter, highlights the relationship 
between stock price informativeness and dividends and how stock liquidity 
can affect this relationship. Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Related Literature 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines some of the relevant literature on dividend policy and 
stock liquidity. Dividend policy represents one of the key financial decisions 
because of its direct connection to shareholders and its relationship with 
other major corporate decisions, such as financing and investment decisions. 
According to Lease et al. (2000), dividend policy refers to the practice that 
managers follow when making decisions about the size and pattern of cash 
distributions to shareholders regularly. The issue of dividends has captured 
the attention of finance researchers since the middle of the 20th century. 
Several theories have been developed to explain the dividend behaviour of 
firms. Nevertheless, dividend policy remains one of the most challenging 
issues in finance (Allen et al. 2000). Black (1976: 5) states that “…the harder 
we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces 
that just don’t fit together”. 
One of the seminal studies on dividend policy is that by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), who suggest that dividend policy is not vital because it has no impact 
on the value of the firm and hence does not affect shareholder wealth. Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) argue that firm value is determined solely by its 
earning power and its business risk and not on how the income is allocated 
between dividends, stock repurchases and retained earnings. They show 
that, in perfect capital markets, dividend policy is irrelevant and the firm value 
is independent of its payout policy. According to them, investors are 
indifferent between share repurchases and dividends as they can imitate any 
desirable payout either through selling holdings in the firms that don’t pay 
dividends or by reinvesting their dividends. Moreover, DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (2006) argue that the assumptions of Modigliani and Miller are 
perfectly proper for proving that dividing a given cash payout between 
dividends and repurchases is a matter of indifference in frictionless markets. 
While many researchers support this theory, others have suspicions about it. 
Several studies suggest that in a world of market imperfections, such as 
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transaction costs, taxes, and information asymmetries, dividend policy 
seems to be important for both managers and shareholders. For example, 
managers tend to show extra care in their payout decisions as the decision 
to distribute cash dividends determines the amount of funds available for 
managers to reinvest. For investors, dividends are not only a means of 
regular income, but dividend announcements can signal important 
information about firms’ future performance. Moreover, investors who want to 
sell their stocks will incur costs, while investors who hold dividend-paying 
stocks can meet their liquidity needs with less or no cost, and hence avoid 
trading frictions.  
Several studies investigate the reason why firms pay dividends and the 
potential effect of dividend policy on firm value. A large body of the empirical 
investigation focuses on the impact of dividend policy on stock prices, and 
consequently the extent of its contribution to achieve management’s optimal 
target of maximizing the market value of shares and thus maximizing 
shareholders’ wealth. Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevance theory, which 
claims that dividends do not impact share price, has been supported by 
several empirical studies, including that by Black and Scholes (1974), Miller 
(1986), and Bernstein (1996).  
Some researchers (e.g., Gordon 1963) suggest that dividends can increase 
firm value and shareholders wealth due to the “bird in the hand” hypothesis. 
According to this hypothesis, more certainty is attached to dividend 
payments received now, against earnings retained for investment in projects 
with future earnings that are not certain. Firms should, therefore, pay high 
dividends and offer high dividend yields to maximize their share. However, 
there are other theories such as the tax preference theory (Brennan 1970; 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 1979) which argues that, in the existence of 
market imperfections such uneven tax treatments, dividend payments can 
decrease firm value and result in negative consequences for shareholders 
wealth. Accordingly, firms should avoid or make low dividend payments if 
they want to maximize their share prices. 
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On the other hand, signalling theory (Bhattacharya 1979; John and Williams 
1985; Miller and Rock 1985) and agency costs theory (Easterbrook 1984; 
Jensen 1986) suggest that increasing dividend payments increases share 
price. Consistent with the signalling argument, several studies show that 
stock prices exhibit a significant increase following announcements of 
dividend initiation or increase and significant decline subsequent to 
announcements of dividend elimination or cut (Aharony and Swary 1980; 
Abeyratna et al. 1996; Bali 2003; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 
2011). Several other studies show that dividend policy reduces the agency 
costs associated with separation of ownership and control (see, e.g., Rozeff 
1982; La Porta et al. 2000). 
Overall, existing evidence on the effect of dividend payments on firm value, 
and hence shareholders’ wealth, is mixed and inconclusive. The current 
study aims to contribute to the literature by identifying the potential channels 
through which dividends can affect shareholder wealth. Dividends could 
potentially affect firm value by affecting the trading environment of the firm's 
stock, namely by changing the information environment and the liquidity of 
the stock. Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) suggest that stock liquidity proxies for 
the quality of the firm’s information environment. In particular, any 
improvement in stock liquidity associated with dividend payment can be 
explained as a result of the decreased level of information asymmetry 
between firm managers and investors, as well as between different groups of 
investors after dividend payment. 
Liquidity is one of the characteristics of securities markets that firm managers 
are concerned about, because it has a marked impact on trading costs and 
shareholders’ required rate of return, which in turn affects the firm’s value 
(see, e.g., Baker and Pettit 1982; Wan 2001; Bilinski et al. 2012). Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) argue that since liquidity can increase value, firms are 
more likely to follow a corporate policy that makes their stocks more liquid. 
Since stock liquidity can have critical implications for several finance areas, 
including asset pricing, stock market performance, and, most importantly, 
corporate policies, many researchers study the issue of stock liquidity.  
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses 
the main theories of dividend policy. Section 2.3 defines the concept, the 
dimensions and the different measures of liquidity. Section 2.4 summarizes 
and concludes. 
 
2.2. Theories of dividend policy 
A wide range of theories have been developed to explain the issue of 
dividend policy. These include dividend irrelevance theory, the information 
content of dividends (signalling), agency-cost hypothesis, clientele effect 
theory, and the life cycle theory.7 
2.2.1. Irrelevance theory 
Irrelevance theory stems from a study by Miller and Modigliani (1961), who 
argue that dividend policy does not affect a firm’s cash flows or its cost of 
capital. This argument is based on the assumptions of perfect capital 
markets and rational investors, which can be summarized as follows: (1) 
there are no tax differences between dividends and capital gains; (2) there 
are no flotation and transaction costs when securities are traded; (3) 
information is symmetrical and costless (i.e., all market participants have free 
and equal access to the same information); (4) there is no conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders, and hence no agency costs; and (5) 
all market participants are price takers.8  
According to the irrelevance theory, each dollar distributed to shareholders 
represents a capital loss of a dollar, and hence more external financing is 
required to finance future projects with net present value. Accordingly, firm 
value is affected by investment policies, rather than financing policies.  Miller 
and Modigliani (1961: 414) state that “…given a firm’s investment policy, the 
dividend payout policy it chooses to follow will affect neither the current price 
                                                             
7 In this thesis, dividend policy is considered as a policy that involves making decisions 
regarding distributing the firm’s profits to investors in the form of cash dividends or keeping 
them in the firm for investments. Therefore, all the literature discussed in this section is 
related to cash dividends relative to retained earnings. 
8 “Price takers” refers to the fact that no buyer or seller (or issuer) of securities is large 
enough for their transactions to have an appreciable impact on the currently ruling price 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961). 
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of its shares nor the total returns to shareholders”. They also argue that all 
dividend policies are in fact the same to all investors, since the latter can 
build “homemade” dividends by changing their portfolios in a manner that 
matches their preferences. Consequently, shareholders would be indifferent 
between dividends and capital gains as the value of their wealth is only 
influenced by the income generated by the investment decisions, and not by 
how this income is distributed (Black and Scholes 1974; Miller 1986; 
Bernstein 1996). 
A number of empirical studies provide support for the dividend irrelevance 
theory. For example, Black and Scholes (1974) study the effect of dividend 
policy on stock prices by investigating the relationship between dividend yield 
and stock returns. They create 25 portfolios of stocks listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and use the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) to 
examine the dividend yield effects. They find that dividend increase does not 
have a permanent impact on stock prices. They attribute the temporary 
changes in prices following dividend changes to investors’ believes that the 
change in dividend is an indication of a shift in future earnings. They 
conclude that neither high-yield nor low-yield dividend policies influence 
stock prices. Hess (1982), Miller and Scholes (1982), and Bernstein (1996) 
provide evidence to support the irrelevance theory of dividends, and confirm 
that dividend policy has no effect on the firm’s stock price. Moreover, Miller 
and Rock (1985) argue that dividends are a tool for signalling information on 
earnings to the market, and, consequently, the price reaction to dividend 
changes is actually a reaction to earnings, rather than dividends. 
However, other researchers provide evidence that challenge the irrelevance 
argument. For example, Ball et al. (1979) examine the effect of dividend 
policy on firm value in Australia over the period 1960 to 1969, and do not find 
any evidence to support Miller and Modigliani’s irrelevance theory. However, 
they find a significant relationship between stock returns and dividend yield in 
the year following dividend payment. Using a survey of chief financial officers 
of 562 US firms listed on the NYSE, and based on 318 responses, Baker et 
al. (1985) provide evidence that a firm’s dividend policy does indeed 
influence its stock price. In a similar study, Baker and Powell (1999) survey 
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603 CFOs of firms listed on the NYSE. Based on 198 responses, they find 
that 90% of respondents believe that dividend policy has an impact on firm 
value. Using a sample of US banks, Siddiqi (1995) and Casey and Dickens 
(2000) also show that dividend policy is an important determinant of firm 
value. 
2.2.2. Asymmetric information (signalling) theory 
In Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) irrelevance hypothesis on the effect of 
dividend policy on firm value, one of their main assumptions is that all 
investors have the same perspective regarding the firm. In other words, they 
assume that all investors possess the same information about the firm and 
are able to understand and translate this information in the same way, as 
well as managers and investors have the same information and, hence the 
same expectations, about the firm. In real markets, however, asymmetric 
information between market participants exists and investors and managers 
have different information and expectations about the firm’s future profitability 
and risk. Moreover, managers are likely to possess better information about 
the firm’s future performance than outside investors. Since managers can 
access information that may not be available to outsides, they may use 
dividend policy as a means to convey such information to investors (e.g., 
Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985; Bali 2003). Therefore, dividend 
policy can affect firm value by decreasing the information gap between 
managers and investors. 
The theory of asymmetric information was first developed in the beginning of 
the 1970s, and was applied to the field of finance in the 1980s. The 
developers of this theory are Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973), and Stiglitz 
(1975), who were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics science in 2001 for 
their research on information asymmetry. Akerlof (1970) investigate the cost 
of information asymmetry using the used-car market as a pooling equilibrium 
in the absence of signalling activities. Spence (1973) focuses on the labour 
market and carries out a formal partial equilibrium analysis of market 
signalling. Spence’s signalling model has been used extensively by others to 
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test different economic and finance issues, and has become one of the main 
theories of dividend policy.  
Bhattacharya (1979) argues that managers use dividends as a mechanism to 
convey information about their firms’ future prospects to the market. 
Specifically, he structures a two-period signalling model and assumes that 
under conditions in which outsider investors have imperfect information 
about firms’ profitability, any change in dividends conveys information on 
managers’ views of firm’s future prospects to the market. According to 
Bhattacharya’s  two-period model, at the beginning of the first period, the firm 
announces that it will pay dividends at the end of this stage based on 
manager’s confidence in the coming investment. However, when 
investments cannot realize the expected returns to cover the announced 
dividend payments, the firm is forced to generate external finances to meet 
the dividend payments. After paying dividends, part of the ownership will be 
transferred to new shareholders, who receive the firm’s payoffs generated at 
the end of the second period. Since the issuance of new securities can be 
costly, firms with low profitable investment opportunities would face higher 
financing costs for the same level of dividend payments. Moreover, the 
transaction costs of issuing new stocks discourage low-quality firms from 
replicating the dividend policy of high-quality firms. Bhattacharya (1979) 
argues that dividend payment is a costly signal, and hence only good firms 
can afford to announce them. Therefore, firms with negative future prospects 
cannot use dividends as a signal, and investors pay a higher tax associated 
with dividends because they believe that higher dividends put a premium on 
the value of a firm that is entirely equity-financed, while the advantages of 
dividends exceed their tax disadvantage.  
Building on Bhattacharya (1979) work, Talmor (1981) develops a multi-period 
signalling model in which different valuation parameters are employed. He 
argues that dividend policy is only one of the financial decisions that 
managers must make, and each of these decisions can serve as a signalling 
device. Talmor’s (1981) model assumes that in each period, different 
financial decisions are determined simultaneously by taking into 
consideration their impact on firm value. Hakansson (1982) adds to the 
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model of dividend signalling by suggesting three mutually exclusive 
conditions under which dividend policy is proven to be informative: (1) 
heterogeneous beliefs among investors, (2) an incomplete financial market, 
and (3) non-time additive utility.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) assume that insiders have better information than 
outsider regarding the firm’s future prospects and can transmit this 
information to outsiders through unexpected changes in dividend policy. 
Miller and Rock (1985) propose a two-period signalling model in which they 
assume that firm’s managers have more information about the position of the 
firm than shareholders do. In this model, at the beginning of the first period, 
the firm invests in a project whose profitability cannot be observed by 
outsider investors. At the end of the first period, the project generates 
earnings that the firm uses to finance its dividend payments and its new 
investments. The assumptions of this model state that the announcements of 
financial changes such as earnings, dividends, and so on are mutually 
related, suggesting that both dividend payments and financing are opposing 
sides of the same topic. They state that the unexpected changes in earnings 
have the same impact on firm value as the unexpected changes in dividends. 
Furthermore, the current pattern of dividend payment, not the dividend itself, 
is the basis of future earnings expectations of the market. Unlike 
Bhattacharya's  (1979) model, in which the transaction costs of issuing new 
stock is the cost of signalling, Miller and Rock (1985) suggest that the cost of 
signalling is the cost of foregoing investments, since paying dividends uses 
the cash that could be used instead for investments. Ambarish et al. (1987) 
further analyze the signalling model of dividends and argue that the 
signalling cost can be reduced through an efficient mix of different signal 
instruments, such as dividends announcements, earnings announcements, 
share buybacks, investment announcements, and equity issues. According 
to this model, there is a trade-off between different signalling devices. For 
instance, the dividend payment should not be used as a signal, since the 
cost of paying dividends is higher than the cost of earning announcements. 
Myers (1977) suggests that the announcement of dividend payments is a 
signal of managers’ expectations about future earnings compared with 
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earnings announcements, and thus the market is more likely to translate 
dividends announcements, rather than earnings announcements, as an 
efficient signal. 
John and Williams (1985) develop another signalling model in an adverse 
environment in which dividends are taxable. They indicate that under some 
conditions – for example, if the current shareholders are selling their holdings 
to meet personal liquidity needs – the market may value a firm’s shares 
below its intrinsic value. However, in order to reduce this under-valuation, 
managers pay larger dividends to their shareholders as a credible signal 
when other firms, whose future prospects are not as good, cannot imitate the 
dividend behaviour of undervalued firms. John and Williams (1985) argue 
that payment of larger dividends is taken as favourable inside information by 
the market; thus, investors prefer to buy the shares of firms distributing larger 
dividends at higher share prices. On the other hand, firms with less 
favourable inside information – i.e., non-dividend-paying firms – should 
experience negative price reactions. The model proposes that increased 
shareholder tax costs that arise from receiving higher dividends are offset by 
the increase in firm value. Allen et al. (2000) contribute to the signalling 
model of dividends by assuming that institutional investors will choose the 
stocks of dividend-paying firms because of the tax advantage of dividends. 
They argue that high-quality firms tend to pay dividends in order to attract 
institutional investors who are better informed and are more likely to reveal 
the quality of the firm. On the other hand, low-quality firms avoid paying 
dividends because they do not like the value of their firm to be revealed by 
institutional investors. Therefore, dividend policy can help high-quality firms 
to adjust their ownership structure and improve their information 
environment. 
The signalling role of dividends has been empirically tested mainly by 
investigating (1) whether dividend change announcements lead share prices 
to move in the same direction, and (2) whether dividend change 
announcements allow the market to expect future earnings. These two 
issues have been studied extensively, but the results have been mixed and 
inconclusive. 
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 Dividend announcements and price reactions 
 
Many early studies provide support for the signalling hypothesis that the 
information content of dividends is reflected in stock price movements, as the 
announcement of dividend increases (decreases) is associated with 
significant price increases (decreases). For example, Charest (1978) finds 
that dividend increases announcements generate excess returns of about 
1%. Asquith and Mullins (1983) report a significantly positive excess return  
on and immediately after the announcement of dividend initiations. Similar 
results are reported by other studies, including those by Healy and Palepu 
(1988), who find a two-day excess return of 3.9%, and Michaely et al. (1995), 
who find a three-day excess return of 3.4%. In a similar vein, Bali (2003) 
examines the stock price reaction to dividend increases and dividend cuts, 
and reports an average 1.17% abnormal return following dividend increases 
and average abnormal return of -5.87% in the periods following dividend 
cuts, consistent with the predictions of the signalling hypothesis. Brav et al. 
(2005) survey and interview a large number of executives of US firms and 
find that 80% of executives believe that the dividend decision conveys 
information to investors.  
However, the significance of dividends as a signalling device seems to vary 
considerably across markets. For example, Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
find that the impact of dividends as a signalling means in Japan is 
significantly lower compared to that of the USA. Dewenter and Warther 
(1998) conclude that Japanese firms are subject to less information 
asymmetry compared to US firms, and they attribute these differences to the 
differences in the structures of corporate governance between Japan and the 
USA. McCluskey et al. (2006) investigate how the Irish stock market 
responds to company announcements about dividend payments. They report 
significant abnormal returns following the announcements of increases or no 
changes in dividends, and insignificant abnormal returns subsequent to 
dividend cuts. Positive (negative) reactions to dividend increases 
(decreases) are reported by Bozos et al. (2011), Dasilas and Leventis 
(2011), Al-Yahyaee et al. (2011), and Kumar and Raju (2013) in the contexts 
of the UK, Greek, Omani, and Indian stock markets, respectively. 
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Nevertheless, some studies provide no support for the signalling hypothesis. 
For example, Bernhardt et al. (2005) use a sample of US firms that were 
listed on the NYSE during the period 1962–1996 and show that the 
information content of dividends is not positively related to the marginal cost 
of dividends, as suggested by the signalling theory, while the excess returns 
are more strongly related to the tax regime. An insignificant relationship 
between dividend announcements and share prices is also found by Ali and 
Chowdhury (2010), who examine stock price reactions of 25 listed private 
commercial banks in Bangladesh surrounding 44 days of the dividend 
announcement dates. They apply the standard Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
event study methodology and reveal that stock price reactions to dividend 
announcement are not statistically significant. 
 Dividend announcements and future earnings 
 
Several studies investigate whether dividend changes are reliable signals of 
the future earnings of a firm. However, no significant evidence has been 
found. For example, DeAngelo et al. (1996) examine a sample of 145 firms’ 
annual earnings growth and find that there is no significant evidence of 
dividend signalling for future earnings. Their test focuses on the dividend 
decision in year zero, which could convey information to outside investors 
and thereby help the market to predict the earnings. The results show that 
dividend changes are not helpful in predicting future earnings. Moreover, 
firms that increase dividends do not exhibit any positive earnings in following 
years, and that their earnings performance is not better than that of firms that 
do not change their dividends.  
Similarly, Benartzi et al. (1997) and Grullon et al. (2002) find no significant 
evidence that dividend changes convey information about future earnings. 
Benartzi et al. (1997) show that earnings increase in the two years following 
the dividend cut, and that dividend omissions are followed by earnings 
increases, which is in counter to the signalling hypothesis. Benartzi et al. 
(1997) also find that firms that increase dividends tend to have a lower 
decrease in future earnings compared to those that do not. However, they 
find that dividend changes are strongly related to contemporaneous and 
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lagged earnings changes. Overall, Benartzi et al. (1997) results represent a 
real challenge to the signalling hypothesis. 
Grullon et al. (2002) examine the signalling hypothesis of dividends and find 
inconsistent results. They use a sample of firms that change their dividends 
by more than 10%, and show that the level of firms’ profitability declines in 
the years following announcements of dividend increases. However, Nissim 
and Ziv (2001) provide support for the signalling hypothesis and find that 
dividend changes are positively correlated with earnings changes over a 
period of two years following the dividend change while adjusting normal 
earnings for mean reversion in reported profits. Nevertheless, their results 
differ for dividend increases vs. decreases. After controlling for current and 
expected profitability, Nissim and Ziv (2001) find no association between 
dividend decreases and future profitability, and they assume that this result is 
due to accounting conservatism. 
Grullon et al. (2005) disagree with Nissim and Ziv (2001) in relation to 
controlling for an incorrect linear form of the mean reversion in earnings, as it 
can result in a spurious positive correlation between dividend changes and 
future earnings changes. Therefore, Grullon et al. (2005) adapt Nissim and 
Ziv’s (2001) regression model by incorporating a nonlinear earnings process. 
Grullon et al. (2005) show that when the partial adjustment model of Fama 
and French (2000) is used to estimate normal earnings, rather than the mean 
aversion model used by Nissim and Ziv (2001), dividend payments are not 
reliable signals of future earnings, showing no support for the information 
content of dividends about earnings prospects. On the other hand, more 
recently, applying both Nissim and Ziv’s (2001) linear and Grullon et al.’s 
nonlinear models to the dividend events of UK and US firms, Braggion and 
Moore (2011) and Liu and Chen (2015), respectively, find strong support for 
the information content of dividends under both models.  
To sum up, many studies test the signalling theory of dividend policy by 
empirically examining the informational content of dividend changes. Studies 
on the price reaction to dividend changes provide strong support for the 
28 
 
signalling hypothesis, while those on earnings changes following dividend 
changes provide contradictory evidence to signalling theory.  
2.2.3. Agency costs model 
In corporations, the two sides engaged in a contract may have different goals 
and different levels of information. This is called the agent–principal model, 
and represents the basis of agency models that have been the essence of 
the corporate finance literature since the pioneering work of Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984), and Jensen (1986). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976: 308) describe the agency relationship as “a contract under 
which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent”. The main problem with the 
agency relationship is the separation of ownership and control, which results 
in agency costs that are mainly caused by two factors: information 
asymmetry (the agent tends to have more information) and conflicts of 
interest between the principal and the agent. In such a relationship, the 
principal cannot guarantee that the agent is always acting in their best 
interest, mostly when the actions of the agent are costly for the principal to 
observe and when the activities that are valuable to the principal are costly 
for the agent to carry out. To manage these agency costs, a variety of tools 
may be used, including dividend policy. Several studies suggest that paying 
dividends can serve as a tool to decrease agency costs that arise from the 
separation of ownership and control (Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984; Chen 
et al. 2007b; John et al. 2011).  
According to the agency costs model, managers are likely to exploit their 
superior information and take actions that increase their utilities at the 
expense of shareholders, resulting in agency costs. Therefore, dividend 
policy can be used as a mechanism to reduce these agency costs by paying 
the firm's excess cash to shareholders. Rozeff (1982) argues that the 
payment of dividends decreases the amount of cash in the hands of 
managers, which will force them to use external funds to finance the firm’s 
investment projects. This action is favourable to shareholders since it puts 
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the firm under the additional control of external fund providers. Rozeff (1982) 
also suggests that the new capital providers will not provide funds unless 
they get information about the potential use of those funds. Consequently, 
shareholders may also receive additional information, and, hence, the 
degree of information asymmetry will be reduced (Howe and Lin 1992). 
Furthermore, Easterbrook (1984) claims that dividends can have a crucial 
role in decreasing agency problems between owners and managers. He 
argues that the payment of dividends and the subsequent raising of external 
funds result in monitoring of the firm by capital market participants such as 
investment banks, financial regulators, and potential investors. This 
monitoring reduces agency costs and thus increases firm value.  
Jensen (1986) free cash flow theory argues that free cash flow can be used 
to reduce agency costs. Free cash flows are those left in the firm after 
financing all the investments with positive net present value, and which 
managers may utilize to invest in non-profitable projects. Jensen suggests 
that the conflict between shareholders and managers increases in firms with 
free cash flows. Firms can reduce the free cash flows available to managers, 
either by paying dividends or increasing the level of debt, and hence 
obligating the firm to pay debt interest. 
Several empirical studies investigate the extent to which agency theory can 
explain dividend policy. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that higher 
managerial ownership may lead to mitigating the cost associated with the 
separation between ownership and control. The greater fraction of shares 
held by managers means that non-value-maximizing actions are 
unfavourable to managers. Therefore, managerial ownership aligns the 
interest of both managers and outside investors. Rozeff (1982) was one of 
the first to test the agency costs theory using a large sample of US firms. He 
argues that the optimal dividend payout can be achieved once the sum of 
transaction costs and agency costs are minimized. He uses two proxies for 
agency costs, namely the percentage of common stock held by insiders and 
the number of shareholders. He argues that dividend payout ratio should be 
negatively related to the percentage of stock held by insiders (insider 
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ownership), but positively related to the number of shareholders (dispersion 
of ownership). Rozeff (1982) provides empirical support for the agency costs 
hypothesis and shows that the agency costs variables are significantly 
related to the payout ratio. Dempsey and Laber (1992) replicate the work of 
Rozeff (1982) and provide consistent findings. Alli et al. (1993) find that the 
ownership dispersion factor is insignificant related to dividend decision, while 
the insider ownership variable remains significantly and negatively related to 
dividend payouts. 
Easterbrook (1984) and Stulz (1990) present support for the agency theory 
by showing that the payment of dividends exposes firms to the possible need 
to visit capital markets in the future to get external funds, and therefore gives 
outside investors an opportunity to have some control over insiders. Agrawal 
and Jayaraman (1994) and Mahadwartha (2007) argue that dividends and 
managerial ownership can be substitutes, and hence negatively related, if 
the main reason for paying dividends is to overcome the agency problem. 
Many empirical studies, including those of Dempsey and Laber (1992), 
Espen and Verma (1994), and Collins et al. (1996), report a negative 
association between managerial ownership and dividend payouts. However, 
Casey and Dickens (2000) replicate the work of Rozeff (1982) on a sample 
of US firms over the period 1982–1992, and find that insider ownership is not 
significantly related to dividends. Similarly, Hu and Kumar (2004) show that 
managerial ownership does not affect dividend payout ratio once firm size is 
added into the model. Grullon et al. (2002) find that dividend increases tend 
to be followed by decline in capital expenditures, suggesting that firms that 
increase dividends reach maturity as they experience a decline in investment 
opportunity. Al-Malkawi (2007) finds strong evidence to support the agency 
cost hypothesis in an emerging market. He examines a panel dataset of all 
public firms listed on the Amman Stock Exchange between 1989 and 2000, 
and finds that the percentages of stocks held by insiders and state ownership 
significantly affect the amount of dividends paid. Similarly, La Porta et al. 
(2000) use a sample of more than 4,000 firms from 33 countries and show 
that dividends are used as a tool to alleviate the conflict between insiders 
and outsiders. They find that firms operating in countries where investor 
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protection is typically better make higher dividend payouts than do firms in 
countries where investor protection is low.  
Another strand of studies on the agency costs model of dividends suggests a 
positive relationship between large shareholder ownership and dividend 
payments. It is argued that large investors tend to prefer dividends to capital 
gains because of the tax advantage on dividends. Specifically, low-tax 
investors are more likely to invest in dividend-paying stocks compared to 
high-tax investors. Allen et al. (2000) argue that firms pay dividends with the 
aim of attracting large and well-informed investors (e.g., institutions) who 
have a lower tax rate and tend to have more ability to control managerial 
activities. As a result, a higher percentage of institutional shareholding 
means better monitoring of management, which reduces agency costs and 
increases firm value (Chang et al. 2016). Espen and Verma (1994) show a 
significant positive effect of both institutional shareholders and managers 
ownerships on dividend policy. Moreover, using a sample of UK firms 
covering the period from 1988 to 1992, Short et al. (2002) show a significant 
positive relationship between dividend policy and institutional ownership. 
Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007) find that the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors increases as dividends increase. Similarly, Crane et al. 
(2016) suggest that higher overall institutional ownership causes firms to pay 
more dividends.   
However, Hu and Kumar (2004) find that the probability of paying dividends 
and dividend yields are negatively related to the percentage of shares owned 
by the largest outside shareholders. Jain (2007) also presents evidence that 
institutional investors are more likely to hold non-dividend-paying stocks or 
low-dividend-paying stocks, whereas non-institutional investors tend to hold 
high-dividend-paying stocks. Karpavicius and Yu (2012) examine the impact 
of institutional ownership on dividends and show that an increase (decrease) 
in institutional ownership results in a lower (higher) dividend yield. Firth et al. 
(2016) find that institutional investors, such as banks, insurance companies, 
and securities companies do not have any effect on firms’ cash dividend 
payments. 
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In brief, the separation of management from ownership leads to agency 
costs including asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders. These agency costs can be decreased through 
dividend policy, which can serve as a way of monitoring and controlling 
managers’ performance. By increasing cash dividends, the firm can be 
forced to use external funding. Such an action causes managers to be under 
the monitoring of the capital market, and this capital market monitoring can 
decrease agency costs and lead to an increase in the market value of the 
firm. In addition, the increasing cash dividends lead to a withdrawal of cash 
from the control of managers, which reduces the likelihood of misuse of 
funds by investing in negative net present value projects, which may affect 
shareholders’ wealth. If the firm has not paid dividends, this will open the 
door for its managers to adopt policies that may not be in the stockholders' 
interest (DeAngelo et al. 2004). 
2.2.4. Clientele effect theory  
Shareholders face different tax treatments for dividend income and capital 
gains, which may create shareholders clienteles. These clienteles will be 
attracted to firms which follow dividend policies that best match their 
preferences. For example, investors in low tax brackets who depend on fixed 
income are more likely to be attracted to firms that pay high dividends. 
Additionally, institutional investors tend to be attracted to high-dividend 
stocks (see, e.g., Han et al. 1999; Dhaliwal et al. 1999; Short et al. 2002). 
However, investors in relatively high tax brackets might find it valuable to 
invest in firms that keep most of their income in order to obtain potential 
capital gains.  
Allen et al. (2000) argue that clienteles consisting of institutional investors 
tend to be attracted to dividend-paying firms due to their relative tax 
advantages over individual investors. Similarly, high-quality firms have a 
preference to attract institutional clienteles (through paying dividends) 
because institutions are better informed than retail investors, and have more 
ability to monitor or detect firm quality.  
33 
 
A large body of empirical research examines the clientele effects of dividend 
policy. Elton and Gruber (1970) examine the share price movement around 
the ex-dividend day and find that share prices fall by less than the amount of 
the dividend on ex-dividend days. They argue that tax differences induce a 
preference for capital gains compared to dividends, which supports the tax 
clientele hypothesis that investors in high (low) tax brackets invest in low- 
(high-) dividend-yield stocks. Pettit (1977) also shows that investor age has a 
significant positive relationship with portfolios’ dividend yield, but investors’ 
income has a negative relationship with dividend yield. He argues that 
elderly, low-income investors are more likely to invest in high-dividend stocks 
because they depend more on their portfolios to finance their current 
consumption, and avoid the transaction costs associated with selling stocks. 
Dhaliwal et al. (1999) test the changes in institutional shareholdings after 
dividend initiations. They use a sample of 133 dividend-initiating firms from 
1982 to 1995 and show that 80% of the sample firms experience a significant 
increase in institutional shareholders after dividend initiation. They argue that 
their results are driven by the strong influence of the tax-clientele effect on 
investors’ decisions. Graham and Kumar (2006) investigate the stock 
holdings and trading behaviour of more than 60,000 households. They find 
that retail investor stock holdings indicate a preference for dividend yield that 
increases with age and decreases with income. They also find that older, 
low-income investors disproportionally purchase stocks before the ex-
dividend day. Furthermore, among small stocks, the reduction in ex-day price 
decreases with age and increases with income, consistent with clientele 
effects. Brav et al. (2005) document that financial executives tend to be 
hesitant in making big changes to payout policy, as such changes might 
modify a firm’s investor base and adversely impact its stock price.  
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007) find that 
institutions overweight their portfolios with dividend-paying stocks. Hotchkiss 
and Lawrence (2007) find that institutional investors appear to have different 
“dividend clienteles” as some institutions steadily hold stocks with high 
dividends. Once firms declare changes in their dividend policy, dividend 
increases (decreases) are associated with increased (decreased) holdings 
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by institutions that seem to have a preference to dividends based on their 
prior portfolio. Desai and Jin (2011) analyze a panel of firms matched with 
the tax characteristics of their institutional shareholders and find that 
“dividend-averse” institutions have significantly low tendency to hold shares 
in firms with larger dividend payouts. This relation between the firm payout 
policy and the tax preferences of institutional shareholders may indicate that 
dividend-averse institutions are attracted to low-dividend-paying firms, or 
managers adjusting their payout policies to the interests of their institutional 
shareholders. Recently, Dahlquist et al. (2014) found that investment funds 
that face a higher effective tax rate on dividend income than on capital gains 
tilt their portfolios away from dividend-paying stocks.  
2.2.5. The life cycle theory 
The life cycle theory was first proposed by Mueller (1972). It states that each 
firm has its own life cycle. The start-up stage tends to be difficult for new 
firms, in which the limited resources have to be invested in product 
development and marketing. Following the start-up stage, the firm will enter 
into a high-growth stage in which its customer base increases, as well as its 
market potentials. After the growth stage, firms will reach a maturity stage 
during which the growth rate declines and the investment opportunities 
decrease.  
The characteristics of firms differ over their life cycle, and dividend policies at 
different stages are correspondingly adjusted by managers. In the early 
stages, a new firm tends to have many growth opportunities, but its 
profitability is rather low and unstable. Moreover, the information asymmetry 
level of new firms is often high, and thus their cost of capital tends to be 
relatively high. Therefore, it might be best for a new firm to retain its 
earnings, rather than distribute them to shareholders. However, when the 
firm reaches the maturity stage, its investment opportunities begin to 
decrease, such that its growth rate and systematic risk decline. 
Nevertheless, mature firms are commonly associated with high earnings, and 
are therefore more likely to distribute cash dividends to shareholders. 
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The life cycle explanation of dividends has also been extensively tested in 
the literature (see, e.g., Fama and French 2001; Grullon et al. 2002; 
DeAngelo et al. 2006). Fama and French (2001) analyze the dividend 
policies of US firms and suggest that the decline in the percentage of 
dividend-paying firms is to some extent a result of the increasing number of 
small, low-profit, and high-growth firms. This is in line with the life cycle 
theory that firms in the start-up stage are reluctant to distribute dividends. 
Based on the differences between high-growth firms and mature firms, 
Grullon et al. (2002) provide evidence that the systematic risk declines 
(increases) following dividend increases (decreases). Using a large sample 
of 7,642 dividend change announcements between 1967 and 1993, they find 
that the increase in stock prices after dividend increase is an indication that 
investors recognize dividend-increasing firms as those with lower systematic 
risk. Following these findings, Grullon et al. (2002) propose the maturity 
hypothesis, which posits that a firm tends to increase dividends as it moves 
to a more mature phase, during which its investment opportunities decline, 
leading to an increase in the firm’s free cash flows. A mature firm then pays 
out these free cash flows in the form of dividends. Consistent with the results 
of Grullon et al. (2002), Eije et al. (2014) examine the influence on firm risks 
of a sample of US firms that initiate or omit dividends over the period 1972–
2012. They find that firms’ aggregate systematic risk, measured as the 
aggregation of the three risk factors posited by Fama and French (1993), 
significantly declines (increases) after cash dividend initiations (omissions), 
which supports the life cycle maturity hypothesis. 
DeAngelo et al. (2006) provide further support for the life cycle theory of 
dividend policy by using a mix of earned/contributed capital as a measure for 
the maturity of a firm. They find a significant relationship between the 
decision to pay dividends and the earned/contributed capital mix after 
controlling for profitability, growth, firm size, total equity, cash balances, and 
dividend history. Moreover, they show that this relationship holds for both the 
initiations and omissions of dividends. Similarly, Denis and Osobov (2008) 
test the dividend policy of firms at an international level involving six 
economies: US, UK, Japan, Canada, Germany, and France. They find that 
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the decline in the tendency to pay dividends is strongly explained by the mix 
of earned/contributed capital. Coulton and Ruddock (2011) examine whether 
the life cycle theory explains the variation in payouts of Australian firms, and 
find strong evidence that the probability that a firm pays dividends increases 
in proportion with the retained earnings of its capital structure. Firms with a 
relatively low proportion of retained earnings are likely to be in growth or 
capital-infusion stages, while firms with a high proportion of retained earnings 
are likely to be more mature, and can generate cash but have fewer growth 
opportunities, and are therefore good candidates to pay dividends. More 
recently, Banyi and Kahle (2014) examine the life cycle theory of dividends 
and find a positive relation between earned/contributed capital and the 
fraction of US firms that pay dividends.  
In summary, the life cycle theory argues that changes in dividends is an 
indication of the changes in growth opportunity and free cash flows (Fama 
and French 2001; Grullon et al. 2002; DeAngelo et al. 2006). In the early 
stages of their life cycles, firms are more likely to reinvest in profitable 
projects, rather than distribute dividend payments. However, as firms reach 
matures stages in terms of profitability and growth opportunities, they tend to 
pay dividends. Generally, the empirical evidence is in line with the 
predictions of the firm life cycle theory of dividends. 
2.2.6. Summary of the dividend policy literature 
The extant finance literature has put a great deal of effort into understanding 
dividend policies, and this has led to the development of several theories. 
However, after several decades of investigation, no general consensus has 
arisen, and dividend policy remains a puzzle. In the perfect capital market 
outlined by Miller and Modigliani (1961), the value of a firm is independent of 
its dividend policy. However, various market imperfections exist, including 
information asymmetry, and this source of market imperfection has provided 
the basis for the development of various models of dividend policy, including 
signalling and agency models. The main argument of these models is that 
the different market participants (investors and managers) tend to have 
distinct information about the firm’s future prospects. With regard to the 
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signalling model, dividend policy is used as tool to convey information about 
the firm’s performance to the market. In the agency model, on the other 
hand, the dividend policy is used as a tool to reduce the information costs 
associated with the separation of management and control. In both models, 
any changes in dividend policy will affect the information gap between the 
market participants; hence, the market value of the firm will be affected. 
2.3. Stock liquidity 
Liquidity is a key characteristic of financial markets. It is a multi-dimensional 
phenomenon that reflects different interdependent dimensions, such as 
frequency of trade, volume of trading, and market depth (Sarr et al. 2002; Liu 
2006). Previous literature focuses on the liquidity of individual stock and the 
impact on its return (see, e.g., Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Eleswarapu 
1997; Chalmers and Kadlec 1998; Datar et al. 1998). However, in the last 
decade, aggregate market liquidity has been the focus of many researchers 
(Chordia et al. 2000; Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Liu 2006). Given its 
importance for the functioning of the financial markets and for the economy 
as a whole, the behaviour and determinants of stock liquidity have been the 
main concern for investors, businesses, financial regulators, and policy 
makers. 
Understanding the determinants and possible effects of stock liquidity is 
important for several reasons. First, liquidity is a main function of the market, 
as investors who enter the market either supply or demand liquidity. Second, 
market liquidity is an important factor influencing both the individual stock 
return and the aggregate market return. Third, changes in market liquidity 
could lead to financial crises. A recent study by Næs et al. (2011) regarding 
the most recent financial crises shows that the decrease in stock market 
liquidity is a sign of crisis in the real economy. 
2.3.1. Liquidity definitions and dimensions  
Over the years, while several definitions have been developed for liquidity, 
there is no consensus on a single one. The majority of previous studies 
define liquidity according to its dimensions or characteristics. Harris (2003) 
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refers to liquidity as the ability to trade in large quantity at low cost. According 
to Nahandi et al. (2012: 4956), liquidity of a security is “the possibility of 
selling it fast. The faster you can sell a security with low cost, the more 
capability of liquidity it is claimed to have. The securities being transacted 
daily and repetitively have more liquidity and lower risk.” Aitken and 
Comerton-Forde (2003) define liquidity as the ability to exchange securities 
into cash at the lowest cost. For Liu (2006), liquidity is the ability to trade 
large quantities quickly at low cost, with less price impact. Accordingly, 
liquidity is presented in three dimensions: time, price, and quantity. 
In spite of the ambiguous concept of stock liquidity, most of the liquidity 
literature defines it through its different dimensions. Kyle (1985) associates 
liquidity with four interdependent dimensions, as follows: 
1. Trading Time or Immediacy: This is the time needed to execute a 
transaction. The shorter the time required to trade a stock, the more 
liquid that stock is. Massimb and Phelps (1994: 41) define liquidity as 
the “market’s ability to provide immediate execution for an incoming 
market order (often called ‘immediacy’)”. The most common measures 
for trading time are the waiting time between subsequent trades or the 
inverse and the number of trades per time unit.  
 
2. Width or Tightness: This is the ability to trade immediately, without a 
large change in price (i.e. tightness shows the cost associated with 
trading, or the cost of immediacy). Kyle (1985: 1316) refers to 
tightness as “the cost of turning over position in a short period of 
time”. The common measures for tightness are the different versions 
of the spread (see, e.g., Engle and Lange 2001; Hasbrouck 2003). 
 
3. Depth: This represents the volume that can be traded by an investor 
without significant changes in prices. Kyle (1985: 1330) defines depth 
as “the ability of the market to absorb quantities without having a large 
effect on price”. There are many measures of depth, including the 
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number of shares traded, the number of transactions, and the different 
volume measures. 
 
4. Resiliency: This is the ability to buy or sell a certain amount of an 
asset with little influence on the quoted price. According to Harris 
(2003), it refers to how quickly prices return to original levels following 
changes in response to large trading. For Kyle (1985), resiliency is the 
speed with which prices tend to be corrected in the market. Resiliency 
can be measured by the market reaction curve, which is defined by 
Engle and Lange (2001: 115) as “the schedule of the hypothetical 
transaction price to be expected for various-size buying or selling 
orders”. 
2.3.2. Stock liquidity measures 
Stock liquidity is difficult to define, and more difficult to measure, by its very 
nature (Lesmond 2005; Korajczyk and Sadka 2008). Recently, a large 
amount of literature has dealt in different ways with stock liquidity. However, 
existing studies have not yet reached consensus on how liquidity is defined 
and measured. Fernandez (1999) argues that there is a lack of knowledge of 
how liquidity can be measured and how liquidity risk can be integrated into 
the risk-management process. Therefore, he addresses the importance of 
using different liquidity measures to reflect the different aspects of liquidity. 
Moreover, Aitken and Winn (1997) indicate that studies on stock market 
liquidity use around 68 proxies, but fail to find an agreement on the best one 
to use. Sarr and Lybek (2002) divide liquidity measures into four groups: (1) 
transaction cost measures that reflect stock tightness; (2) volume-based 
measures to capture depth and breadth; (3) price-based measures to reflect 
resiliency; and (4) market-impact measures to capture resiliency and speed 
of price adjustment. 
Given the multidimensional nature of liquidity, liquidity measures can be 
categorized into one-dimensional and multi-dimensional measures. The one-
dimensional liquidity measures, such as bid–ask spread measures, depth 
measures, and volume measures, consider only one aspect of liquidity and 
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time measures, whereas the multi-dimensional liquidity measures, including 
the quote slope, composite liquidity, liquidity ratio, and Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity ratio, aim to capture various aspects in one measure. The following 
sections provide a summary of the main liquidity measures used in the 
literature. 
2.3.2.1. One-dimensional liquidity measures 
One-dimensional liquidity measures can be divided into two main sets: 
trading cost measures, which address the tightness of stock liquidity, and 
trading activity measures, which capture the depth and breadth of stock 
liquidity. 
 Trading cost measures 
 
The costs of trading measures capture the tightness aspect of stock liquidity. 
Trading cost is a decreasing function of stock liquidity. The trading costs are 
widely measured by bid–ask spread measures, which represent the most 
commonly used measures of liquidity, and have been used extensively in 
various research areas. The bid–ask spread measure gives an 
approximation of the cost incurred when trading, and is measured as the 
difference between the ask and the bid price. The smaller the spread 
measures, the more liquid the market is. The most commonly used 
measures of bid–ask spread are discussed below: 
 
Absolute/quoted spread (ࡿࢇ࢈࢙) 
This measure is the difference between the lowest ask price and the highest 
bid price, and is always positive. It is calculated as follows: 
ܾܵܽݏ௧ = ݌௧
஺ − ݌௧
஻  
where ݌௧஺	is the best ask price at time t and ݌௧஻	is the best bid price at time t. 
The higher the ܾܵܽݏ௧, the higher the trading cost and the lower the stock 
liquidity. This measure is widely used in the liquidity literature (Chordia et al. 
2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001). 
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Relative/proportional quoted spread (ࡿ࢖࢘࢕) 
This measure is the ratio of the absolute bid–ask spread to the average of 
the bid price and ask price, and can be found by: 
ܵ݌ݎ݋௧ =
݌௧
஺ − ݌௧
஻
݌௧
ெ =
2(݌௧
஺ − ݌௧
஻)
݌௧
஺ + ݌௧
஻  
where ݌௧ெ indicates the mid-price, which equals 
௣೟
ಲା௣೟
ಳ
ଶ
. The first to use this 
spread measure was Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Using 49 stock 
portfolios from the NYSE over 1961–1980, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
provide empirical evidence that investors require a higher rate of return as 
compensation for trading cost, which is measured by the bid–ask spread. 
Using the same sample, but over a different period (1973–1990), Eleswarapu 
(1997) supports the results of Amihud and Mendelson (1986). The relative 
spread is easy to calculate and can make the liquidity of different stocks 
comparable to each other. Moreover, it can be calculated even if no trade 
takes place (Brennan et al. 1998; Jones 2002). On the other hand, many 
studies criticize the proportional spread. For instance, Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam (1996) state that the true execution price is not reflected in 
the proportional spread, since several large trades take place outside the 
quote and many small trades take place inside it. Therefore, many studies 
now use effective spread as a proxy for liquidity. 
 
Effective spread (ࡿࢋࢌࢌ) 
Effective spread is the ratio of the absolute difference between the traded 
price and the midpoint of the best bid and ask price, to the midpoint. It can be 
computed as: 
݂ܵ݁ ௧݂ =
|݌௧ − ݌௧
ெ|
݌௧
ெ  
where ݌௧ indicates the last traded price before time t and the mid-price, ݌௧ெ, is 
computed as above. The effective spread has an advantage over absolute 
spread in that it is not limited to the inside quotes. 
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 Trading activity measures 
 
Trading activity measures capture the depth aspect of stock liquidity. The 
higher the trading activity, the higher is the stock liquidity. The most widely 
used proxies for measuring the trading activity are discussed below: 
Trading volume (ࡽ) 
Trading volume is defined as the number of traded shares, which is given by: 
ܳ௧ =෍ݍ௜
ே೟
௜ୀଵ
 
where ௧ܰ indicates the number of trades in time ݐ, and ݍ௜ is the number of 
shares traded at trade ݅. A higher trading volume implies higher stock 
liquidity. Trading volume (ܳ௧) has been used in a number of liquidity-related 
studies; for example, Chordia et al. (2000), Elyasiani et al. (2000), and 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001). 
 
Dollar volume ( ࢂ)  
It refers to the dollar value of traded shares, which is calculated as: 
௧ܸ =෍݌௜ ∗ ݍ௜
ே೟
௜ୀଵ
 
where ܰ	denotes the number of trades, ݌௜ and ݍ௜denote the price and 
quantity of traded shares at the ith trade. Many studies use dollar volume as 
a proxy for liquidity; for example, Chordia et al. (2000) and Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003). 
Turnover ratio (ࢀࡻ) 
It is the ratio of the number of traded shares to the number of issued shares, 
and can be calculated for a specific time interval as follows: 
ܱܶ௧ =
∑ ݍ௜
ே೟
௜ୀଵ
ܱܰ௧
 
where ݍ௜ denotes the number of shares traded at the ith trade, ௧ܰ is the 
number of trades and ܱܰ௧ is the number of shares outstanding. Like the 
trading volume, turnover ratio is frequently used. For example, Darrat et al. 
(2007) show that the volatility of the stock is positively related to the number 
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of shares traded. In the field of assets pricing, Chordia et al. (2000) find a 
negative relationship between stock return and stock turnover.  
The data required to calculate volume measures are available for most 
markets, which makes them easy to calculate. However, Aitken and 
Comerton-Forde (2003) argue that volume measures reflect past trading 
activity. Volume measures have been used widely in the literature.  
Quoted depth (ࡰ) 
This measure reflects the sum of the quantity volume available at the best 
bid and ask price, and can be calculated as: 
ܦ௧ = ݍ௧
஺ + ݍ௧
஻ 
where ݍ௧஺ and ݍ௧஻	refer to the best bid and the best ask quantity volume in the 
order book. ܦ௧ also refers to as “quantity depth” (Huberman and Halka 
(2001) can be divided by two and, hence, modified to an average depth of 
the bid and the ask depth, similar to Chordia et al. (2000) and Goldstein and 
Kavajecz (2000). 
Quoted dollar depth (ࡰࡿ) 
It is usually calculated as the average of the number of shares at the best bid 
price times its price, and the number of shares at the best ask price times its 
price. 
ܦ$௧ =
ݍ௧
஺ ∗ ݌௧
஺ + ݍ௧
஻ ∗ ݌௧
஻
2
 
where ݌௧஺ refers to best ask price at time ݐ and ݌௧஻	to the best bid price at time 
ݐ. The dollar depth has the advantage of making the liquidity of different 
stocks comparable to each other.  
Depth measures have been widely used in the liquidity literature. In Chordia 
et al. (2005), dollar depth is used as a proxy for liquidity to examine the 
relationship between liquidity spillovers and stock returns. Researchers who 
study the effect of ownership structure on market liquidity find a negative 
relationship between the fractional ownership of insiders and institutions and 
the quoted depth; for example, Rubin (2007) and Chung et al. (2010). The 
higher the depth measure, the more liquid is the market.  
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Waiting time (ࢃࢀ)  
It also refers to as number of transactions per time unit and can be given by: 
ܹ ௜ܶ௧ =
1
ܰ − 1
෍(ݐ௜ − ݐ௜ିଵ)
ே
௜ୀଶ
 
where ݐ௜ denotes the time of a trade, ݐ௜ିଵ the time of the previous trade, and 
ܰ the number of trades between time ݐ and time ݐ − 1. Many researchers 
use the number of transactions as a proxy for liquidity, including Dufour and 
Engle (2000), who provide evidence that the shorter the time between 
trades, the higher the stock price volatility and return. 
2.3.2.2. Multi-dimensional liquidity measures 
The measures discussed above are based on capturing a single aspect of 
stock liquidity. In the following, we discuss the most commonly used 
measures that reflect the multi-dimensional nature of stock liquidity. Multi-
dimensional liquidity measures reflect the properties of more than a one-
dimensional liquidity measure, and hence reflect both the price and quantity 
aspects of stock liquidity. The majority of these measures focus on the price 
impact.  
Amivest/liquidity ratio (ࡸࡾ) 
Amihud et al. (1997) develop this liquidity proxy which combines both the 
quantity and cost aspects of stock liquidity. The liquidity ratio captures the 
trading volume associated with a unit change in the stock price. 
ܮܴ௧ =
௧ܸ
|ݎ௧|
 
where ݎ௜௧ denotes the return at time ݐ, and ௧ܸ is the dollar volume at time ݐ. 
The liquidity ratio reflects the price impact of a trade by measuring the traded 
volume that causes price to change by 1% during a certain period. The 
higher the trading volume absorbed without a significant change in price, the 
higher the liquidity ratio, and hence the higher the stock liquidity. This 
measure is used in various research areas; for instance, Elyasiani et al. 
(2000) use the liquidity ratio to examine the impact of stock movements from 
NASDAQ to NYSE or AMEX on their liquidity. In another field, Becker‐Blease 
and Paul (2006) apply liquidity ratio to study the impact of stock liquidity on 
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investment decisions, and show that liquidity improves as capital 
expenditures increase. 
Zeros  
Lesmond et al. (1999) develop this liquidity measure which is defined as the 
number of days with zero daily return during a year for a certain stock 
(zeros). 
ܼ݁ݎ݋ݏ =
(݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	݀ܽݕݏ	ݓ݅ݐℎ	ݖ݁ݎ݋	ݎ݁ݐݑݎ݊ݏ)
ܶ
 
where T is the number of trading days in a month. This measure is based on 
the models of Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985), who argue that 
informed investors will trade only if the value of the informational signal is 
large enough to cover transaction cost. If the value of the information signal 
is not sufficient to exceed the transaction cost, this investor will either trade 
less or not trade, incurring a zero return. Lesmond et al. (1999) state two 
main advantages for this measure. First, it is easy to calculate since it needs 
only the time series of daily returns, which are available and easy to obtain. 
Second, this measure implicitly reflects all transaction costs, as it is based on 
the investor decision to trade, which in turn depends on the transaction 
costs. However, it has several limitations, including the fact that zero returns 
do not always indicate non-trading, but can result from uninformed trading or 
lack of information (Bekaert et al. 2007). Moreover, some trades (such as 
index trades) do not give rise to price changes. 
Flow ratio (ࡲࡾ)  
This measure is introduced by Ranaldo (2001). It captures the resiliency 
aspect of stock liquidity, and combines the quantity and time aspects of 
liquidity. It is calculated as the dollar volume divided by the waiting time. 
Accordingly, it measures if trading takes place in few but large transactions, 
or in lots of small trades. The higher the flow ratio, the higher is the liquidity. 
ܨܴ௧ =
௧ܸ
ܹ ௧ܶ
=
∑ ݌௜ ∗ ݍ௜
ே೟
௜ୀଵ
1
ܰ − 1∑ (ݐ௜ − ݐ௜ିଵ)
ே೟
௜ୀଶ
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where ௧ܸ is the dollar volume traded in time ݐ and ܹ ௧ܶ	is number of 
transactions between time ݐ and time ݐ − 1.  
Order ratio (ࡽࡾ) 
It is another liquidity measure introduced by Ranaldo (2001) and can be 
calculated as: 
ܴܳ௧	 =
|ݍ௧
஻ − ݍ௧
஺|
௧ܸ
=
|ݍ௧
஻ − ݍ௧
஺|
݌௧ ∗ ݍ௧
 
The order ratio defines as the order imbalance value (|ݍ௧஻ − ݍ௧஺|) divided by 
the dollar volume ( ௧ܸ). It compares depth measured as market imbalance to 
trading volume. A high (low) order ratio indicates low (high) liquidity.  
Illiquidity ratio (ࡵ࢒࢒࢏ࢗࡾ)  
Amihud (2002) introduces this measure that is he related to the Amivest 
liquidity ratio. According to Amihud (2002), this measure reflects Kyle’s 
(1985) concept of illiquidity, which is the price response of order flow, and is 
the percentage change in price resulting from one-dollar trading. Amihud 
(2002) refers to illiquidity ratio as the absolute stock return divided by the 
dollar volume. The lower the illiquidity ratio, the higher is the stock liquidity. 
ܫ݈݈݅ݍܴ௧ =	
|ݎ௧|
௧ܸ
 
where, ݎ௧	is the return in time ݐ, ௧ܸ 	is the dollar volume in time ݐ. Because it is 
easy to calculate, illiquidity ratio has been used by several researchers. In 
the area of liquidity and asset pricing, Nguyen et al. (2007) apply the 
illiquidity ratio as a measure of liquidity. Acharya et al. (2013) use the 
illiquidity ratio as a proxy for liquidity to study the effect of liquidity shocks of 
stocks and treasury bonds on US corporate bond returns over the period 
1973–2007. Edmans et al. (2013) use the illiquidity ratio and show a positive 
effect of stock liquidity on block-holder governance. Goyenko et al. (2009) 
and Hasbrouck (2009) point out the high performance of this measure 
relative to other measures in capturing the transaction costs using US data. 
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ࡸࡹ࢞  
Liu (2006) establishes this new liquidity measure which is based on the 
definition of liquidity as the ability to trade large quantities quickly at low cost 
with less price impact.  
ܮܯݔ = ൮݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ	݋݂	ݖ݁ݎ݋	݈݀ܽ݅ݕ	ݒ݋݈ݑ݉݁ݏ	݅݊	݌ݎ݅݋ݎ	ݔ	݉݋݊ݐℎݏ
+
1
(ݔ_݉݋݊ݐℎ	ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ)
݂݈݀݁ܽݐ݋ݎ
൱ ∗
21ݔ
ܰ݋ܶܦ
 
where ܮܯݔ is the degree of illiquidity for month ݔ; ݔ_݉݋݊ݐℎ	ݐݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ is the 
turnover over the prior ݔ months, measured by the sum of daily turnover over 
the prior ݔ months, and ܰ݋ܶܦ is the total number of trading days in the 
market over the prior ݔ months. The number of zero daily volumes in the 
prior ݔ months reflects the intuition that the absence of trading in a security 
specifies its level of illiquidity.  
This liquidity measure captures various aspects of liquidity, for example 
trading speed, trading quantity, and trading cost. Particularly, the number of 
zero daily volumes over the prior ݔ months reflects the continuity of trading 
and the potential delay in executing an order. The adjustment for turnover 
captures the trading quantity aspect of liquidity. The link between zero 
volumes and number of trades can also capture the aspect of trading cost. 
2.3.2.3. Other liquidity measures  
Some researchers employ a set of liquidity measures that differ from those 
mentioned above. For example, Chordia et al. (2001) present a liquidity 
measure called composite liquidity (ܥ݋݉݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݁	ܮ݅ݍ), which combines depth 
and trading cost dimensions and is calculated as follows: 
ܥ݋݉݌݋ݏ݅ݐ݁	݈݅ݍ =
%	ܳݑ݋ݐ݁݀	ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀
ܦ݋݈݈ܽݎ	݀݁݌ݐℎ
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Composite liquidity is calculated by using the relative bid-ask spread ௣೟
ಲି௣೟
ಳ
௣೟
ಾ 	in 
the numerator divided by the dollar depth ௤೟
ಲ∗௣೟
ಲା௤೟
ಳ∗௣೟
ಳ
ଶ
. A high relative bid-ask 
spread with low  dollar depth implies high composite liquidity which denotes 
low liquidity. 
Another liquidity measure is market impact	(ܯܫ). The spread measures take 
into account only the price dimension, ignoring the volume dimension of 
liquidity. However, the market impact measure tries to overcome this 
problem by capturing both trading costs and volume. It is referred to as the 
spread of a specific trading volume, and is calculated as follows: 
ܯܫ௧
௏∗	 = ௧ܲ
஺,௏∗ − ௧ܲ
஻,௏∗ 
where ௧ܲ
஺,௏∗ is the ask price at time ݐ for a certain volume and ௧ܲ
஻,௏∗ is the bid 
price at time ݐ for a certain volume. 
Depth for price impact (ܦܫ) is a liquidity proxy that combines the trading 
volume and cost aspects of liquidity. It is the number of shares traded that 
result in a movement in price by a certain amount of ܭ ticks away from the 
quote midpoint. The ask-side price impact depth is calculated as follows: 
ܦܫ஺		(ܭ) = ܳ௞
஺ 
where ܳ௞
஺ is the sum of shares sold at ܭ different ask prices. This measure 
can be calculated for the bid side of the market as well. The greater the 
depth for the price impact measure, the more liquid the market. 
Holden (2009) develops a proxy of the effective spread based on observable 
price clustering (effective tick). This measure is based on the notion that 
trade prices are clustered in order to minimize negotiation costs between 
potential traders. Effective tick can be calculated as the ratio of the 
probability weighted average of each effective spread size to the average 
price in time interval i ( തܲ௧), as follows: 
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ݅ݒ݁	ݐ݅ܿ݇ = ൭
∑ ߛො௝ݏ௝
௃
௝ୀଵ
തܲ௧
൱ 
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where തܲ௧ is the average trade price over the time period of aggregation, ߛො௝ is 
the constrained probability of the ݆௧௛	spread and ݏ௝	is the realization of the 
effective spread at the closing trade of the day which is randomly drawn from 
a set of possible spreads (ݏ௝). The higher the effective tick, the lower is the 
stock liquidity.  
Goyenko et al. (2009) propose five liquidity measures computed from two 
major databases: high-frequency Trade and Quote (TAQ)9 and Rule 60510. 
Effective spread (TAQ) is the first measure, which is calculated as follows: 
ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐ݅ݒ݁	ݏ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀	(ܶܣܳ)௞ = 2|ln( ௞ܲ) − ln	(ܯ௞)| 
where P୩ is the price of the ܭ௧௛ and ܯ௞ is the midpoint of the best bid offers 
(BBO)11 existing at the time of the	ܭ௧௛ trade. It is computed from the TAQ 
database and equals the dollar-volume-weighted average of effective spread 
(TAQ)k calculated over all trades in a time interval. 
The realized spread (TAQ)K is the second liquidity measure. It is the 
temporary component of the effective spread. The $effective spread (605) is 
the third liquidity measure and is calculated from the Rule 605 database. It 
refers to the ratio of share-volume-weighted average of $effective spread 
(605)k computed from overall market to the average price in a certain month. 
The fourth liquidity measure is the static price impact (605), which is the cost 
of demanding additional immediate liquidity and can be seen as the first 
derivative of the effective spread with regard to order size. The fifth liquidity 
measure is the five-minute price impact (TAQ)k, which measures the 
derivative of the cost of demanding a certain amount of liquidity over five 
minutes, and differs from the curve for demanding the same amount of 
liquidity immediately. 
                                                             
9 The TAQ database is a collection of intraday trades and quotes for all securities listed on 
the NYSE, American Stock Exchange, Nasdaq National Market System and SmallCap 
issues (see http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/rs/data/dstest.aspx?DB=taq-database). 
10 The Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Rule 605 on 15 November 2000, and 
aims to improve public disclosure of order execution quality. The Rule requires all 
exchanges and other market centres to make detailed monthly public disclosure of execution 
quality (see http://www.finra.org/industry/sec-rule-605). 
11 BBO stands for the best bid and offer. It is the highest bid price and lowest ask price 
available for a given stock at a specific moment in time.   
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2.3.2.4. Comparison of measures  
The list of liquidity measures discussed above is long, but far from complete. 
The most important insight from discussing these measures is that liquidity is 
not a one-dimensional variable, and therefore is difficult to capture using a 
single measure; indeed, according to Amihud (2002), it is doubtful whether 
there is one single measure that captures all aspects of liquidity. However, 
one-dimensional measures may provide insight into certain questions of 
stock liquidity that multi-dimensional measures may be unable to provide.  
The relative performance of the most commonly used liquidity measures has 
been assessed extensively. However, mixed and contradictory results have 
been shown. Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) compare between effective 
bid–ask spread and posted bid–ask spread and find a significant difference 
between them.12 More specifically, they find that the effective spread 
averages half the posted spread, and that effective spread is significantly 
smaller than posted spread. Moreover, Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) find 
that the correlation between the effective spread and the posted spread is 
less than 0.1. They claim that this low correlation implies that empirical 
evidence from studies employing the posted spread may be misleading. 
Therefore, they see the posted spread as a poor measure of liquidity.  
Hasbrouck (2009) compares four measures – namely TAQ, Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity ratio, Gibbs, and Zeros – to effective spread and price impact that 
are calculated from TAQ data over the period 1993–2003. He shows that 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio dominates as a measure for price impact and 
Gibbs dominates as a measure for effective spread. In a recent study, 
Goyenko et al. (2009) compare the most widely used liquidity measures, 
including many bid–ask spread proxies and price impact proxies. They 
document a close association between many of these proxies. In addition, 
they show that the widely used Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is a good 
measure for price impact. Goyenko et al. (2009) also find that liquidity 
                                                             
12 According to Petersen and Fialkowski (1994), the posted spread is the minimum ask price 
minus the maximum bid price and the effective spread is the posted spread minus twice the 
expected price improvement in the subsample. Price improvement is defined as minimum 
(ask price) minus transaction price for buy orders, or transaction price minus maximum (bid 
price) for sell orders. 
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measures derived from daily data are good measures of high-frequency 
transaction cost benchmarks. Moreover, in monthly and annual comparisons 
of effective and realized spreads, they find that the best measures are 
effective spread, effective tick, and Zeros. 
2.4. Conclusion 
This chapter briefly reviews some literature relating to dividend policy and 
stock liquidity. It explains how the dividend irrelevance theory of Modigliani 
and Miller (1961) has inspired researchers to study, both theoretically and 
empirically, the importance of dividend policy to corporations and investors, 
and consequences related to the stock market. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
argue that firm value is independent of dividend policy under assumptions of 
perfect capital markets. Much of the research done on dividend policy 
examines its impact on firm value when certain assumptions of perfect 
capital market are relaxed. In general, the evidence is mixed for all of the 
major dividend theories. The evidence on taxes seems to point to the 
existence of dividend clienteles, but there is little support that they actually 
affect firm value. There also seems to be mixed support for the role of 
agency theory in explaining firms’ dividend policies. Finally, the long-held 
notion that dividend increases signal managements’ beliefs of higher future 
cash flows has recently been under attack. 
While the dividend theories seem to have some validity, tests of the theories 
appear to be noisy, and sensitive to the sample design and the variables 
used. Moreover, the majority of empirical studies that test dividend theories 
imply that dividends can affect firm value by focusing on the valuation effects 
of dividends through investigating changes in stock market price. However, 
dividends could potentially affect firm value by affecting the external 
characteristics of the firm's stock; e.g., by changing the information 
environment, and hence the liquidity of the stock. The changes in stock 
market liquidity have several implications on corporate financial policies 
(Amihud and Mendelson 1986). This thesis adds to the existing dividend 
literature by investigating stock liquidity as a potential channel through which 
dividends affect firm value. 
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This chapter also discusses the concept of stock liquidity, and its dimensions 
and measures. Although stock liquidity is a broad and elusive notion, it can 
be defined by four main dimensions, which are immediacy, tightness, depth, 
and resiliency. Immediacy is defined as the speed with which orders can be 
executed. Tightness refers to small bid–ask spreads which produce low 
transaction costs. Depth refers to the presence of large orders below and 
above the price. Resiliency arises in a market in which new order arrivals 
flow quickly to adjust order imbalances, which lead prices to move away from 
their true value. The literature on stock liquidity has applied a large number 
of measures to capture its dimensions. These measures can be categorized 
into either one-dimensional or multi-dimensional. However, the empirical 
studies show that each measure has different strengths and limitations.  
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Chapter 3: Dividend Policy and Stock Liquidity 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Liquidity is one of the key characteristics of securities markets that investors 
observe when making investment decisions and analysing securities. It is 
important because it has a direct impact on transaction costs and 
shareholders’ required rate of return, which in turn affects the firm’s value. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that since liquidity can increase firm 
value, firms are more likely to follow a corporate policy that makes their 
stocks more liquid (Amihud and Mendelson 2012). Moreover, Baker and 
Pettit (1982), Wan (2001), and Bilinski et al. (2012) show that firm’s 
managers exhibit more care about the liquidity of the firm’s stock because 
any increase in liquidity reduces transaction costs and increases firm value. 
Since stock liquidity has critical implications for several finance areas, 
including asset pricing, stock market performance, and, most importantly, 
corporate policies,13 many researchers have studied issues of stock liquidity. 
Because of its importance, examining liquidity effects of particular corporate 
decisions, such as dividend policy decisions, is vital.  
Some of the key decisions of firms’ management are dividend policy 
decisions. Firm managers should be careful when making the decision 
regarding whether to pay dividends, as well as the amount of dividends. 
Early literature on dividend policy focuses mostly on the reasons for paying 
dividends (Alli et al. 1993; DeAngelo et al. 2006; Denis and Osobov 2008), 
the information content of dividend announcements (Miller and Rock 1985; 
Amihud and Li 2006), and the valuation effects associated with dividend 
announcements (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and 
Leventis 2011). Companies choose to pay dividends with the ultimate goal of 
enhancing their stock valuation (Baker 2009). Dividend policy has been 
studied extensively by researchers to measure the financial impact on a 
firm’s share market price (e.g., Asquith and Mullins 1983; Abeyratna et al. 
                                                             
13 See Amihud and Mendelson (2012) for detailed discussions of the implications of stock 
liquidity. 
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1996; Marsh and Power 1999; McCluskey et al. 2006; Dasilas and Leventis 
2011) and consequently the extent of its contribution to achieve 
management’s target, namely maximizing the market value of shares and 
thus maximizing the owners’ wealth.  
However, there are other possible sources of the gains in shareholders 
wealth associated with dividend policy, such as changes in the quality of the 
stock’s trading environment and, as a result, an improvement in the stock’s 
liquidity. Firms can improve their stock market liquidity by adopting corporate 
policies that mitigate informational asymmetries between firms’ insiders and 
external shareholders (Amihud and Mendelson 2012). In theory, dividend 
policy influences stock liquidity because dividend payments signal inside 
information about the firm’s future prospectus, thereby decreasing the level 
of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Further, dividend 
policy influences stock liquidity because dividend payment imposes 
monitoring on managers, thereby preventing inefficient or opportunistic 
managers from concealing information. Paying dividends may also help firms 
to attract institutional investors (Allen et al. 2000; Grinstein and Michaely 
2005) who have better-quality information (Amihud and Li 2006; Puckett and 
Yan 2011). Dennis and Weston (2002), Fehle (2004), and Jiang et al. (2011) 
find that firms with higher institutional ownership have greater stock liquidity 
as proxied by narrower spreads, higher market quality index, and smaller 
price impact of trades. Additionally, the high percentage of institutional 
ownership in dividend-paying firms should increase the trading volume of 
their stocks, since institutional investors tend to trade more frequently and in 
larger quantities (Gompers and Metrick 1998; Agarwal 2007; Rubin 2007; 
Brockman et al. 2009). Thus, dividend payment is expected to enhance the 
information environment and hence reduce information asymmetry. When 
information asymmetry is less severe, liquidity providers face less adverse 
selection problems (Glosten and Milgrom 1985). As a result, firms with 
dividend payments are expected to exhibit greater stock liquidity.14 
                                                             
14 It is well recognized that better information quality and lower information asymmetry are 
highly correlated with improving the liquidity of a firm's shares (Bardos 2011). Liquidity is 
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Existing empirical evidence on the impact of dividend policy on stock liquidity 
is mixed. For example, Howe and Lin (1992) show that dividend policy has a 
negative effect on bid–ask spread. They attribute their results to information 
asymmetry theory, and argue that dividends reduce the level of information 
asymmetry and the hence bid–ask spread. However, Brooks (1994) and 
Barclay and Smith (1988) show that the relationship between dividend policy 
and bid–ask spread is at best weak. With regard to the trading activity aspect 
of stock liquidity, several studies, including those by Richardson et al. (1986), 
Gurgul et al. (2003), and Dasilas and Leventis (2011), find that trading 
volume increases with dividend increase and declines with dividend 
reduction. In general, existing empirical evidence on the consequences of 
dividend policy decisions in terms of stock liquidity is inconclusive and in 
some cases outdated; hence, further analysis is required.  
Our sample includes all firms, including dead ones, listed as part of the FTSE 
ALL share index over the period 1996–2013. The final sample includes 1,041 
firms after deleting missing observations. We use three liquidity measures 
reflecting three different dimensions of stock liquidity. These measures are: 
the proportional quoted bid–ask spread, which is a proxy for the trading cost; 
the turnover rate, which is a proxy for the trading activity; and the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio, which reflects the price impact.15 
Our empirical analysis is stratified into two main stages. The first stage 
involves a univariate analysis in which the liquidity characteristics of stocks of 
dividend payers are compared against that of non-dividend payers, and the 
stock liquidity of high-dividend payers is compared to that of low-dividend 
payers. The univariate results suggest that stocks of dividend-paying firms 
are significantly more liquid that those of non-paying firms. Similarly, stocks 
of high-dividend-paying firms are significantly more liquid than those of low-
dividend-paying firms.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
negatively related to the level of information asymmetry that results from some traders 
having informational advantage over others (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). 
15 Studies that use similar proxies to measure stock liquidity include those by Brockman et 
al. (2008) in the context of share repurchases, and Mazouz et al. (2010) in the context of 
asset pricing. 
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The second stage involves the use of pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
regressions with year and industry dummies to control for endogeneity 
concerns and the effects of other variables on this relationship. We find that 
stocks of dividend payers exhibit significantly lower bid–ask spread and 
illiquidity ratio than their non-dividend-paying counterparts. Similarly, stocks 
of firms that pay high amounts of dividends have lower bid–ask spread and a 
lower illiquidity ratio compared to those that pay low amounts of dividends. 
These findings are consistent with the predictions of Bhattacharya's (1979) 
model, which suggests that dividends signal information to the market and 
hence decrease the level of information asymmetry, leading to higher stock 
liquidity. Moreover, these findings are in line with the model posited by 
Easterbrook (1984),  which suggests that dividend-paying firms are more 
likely to visit the capital market, leading to higher levels of monitoring and 
hence more information being released to the market. However, the stock 
turnover ratio is found to be affected negatively by whether the firm pays 
dividends. This negative relationship may be due to the fact that stocks that 
pay dividends tend to be purchased and retained by investors, and thus 
fewer transactions occur (Hotchkiss and Lawrence 2007; IOSCO Emerging 
Markets Committee 2007). 
We subject our results to a number of robustness tests and model 
specifications. First, analysing the impact of dividend policy on stock liquidity 
can be challenging due to the fact that dividend decisions are not randomly 
determined (Li and Prabhala 2005) and may be affected by unobserved 
factors that are also related to stock liquidity (Banerjee et al. 2007). 
Therefore, there is a potential endogeneity problem in estimating the 
relationship between dividend policy and stock liquidity. In other words, 
higher liquidity associated with dividend policy is potentially not an outcome 
of dividend policy as such, but rather an indication that stock liquidity itself 
may impact the decision to pay dividends. To control for possible 
endogeneity, we use a two-stage regression approach and fixed-effects 
model. Our main results are robust to these model specifications as we 
document that stock liquidity of dividend payers and payers of high amounts 
of dividends is higher than those of their non- or low-paying counterparts. 
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Second, we address the possibility that the relationship between dividend 
policy and stock liquidity is affected by the size of the firm. We find that 
compared to firms with no (low) dividends, firms that pay dividends (high 
dividends) have a significantly higher level of stock liquidity, especially when 
the firms themselves are larger. Large firms often face lower degrees of 
asymmetric information, which may explain their greater level of stock 
liquidity.  
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, we link stock 
liquidity to corporate finance. For example, many studies show that stock 
liquidity is influenced by stock repurchases (Brockman and Chung 2001; 
Ginglinger and Hamon 2007; Hillert et al. 2016), asset liquidity (Gopalan et 
al. 2012; Charoenwong et al. 2014), stock split (Goyenko et al. 2006; Huang 
et al. 2015), and corporate governance (Rubin 2007; Poon et al. 2013; 
Prommin et al. 2014). We contribute to this by identifying dividend policy as 
another influential determinant of liquidity. Given the few prior studies that 
examine the liquidity impact of dividend policy and their conflicting results, 
more empirical studies are warranted. Unlike previous studies that mostly 
investigate the relationship between dividend policy and stock liquidity by 
examining the changes in a certain measure of stock liquidity following 
dividend announcements (Richardson et al. 1986; Mitra and Rashid 1997; 
Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011), we adopt a regression 
approach that enables us to test how a firm’s dividend policy decisions 
determine its stock liquidity after controlling for other variables that are 
known to affect stock liquidity.  
Previous studies typically focus on the impact of dividend policy on a single 
dimension of stock liquidity, such as the trading costs aspect, which is 
measured by bid–ask spread (Howe and Lin 1992; Mitra and Rashid 1997), 
or trading activity, measured by trading volume (Richardson et al. 1986; 
Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011). However, stock liquidity 
reflects several aspects. Kyle (1985) and Lesmond (2005) argue that since 
liquidity is very difficult to define and even more difficult to estimate, a list of 
measures is required to capture its different aspects. Given the uncertainties 
surrounding liquidity estimation, we use proportional bid–ask spread, 
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turnover ratio, and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio to capture the impact of 
dividend policy on the trading costs, trading quantity, and price impact 
dimensions of liquidity, respectively. Further, our study complements earlier 
studies on the impact of dividend policy on firm value by introducing stock 
liquidity as a channel through which dividends affect firm value. Higher stock 
liquidity associated with dividend payments can result in a lower rate of 
return and higher firm valuation.16 Finally, to best of our knowledge, this 
study is the first to examine the role of dividend policy decisions in 
determining stock liquidity in the UK. It is vital to research this area, given 
that the LSE is the second most active equity market, after the NYSE in the 
US. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a 
brief review of the literature on the relationship between dividend and stock 
market liquidity. Section 3.3 states the hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.4 
presents our sample and dataset. Section 3.5 describes our research 
methodology. Section 3.6 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Literature review 
The existing literature suggests that dividend policy can have a positive 
impact on stock liquidity. This positive relationship can be based on two 
propositions. The first proposition arises from the widely accepted notion that 
stock liquidity is negatively related to the level of asymmetric information. A 
large body of literature suggests that better information quality and lower 
information asymmetry are highly correlated with improving the liquidity of a 
firm's shares (Bardos 2011). Liquidity is negatively related to the level of 
information asymmetry that results from some traders having informational 
advantage over others (Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). Glosten and 
Milgrom (1985) argue that the information revelation increases with trading 
activity, as informed traders trade aggressively on their information 
advantage for stocks with a high trading activity. As such, firms with liquid 
                                                             
16 The impact of liquidity on rate of return has been widely documented (see, e.g., Amihud 
and Mendelson 1986; Brennan et al. 1998; Amihud 2002). 
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stocks are expected to be associated with low information asymmetry 
(Welker 1995; Richardson 2000). Some studies predict the bid-ask spread as 
an increasing function of the level of information asymmetry (Copeland and 
Galai 1983; Glosten and Milgrom 1985; Glosten and Harris 1988). Diamond 
(1985) shows that increased information disclosures decrease information 
asymmetry between managers and traders and diminishes traders' 
motivation to acquire private information, resulting in less heterogeneity 
among trader beliefs and smaller speculative positions among informed 
traders. Bhattacharya et al. (2013) provide empirical evidence that poor 
earnings quality results in higher information asymmetry, leading to higher 
trading costs and ultimately higher cost of capital. 
The second proposition is related to different explanations about the role of 
dividend policy in financial markets. The first explanation pertains to the 
information signalling model, which suggests that dividends reduce 
asymmetric information by acting as a signalling mechanism (Bhattacharya 
1979; John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985). Given that dividend 
payments are often thought to reflect higher future cash flows and better 
firm’s future prospects (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985), this could 
decrease the asymmetric information level in the market and hence reduce 
the bid–ask spread, leading to higher stock liquidity.  
The role of dividends in reducing agency costs (primarily monitoring costs) 
strengthens this conclusion and provides further explanation for the liquidity 
effect of dividends. This explanation is based on the separation of interests 
between managers and shareholders, as well as on the role of dividends as 
a disciplinary tool that reduces the agency costs associated with such a 
separation (see, e.g., Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). The payment of 
dividends decreases free cash flow, pushing firms to visit the capital markets 
more frequently and reveal information while they attempt to obtain financing 
for their operations and investments. This leads them to be subject to the 
inspection of investment bankers, analysts, and potential new investors more 
often, leading to a reduction in agency costs as well as in the level of 
information asymmetry between managers and investors. Consequently, the 
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payment of dividends should be associated with reduced information 
asymmetry and, hence, increased stock liquidity. 
The clientele theory proposed by Allen et al. (2000) can also provide some 
explanation for the liquidity–dividend relationship. This theory rests on two 
assumptions. The first is that, due to tax effects, institutional investors prefer 
higher dividends relative to individual investors. Specifically, corporations 
and financial institutions are afforded lower marginal tax rates of dividends 
over capital gains. The second assumption is that because of their 
investment size and the amount of resources available to them, institutional 
investors have greater incentive and ability to collect and analyze information 
concerning their investments, as well as a greater ability to discipline 
managers and push for changes if management performs poorly. Based on 
these two assumptions, Allen et al. (2000) show that payment of dividends 
attracts institutional investors, and hence both agency costs and level of 
information asymmetry  are reduced. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that 
there is significant evidence that institutions prefer dividend-paying firms 
compared to non-dividend-paying firms, even after holding constant size, 
risk, market-to-book ratio, and a host of other variables. Institutions are able 
to generate more information about a dividend-paying firm, thereby 
improving the quantity and quality of public information (Amihud and Li 2006; 
Puckett and Yan 2011). Given that institutional investors are more effective 
in gathering and analysing information about the firms in which they invest, 
the level of information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders is 
lower for firms that pay dividends (Allen et al. 2000; Leary and Michaely 
2011). Consequently, increasing the information environment of dividend-
paying stocks should lead to higher stock liquidity. Dennis and Weston 
(2002), Fehle (2004), and Jiang et al. (2011) find that firms with higher 
institutional ownership have greater stock liquidity, as proxied by narrower 
spreads, higher market quality index, and smaller price impact of trades. 
Additionally, the high percentage of institutional ownership in dividend-paying 
firms should, all else being equal, increase the trading volume of their stocks. 
Gompers and Metrick (1998) examine the trading patterns of large 
institutional investors and find that they trade more frequently, and in larger 
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quantities, than small investors do. Several studies show that institutional 
holdings are positively correlated with liquidity due to higher trading activity, 
which suggests that trades made by institutional investors are more frequent 
and larger in quantity compared to those of other investors (Bennett et al. 
2003; Agarwal 2007; Rubin 2007; Brockman et al. 2009). Therefore, higher 
institutional ownership in dividend-paying firms should increase trading 
volume and decrease bid–ask spreads of their stock, leading to higher stock 
liquidity.17 
Many empirical studies test the impact of dividend policy on a number of 
liquidity proxies. One strand of research examines the effect of dividend 
policy on the bid–ask spread, a measure of the trading costs aspect of 
liquidity. Howe and Lin (1992) examine the bid–ask spreads of the stocks of 
two groups of US firms: non-paying firms in a given year and firms that pay 
only cash dividends. They find that non-dividend stocks have an average 
bid–ask spread of 8.3%, while dividend-paying stocks have an average  
spread of 4.36%. Similarly, Mitra and Rashid (1997) examine the bid–ask 
spread before and after dividend initiations for a sample of US firms during 
the period January 1976 to December 1987. They find that the mean 
percentage and dollar bid–ask spreads increase significantly on the day 
preceding the announcement date. Nevertheless, on the announcement day, 
the mean percentage and the dollar bid–ask spread decline significantly and 
continue to remain low, on average, over year following the announcement 
date. Moreover, the results show that the magnitude of the decline in the 
post-event period percentage spread has a significant positive association 
with the magnitude of the dividend yield. The authors conclude that dividend 
events provide useful information to the market, and hence reduce 
informational asymmetry. Consequently, bid–ask spread decreases and 
stock liquidity improves. However, using a sample of 90 NYSE firms, Brooks 
(1994) finds that total spreads do not significantly change around the 
dividend announcement period, suggesting that dividend announcement is 
not informative. 
                                                             
17 This might suggest that institutional ownership may interact with dividend policy and 
hence institutional ownership in non-dividend paying firms could increase stock liquidity. 
However, the lack of access to data on ownership structure prevents us from testing for this. 
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Another area of research examines the price reaction and the trading volume 
reaction to dividend change. Richardson et al. (1986) argue that the study of 
trading volume reactions is helpful in analysing the information content of 
dividends, as well as the existence of clientele effects. They argue that one 
implication of dividend clientele theory is that trading should increase after a 
dividend change as the firm’s shareholder clientele adjusts. They test the 
abnormal trading volume, as well as abnormal returns around dividend 
changes, using a sample of 192 US firms that announced a cash dividend for 
the first time during the period 1969 to 1982. They investigate the weekly 
gross trading volume between initial dividend announcements and ex-
dividend dates, and find that the trading volume during the dividend 
announcement week is 35% greater than that observed during a non-
announcement week. In the period from the dividend announcement week to 
the ex-dividend date, trading volume is 54% greater than would occur 
normally over a similar interval.  
Richardson et al. (1986) also examine whether trading volume response is 
related to good news about the firm’s future or clientele adjustments. They 
argue that the abnormal trading volume is associated with two components: 
the information content of dividends, which is measured by abnormal returns, 
and clientele adjustments, which are measured by the magnitude of dividend 
yield. They state that “…tax clientele trading should be positively related to 
dividend magnitude, with less clientele trading for dividends of a trivial 
magnitude” (p. 326). When the only independent variable in their regression 
model is a measure of abnormal returns, a significant and positive intercept 
is interpreted as evidence of clientele trading. When variables representing 
dividend yield and prior price appreciation are added to the model, a positive 
(negative) and significant coefficient on the dividend yield (prior price 
appreciation) variable is interpreted as further evidence in support of clientele 
trading. Richardson et al. (1986) show that volume increases are primarily a 
response to the signal about future earnings, while the clientele adjustments 
are rather small. 
Gurgul et al. (2003) examine abnormal trading volume reactions to dividend 
changes using 22 companies listed on the Austrian stock market between 
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January 1992 and April 2002. They perform their analysis using three groups 
of events: dividend increases, dividend decreases, and constant dividends. 
They report a positive abnormal trading volume on the day of 
announcements in all three groups, and interpret these results as evidence 
that any information on upcoming dividends is valuable for investors, 
resulting in intensified trading. Similarly, Bozos et al. (2011) analyze the 
trading volume around dividend announcements for a sample of 991 final 
dividend announcements of UK companies listed on the LSE over the period 
January 2006 to June 2010. The authors also divide the announcements into 
three groups: dividend increases, dividend decreases, and non-change 
dividends. They find that the two-day cumulative abnormal volumes are 
0.729% and 0.707% for dividend increase and decrease events, 
respectively, and report an excess volume reaction for the unchanged 
dividend group of 0.773%. They interpret this finding as evidence that 
investors adjust their expectations for neutral dividend announcements.                           
Dasilas and Leventis (2011) also examine the trading volume around 
dividend changes for a sample of firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. 
Consistent with the signalling hypothesis, they find that dividend-increasing 
firms generate a positive abnormal trading volume of 19.02% and 6.78% on 
days 0 and +1, respectively. However, they show that dividend reductions 
result in significantly negative trading volume reaction. They argue that the 
negative trading volume reaction implies that investors tend to trade less 
than usual because dividend reductions are considered by the market as an 
indication of deterioration in the firm’s future performance, which discourages 
investors from buying shares. Dasilas and Leventis (2011) also find that the 
trading volume reaction to no-dividend change events is negative, although 
the volume reaction is not statistically significant during the whole estimation 
period. 
From the above discussion, we note mixed results in the relationship 
between dividend policy and stock liquidity. Therefore, further analysis is 
warranted.  
64 
 
3.3. Hypothesis development 
The effect of dividend policy on stock liquidity can be attributed to several 
explanations. The information signalling theory of dividends suggests that 
dividends convey information about the firm’s future prospects (Bhattacharya 
1979; John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985). If managers are 
expected to be better informed than investors about the future prospects of 
the firm, payment of dividends reduces information asymmetry. Therefore, 
the information content of dividend policy results in a lower level of 
information asymmetry, and hence a decrease in trading costs and increase 
in trading activity – i.e., improve stock liquidity. In addition, dividends play a 
role in monitoring managers, as dividend payments require the firm to visit 
the capital market more frequently, resulting in increased monitoring by 
providers of capital (Easterbrook 1984). Rozeff (1982) also contends that 
new-capital suppliers will provide funds only when they receive information 
about the potential use of those funds. Therefore, shareholders may also 
obtain new information and therefore the level of information asymmetry will 
be reduced, leading to lower trading costs and higher trading activity. Thus, 
improved monitoring through capital market disclosures also establishes a 
link between dividend policy and stock liquidity. The extant literature on 
market microstructure suggests a positive relationship between the level of 
information asymmetry and the magnitude of trading costs (Howe and Lin, 
1992). Some studies predict the bid-ask spread as an increasing function of 
the level of information asymmetry (Copeland and Galai 1983; Glosten and 
Milgrom 1985; Glosten and Harris 1988). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue 
that the information revelation increases with trading activity and hence firms 
with liquid stocks are expected to be associated with low information 
asymmetry (Welker 1995; Richardson 2000).  
Therefore, as dividend policy is associated with higher levels of information, 
information asymmetry should decrease. Consequently, trading costs should 
narrow and stock liquidity should improve.  
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The above arguments also imply that dividend policy can impact other 
dimensions of liquidity, such as price. The price impact on liquidity reflects 
the premium that a buyer or seller needs to make in order to effect a trade 
(Amihud and Mendelson 2012). For instance, when an investor receives new 
information that would result in an increase in the price of a stock, they will 
want to buy a large quantity of that stock at the current price. On the other 
hand, the seller of the stock would be better off holding that stock. 
Accordingly, once market makers (traders) notice any buying pressure, they 
are more likely to sell the stock to the buyer, but only at a higher price. 
Alternatively, if the market receives information that leads to a decrease in a 
stock’s price, sellers will want to sell a large amount of that stock at the 
current price; hence, traders will interpret such selling pressure as a signal of 
negative information about the stock and tend to buy only at a lower price. 
Therefore, traders will protect themselves by demanding price 
premiums/discounts that increase with the quantity bought/sold. In both 
cases, the magnitude of the price impact increases with the level of 
asymmetric information between the trading parties. The higher the level of 
asymmetric information between the trading parties, the larger the risk that 
the party who starts the trade will try to profit from the situation, and the 
greater the compensation required by the counterparty for doing the trade. 
Consequently, a greater level of asymmetric information will result in a larger 
price impact (Amihud and Mendelson 2012).  
Improvement in the trading environment, and hence stock liquidity, could 
also be driven by the number of market participants and transactions. 
Payment of dividends has been documented to attract institutional investors 
(Allen et al. 2000; Grinstein and Michaely 2005). Moreover, Short et al. 
(2002) show a significant positive relationship between dividend policy and 
institutional ownership. Hotchkiss and Lawrence (2007) find that the 
percentage of shares owned by institutional investors increases as dividends 
increase. Similarly, Crane et al. (2016) suggest that higher overall 
institutional ownership causes firms to pay more dividends. Given that 
institutional investors are highly effective in gathering and analysing 
information about the firms in which they invest, the level of information 
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asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders is lower for firms that pay 
dividends (Amihud and Li 2006; Puckett and Yan 2011). Consequently, 
increasing the information environment of dividend-paying stocks due to the 
existence of institutional investors should lead to higher stock liquidity. 
Additionally, many studies find that institutional investors trade more 
frequently, and in larger quantities, than other investors (Agarwal 2007; 
Rubin 2007; Brockman et al. 2009). Hence, the high percentage of 
institutional ownership in dividend-paying firms should also increase the 
trading volume of their stocks. Therefore, since dividends are associated with 
a high percentage of institutional investors that have more ability to generate 
information and trade in large quantity, dividend-paying firms are expected to 
have lower trading costs, higher trading activity and, accordingly, higher 
stock liquidity. Thus:  
H1: Dividend-paying stocks are more liquid than non-dividend-paying 
stocks. 
The above arguments further indicate that stock liquidity may also depend on 
the amount of dividend payment. A higher dividend reflects information on 
higher or more stable future cash flows (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 
1985). Furthermore, a higher amount of dividend payments indicates better 
future prospects; hence, the demand for, and the trading of, high-dividend-
paying stocks will increase, resulting in improved stock liquidity. Additionally, 
a higher dividend indicates that the firm will visit the capital market more 
frequently, meaning that additional information will be available to market 
participants (Easterbrook 1984). The higher level of information associated 
with the higher dividend payment results in higher stock liquidity. This leads 
to the following hypothesis: 
H2: Stocks that pay a higher amount of dividends are more liquid than 
stocks that pay a lower amount of dividends. 
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3.4. Data and sample 
The study covers firms listed on the FTSE ALL share index, which 
represents an aggregate of the FTSE 100, FTSE 250, and FTSE SmallCap 
Indices. The FTSE All Share Index is a market-capitalization weighted index 
representing the performance of approximately 98% of capital value of all 
eligible companies listed on the LSE's main market that pass screening for 
size and liquidity. Using the current constituents of the FTSE ALL share 
index may result in a problem of survivorship bias in our sample. 
Survivorship bias is the tendency for unsuccessful firms to be dropped from 
performance studies because they no longer exist. This problem can yield an 
upward bias, as only firms that were successful enough to survive until the 
end of the study period are included. In order to overcome this problem, we 
include the dead firms that disappeared any time before the end of the 
sampling period. This yields an initial sample of 1,723 firms. Following 
criteria used in previous studies (e.g., Banerjee et al. 2007; Brockman et al. 
2008), we exclude firms from the financial and utilities industries, and thus 
obtain a sample of 1,169 firms over a period from 1996 to 2013, as 
summarized in Panel A of Table 3.1.18  Panel B of Table 3.1 shows the 
distribution of our sample firms across industries based on the Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB).19 Over 28% of the sample is from the 
industrial sector, followed by 26.18% from consumer services and 13.34% 
from consumer goods. Firms in the telecommunications industries account 
for around 2% of the total. Panel C of Table 3.1 represents the yearly 
distributions of our sample firms. As illustrated above, the sample is not the 
same for every year because of frequent revisions to the constituents of the 
FTSE ALL index. 
 
                                                             
18 We exclude financial and utilities firms because they have a different set of regulations 
and their financial ratios are not comparable with firms in other industries.  
19 The ICB is a definitive system categorizing over 70,000 companies and 75,000 securities 
worldwide, enabling the comparison of companies across four levels of classification and 
national boundaries. The ICB system is supported by the ICB Database, an unrivalled data 
source for global sector analysis, which is maintained by FTSE International Limited (see 
http://www.icbenchmark.com). 
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Table 3.1 Sample firms’ distribution across year and industry 
Panel A illustrates criteria for inclusion in the sample. Panel B shows the distribution of sample firms across industries based on the “Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) Level 1” extracted from DataStream. Panel C shows the distribution of observations by year. 
Panel A  Panel B  Panel C 
Selection Criteria for the Sample  Distribution of the Sample across Industries  
Distribution of the Sample across 
Time 
Criterion # of Firms Industry 
# of 
Firms % Year # of Firms 
All firms listed on the FTSE ALL Share during 1996–2013 (dead and 
alive) 1723 Basic materials 83 7.1 1996 647 
Financial firms 521 Consumer goods 156 13.34 1997 647 
Utilities 33 Consumer services 306 26.18 1998 586 
Sample (excluding financials & utilities) 1169 Health care 75 6.42 1999 563 
Industrials 336 28.74 2000 532 
Oil & gas 52 4.45 2001 493 
Technology 135 11.55 2002 474 
Telecommunications 26 2.22 2003 469 
Total 1,169 100 2004 470 
2005 443 
2006 428 
2007 424 
2008 401 
2009 356 
2010 360 
2011 358 
2012 355 
2013 342 
Total 1169 
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The primary dataset is taken from DataStream, which consists of both daily 
and annual data for all stocks (dead and live). The daily data includes closing 
price, ask price, bid price, quantity trading volume, and number of 
outstanding shares. Annual data consists of dividend per share, total assets, 
and earnings before interest and taxes. After deleting all the observations 
with missing values, we end up with 8,780 firm-year observations for 1,041 
firms. All the variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce 
the impact of outliers. 
3.5. Methodology  
3.5.1. Variable definitions 
This section presents definitions of the dependent, independent, and control 
variables used in this chapter. The discussion focuses on stock liquidity 
variables, where the dependent variables include proportional bid–ask 
spread, turnover ratio, and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio. In addition, it 
defines the dividend policy and control variables and provides information 
about the measurements of all variables used in this chapter. Table 3.2 
summarizes the definitions of these variables. 
3.5.1.1. Liquidity measures 
The dependent variables reflect stock liquidity measures. There is no 
consensus in the literature on the definition and measurement of stock 
liquidity, though many have been suggested. Most of the literature examining 
liquidity focuses on its various dimensions (see, e.g., Kyle 1985 and Baker 
1996 for further discussion). In general, it has been concluded that there “is 
no single unambiguous theoretically correct or universally accepted definition 
of liquidity” (Baker 1996: 1). Keeping all these points in mind, and due to the 
lack of a single good measure, this study applies the following widely 
accepted measures of stock liquidity to capture its different dimensions. More 
specifically, we investigate the link between dividend policy and different 
aspects of liquidity, including trading costs (i.e., bid–ask spread), trading 
activity (i.e., turnover ratio), and price impact (i.e., Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
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ratio).20 According to the market microstructure literature, decreased bid–ask 
spread, increased turnover ratio, and decreased illiquidity ratio have an 
incremental effect on stock liquidity. We construct these measures by 
calculating the average for a given firm in a given year. 
Proportional bid–ask spread (Spread) 
The bid–ask spread is the difference between the prices quoted for an 
immediate purchase (bid) and those for an immediate sale (ask). It is 
probably one of the most popular proxies for liquidity, and Amihud (2002) 
and Goyenko et al. (2009) argue that it is one of the best. The market 
microstructure literature finds that the bid–ask spread may reflect the 
following: (1) order processing cost, (2) inventory carrying cost, (3) 
asymmetric information cost, and (4) market structure cost (Huang and Stoll 
1996). This captures most of the transaction cost. Many empirical works on 
the corporate finance–liquidity relationship adopt the bid–ask spread as a 
proxy of liquidity. For example, Rubin (2007) and Poon et al. (2013) rely on 
the bid–ask spread to examine the effects of ownership structure on stock 
liquidity. This measure is easy to calculate and can make the liquidity of 
different stocks comparable to each other. Moreover, it can be calculated 
even if no trade takes place (Brennan et al. 1998; Jones 2002).21 
Turnover ratio (Turnover) 
We use average daily turnover ratio to investigate the impact of dividend 
policy on the trading quantity dimension of liquidity. This ratio is used by 
Leuz and Verrecchia (2000) and Leuz (2003) as a measure for the level of 
information asymmetry, measured as the product of the number of shares 
traded and the stock price, to the stock’s market capitalization. Trading 
activity measures are considered good proxies for stock liquidity because 
                                                             
20 Studies that use similar proxies to measure stock liquidity include those by Brockman et 
al. (2008) in the context of share repurchases, and Mazouz et al. (2010) in the context of 
asset pricing. 
21 The liquidity costs contain some components that might be measured inaccurately. For 
example, the adverse selection component of the bid–ask spread needs “high-frequency 
data”. However, due to the lack of disclosure about information with regard to this 
component, we measure the low-frequency measures of stock liquidity. 
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they are highly associated with the bid–ask spread and other measures of 
liquidity. Additionally, in equilibrium, liquidity is correlated with the trading 
frequency. Thus, if liquidity cannot be observed directly while the turnover 
ratio can, then the latter can be used as a proxy for liquidity. The turnover 
ratio has also been widely used as a proxy for liquidity (see, e.g., Brennan et 
al. 1998; Datar et al. 1998; Chordia et al. 2001b; Avramov et al. 2006; 
Prommin et al. 2014; Huamng et al. 2015, among others), perhaps because 
it can be easily calculated using readily available data (e.g., daily data).  
 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio (Amihud) 
Although the bid–ask spread closely approximates the cost of purchasing or 
selling a small number of shares, it ignores the potential price impact of 
trading many shares. In this study, we also consider the price impact 
measure proposed by Amihud (2002). In particular, Amihud (2002) develops 
a liquidity proxy that measures the daily price response associated with one 
dollar of trading volume. This proxy closely follows the intuitive definition of 
liquid markets as those that accommodate trading with the minimum impact 
on price. In other words, a stock would have a high level of liquidity if the 
stock’s price moves little in response to a large trading volume. Many 
empirical studies employ Amihud’s liquidity proxy to measure the impact of 
corporate decisions, such as share repurchases (Hillert et al. 2016) and 
stock split (Huang et al. 2015), on stock liquidity. Using data from the US 
stock markets, Goyenko et al. (2009) and Hasbrouck (2009) show that 
Amihud’s illiquidity outperforms other measures in capturing the transaction 
costs. 
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3.5.1.2. Main explanatory variable 
Our main explanatory variable represents the dividend policy. In this study, 
two main proxies are employed to reflect the firm’s two dividend policy 
decisions: the decision to pay dividends and the amount of dividends to be 
paid. The first proxy will measure the firm’s dividend payment decisions 
(ܦܫ ௜ܸ,௧) and is a dummy variable having a value of 1 for dividend payers and 
0 for non-dividend payers (see, e.g., Ferris et al. 2009; Kuo et al. 2013). The 
second proxy is the amount of dividend decision	(ܪ݅݃ℎܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧), and is a 
binary variable having a value of 1 for stocks with dividend per share 
(ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧)	above the median, and 0 otherwise.
22 The continuous variable 
(ܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧) is also used to measure the amount of dividend decision. 
3.5.1.3. Control variables 
We use several control variables identified in the literature as main 
determinants of stock liquidity. First, we control for the volatility of returns. 
High return volatility can be viewed as high firm risk and high inventory risk 
faced by market makers (Amihud and Mendelson 1980; Ho and Stoll 1983; 
O'Hara and Oldfield 1986; Poon et al. 2013). Moreover, it is associated with 
a high level of information asymmetry between firm insiders and outsiders, 
as well as between investors with different information sets (Poon et al. 
2013). Thus, we expect to detect a negative relationship between return 
volatility and stock liquidity (Chung et al. 2010; Jacoby and Zheng 2010; 
Gopalan et al. 2012; Poon et al. 2013; Andres et al. 2014). Following Poon et 
al. (2013) and Prommin et al. (2014), we measure return volatility (Volatility) 
using the standard deviation of daily return over the year. Firm market 
performance – i.e., stock returns – can affect the firm's return volatility and 
hence stock liquidity (Hameed et al. 2010); therefore, it is important to control 
for this. Annual returns could reflect a firm's economic prosperity, as firms 
with positive future earnings may have positive returns (Andres et al. 2014). 
The higher the annual returns, the higher the stock liquidity of a firm. The 
                                                             
22 These variables have been chosen to capture the fact that dividend policy involves two 
decisions: the probability to pay and the amount of dividend paid (e.g., Li and Lie, 2006; Kim 
and Jang, 2010; Alphonse and Tran, 2014).  
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firm’s daily returns are averaged over the year to get the annual return 
(Return) (Gopalan et al. 2012; Poon et al. 2013; Andres et al. 2014; 
Charoenwong et al. 2014; Hillert et al. 2016). 
 
Besides these market-based control variables, which are commonly used in 
the literature, we control for the impact of several accounting-related firm 
characteristics. Banerjee et al. (2007) argue that both dividend policy and 
stock liquidity can be related to several common factors, including firm size, 
profitability, and growth opportunities. According to Banerjee et al. (2007), to 
examine the link between firm dividend policy and liquidity it is important to 
control for other variables that are most expected to affect the direction and 
strength of the relationship between stock liquidity and dividend policy. 
Existing studies have identified firm size, profitability, and growth 
opportunities as primary determinants of dividend policy (see, e.g., Fama 
and French 2001; Denis and Osobov 2008; Fatemi and Bildik 2012). 
Moreover, stock liquidity has been documented to be affected by these 
variables (see, e.g., Chordia et al. 2004; Chung et al. 2010; Ertimur 2004; 
Dass et al. 2011; Gopalan et al. 2012). From a theoretical perspective, there 
is a positive relationship between firm size and stock liquidity, in that as the 
firm’s size increases, the liquidity of its stock will increase. A large firm is 
more likely to be followed by analysts and attract investors than a small firm 
(Riahi et al. 2013). Moreover, a large firm is more able to disclose a lot of 
information, thus reducing the level of information asymmetry and improving 
stock liquidity (Loukil et al. 2010). Several studies show that small stocks are 
less liquid than large ones (Stoll and Whaley 1983; Stoll 2000; Chung et al. 
2010; Gopalan et al. 2012). Following Kim and Jang (2010), Chung et al. 
(2010), Poon et al. (2013), and Hillert et al. (2016), the natural logarithm of 
the book value of total assets is used as a proxy for firm size (Size).  
 
Stock liquidity also relates to the firm’s operating performance. The literature 
suggests that investors prefer to buy stocks of profitable firms. It is also 
suggested that financially healthy firms are easier to sell than those facing 
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financial difficulties. In particular, a firm with strong earnings and profits 
should be subject to a smaller illiquidity discount than one with losses. For 
example, using bid–ask spreads as a proxy for the level of information 
asymmetry, Ertimur (2004) finds that loss-making firms indeed experience a 
higher bid–ask spread than profitable firms do. Gopalan et al. (2012) and 
Charoenwong et al. (2014) find that firms with low levels of profitability have 
less liquid stock. Thus, we expect that liquidity is positively related to the 
firm's profitability. We measure firm profitability (Profitability) as the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets (Banerjee et al. 2007). 
 
Similarly, stock liquidity tends to be more valuable for firms with more growth 
opportunities. Therefore, it is expected that such firms may find ways to 
make their stock more liquid in order to reduce their cost of capital (Amihud 
and Mendelson 2012). Moreover, Dass et al. (2011) examine the stock 
liquidity of firms with high growth opportunities (firms with high levels of 
R&D), and find that the stocks of these firms are significantly more liquid than 
those of otherwise comparable firms. Consequently, the relationship between 
growth opportunities and stock liquidity is expected to be positive. Following 
Fama and French (2001),  Fama and French (2002), Banerjee et al. (2007), 
and Hussainey et al. (2011), growth opportunities (Growth) is measured as 
the ratio of the percentage changes in total assets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
 
Table 3.2 Variables definitions and measurements 
This table presents the definitions and measurements of our variables used in this study, and the 
expected signs of the explanatory variables.  
Variable (Code) Definition Exp. Sign Related Studies 
Dependent Variables: Stock Liquidity (Liq) 
Proportional bid–
ask spread 
(Spread) 
ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜ ,௧ =
1
௧ܰ
෍ቈ
2(݌௜
஺ − ݌௜
஻)
݌௜
஺ + ݌௜
஻ ቉
ே೟
௧ୀଵ
 
Howe and Lin (1992) 
Mitra and Rashid (1997) 
Brockman et al. (2008) 
Turnover ratio 
(Turnover) 
The ratio of stock trading volume (ܸܱܮܳ) to the 
number of shares outstanding (NO) 
 ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ ,௧ =
ଵ
ே೟
∑ ቂ
௏ை௅ொ೔
ேை೔
ቃே೟௧ୀଵ  
Banerjee et al. (2007) 
Brockman et al. (2008) 
Griffin (2010) 
Kuo et al. (2013) 
Amihud's (2002) 
illiquidity ratio 
(Amihud) 
Absolute (ݎ) divided by the trading dollar volume 
(ܸܱܮܦ)  
ܣ݉݅ℎݑ݀௜ ,௧ =
1
௧ܰ
	෍ ቈ
|ݎ௜|
ܸܱܮܦ௜
቉
ே೟
௧ୀଵ
 
Banerjee et al. (2007)  
Brockman et al. (2008)  
Kuo et al. (2013) 
Key Explanatory Variables: Dividend Policy 
Dividend 
payment 
decision (DIV) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock is a 
dividend payer and 0 otherwise 
ܦܫ ௜ܸ,௧ = ൜
1, ܦܫܸ ௜ܲ ,௧ > 0
0, ܦܫܸ ௜ܲ ,௧ = 0
 
Positive 
(Turnover) 
 
Negative 
(Spread and 
Amihud) 
Howe and Lin (1992) 
Mitra and Rashid (1997) 
Gurgul et al. (2003) 
Dasilas and Leventis 
(2010) 
Bozos et al. (2010) Amount of 
dividend decision 
(HighDPS) 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the stock pays a 
dividend higher than the median of dividend per 
share and 0 otherwise 
ܪ݅݃ℎܦܲ ௜ܵ ,௧ = ൜
1, ܦܲ ௜ܵ ,௧ > ܯ݁݀݅ܽ݊(ܦܲ ௜ܵ ,௧)
0, ܦܲ ௜ܵ ,௧ < ܯ݁݀݅ܽ݊(ܦܲ ௜ܵ ,௧)
 
Positive (with 
Turnover) 
 
Negative (with 
Spread and 
Amihud) 
Control Variables 
Firm size (Size) 
Natural logarithm of book value of total assets: 
ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ,௧ = ܮܰ(ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ ,௧)  
Positive (with 
Turnover) 
 
Negative (with 
Spread and 
Amihud) 
Stoll (2000) 
Chung et al. (2010) 
Gopalan et al. (2012) 
Poon et al. (2013) 
Hillert et al. (2016) 
Return volatility 
(Volatility) Standard deviation of daily returns over a year 
Negative (with 
Turnover) 
 
Positive (with 
Spread and 
Amihud) 
Chung et al. (2010) 
Jacoby and Zheng (2010) 
Gopalan et al. (2012) 
Poon et al. (2013) 
Andres et al. (2014) 
Stock return 
(Return) Daily return is averaged over the year 
Negative (with 
Turnover) 
 
Positive (with 
Spread and 
Amihud) 
Poon et al. (2013) 
Andres et al. (2014) 
Hillert et al. (2016) 
Firm profitability 
(Profitability) 
Earnings before interest and taxes (ܧܤܫܶ) 
divided by book value of total assets: 
ܲݎ݋݂݅ݐܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ௜ ,௧ =
(ܧܤܫܶ)௜,௧
	ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜,௧
 
Positive (with 
Turnover) 
 
Negative (with 
Spread and 
Amihud) 
Ertimur (2004) 
Dass et al. (2011) 
Gopalan et al. (2012) 
Growth 
opportunities 
(Growth) 
Percentage changes in book value of total 
assets 
ܩܴܱܹܶܪ࢏,࢚ =
ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ ,௧ − ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ ,௧ିଵ
ܽݏݏ݁ݐݏ௜ ,௧
 
Positive (with 
Turnover) 
 
Negative (with 
Spread and 
Amihud) 
Dass et al. (2011) 
Amihud and Mendelson 
(2012) 
Gopalan et al. (2012) 
Hillert et al. (2016) 
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3.5.2. Empirical models 
To examine the impact of dividend policy decisions on stock liquidity, we 
estimate the following model:23 
ܮܫܳ௜,௧ = β଴ + ߚଵܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ + ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ + (ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) +
ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ+ߝ݅,ݐ         (3.1) 
where ܮܫܳ௜,௧ is the stock liquidity variable measured by three different 
proxies, namely bid–ask spread, turnover ratio, and illiquidity ratio. Our 
choice of liquidity measures is driven by our desire to cover different aspects 
of liquidity. Therefore, we employ bid–ask spread (ܵ݌ݎ݁ܽ݀௜,௧) to reflect trading 
costs aspect, turnover ratio (ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜,௧) to reflect trading activity aspect, and 
illiquidity ratio (ܣ݉݅ℎݑ݀௜,௧) to reflect price impact aspect. ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧		is 
a dummy variable that reflects dividend policy decisions. It is measured by 
ܦܫ ௜ܸ,௧ to reflect the dividend payment decision and ܪ݅݃ℎܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ to reflect the 
amount of dividend paid. ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ are control variables. All variables are 
standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance in each year.  
To control for simultaneity, this study follows the common practice of using 
lagged values of the independent variables (Reed 2013; Bellemare et al. 
2015).24 We also follow previous finance studies and include year and 
industry fixed effects to control for the effect of time and industry unobserved 
heterogeneity (see, e.g., Gopalan et al. 2012; Poon et al. 2013;  Prommin et 
al. 2014; Hillert et al. 2016).25 Dummy variables are those that undertake the 
value 0 or 1 to reflect the absence or presence of a categorical effect that 
may be expected to change the outcome. Given the possibility that the 
                                                             
23 A similar approach is used by previous studies that relate corporate finance to stock 
liquidity (e.g., Hillert et al. 2016; Prommin et al. 2014; Poon et al. 2013; Rubin 2007). See 
Appendix A for an explanation of using pooled regressions with year- and industry fixed-
effects models. 
24 For example, Reed (2013) states that replacing a suspected endogenous variable with its 
lagged values is the common practice in applied econometrics. Bellemare et al. (2015: 5) 
state that “Frequently, applied researchers propose to use a lagged value of an explanatory 
variable X in order to ‘exogenize’ it when estimating the causal effect of X on Y. Since Yt 
cannot possibly cause Xt−1, the argument goes, replacing Xt with Xt−1 obviates concerns 
that X is endogenous to Y.” 
25 Unobservable heterogeneity refers to the variables that are not in a model or an analysis 
but could have influence on both the cause and effect and so may cause bias (Shadish et al. 
2002). 
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variables of this study may change over the study period, including year 
dummies will control for the trends of dividend policy. To capture this effect, 
we include a dummy variable for each year in the period of the study. In 
addition, we include industry dummies to reflect industry-specific factors that 
affect the determinants of stock liquidity (e.g., Poon et al. 2013). The 
dividend policy may differ across industries (Dhanani 2005; Kang 2006; 
Mahdzan et al. 2016). For instance, Dhanani (2005) and Kang (2006) state 
that firms in different industries follow different dividend policies because 
each industry has different characteristics, such as investment opportunities, 
regulations, and financial structure. Mahdzan et al. (2016) argue that 
different industries have distinct business natures and operate differently. 
Hence, corporate dividend patterns and dividend payout policies may vary 
across industries.  
3.6. Empirical results 
3.6.1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the main variables 
used in this study.26 The average dividend per share (DPS) is 0.091, implying 
that, on average, UK firms paid £0.091 DPS during the study period. 75% of 
UK firms paid dividends during the study period. The yearly mean 
proportional bid–ask spread is 2.9%, which is comparable to the spread of 
2.1% reported in the US over the period 1947–2008 (Næs et al. 2011). The 
average of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio is 0.002, suggesting that, on 
average, stock price moves by 0.2% for each one dollar of trading volume. 
The yearly average of the stock turnover ratio is 0.4%. All these averages 
exceed the median values, indicating the presence of skewness in the 
distributions of our variables. Furthermore, on average, each of the FTSE 
ALL index shares grows by 5% over the entire study period and has an 
average size in logs of total assets of 12.6. The average profitability ratio is 
5% indicating that earnings before interest and taxes represent 5% of total 
assets. The return volatility has an average of 2.1%. Similar volatility figures 
                                                             
26 In Appendix B, we report the descriptive statistics of the sample of dividend-paying firms 
only. 
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are reported by Chung et al. (2010) (2.39%) and Rubin (2007) (2.92%) in the 
case of the US. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports the correlation matrix of the variables used in 
this study. With regards to the alternative liquidity measures, all correlations 
have the right sign. Bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio are positively 
correlated and both are negatively correlated with turnover ratio.27 All 
correlations of liquidity measures with respect to DPS appear to have the 
right sign. With the exception of its negative correlation with turnover ratio, 
the correlation between the dividend payment decision (DIV) variable and 
other liquidity measures are of the expected sign. As for the control 
variables, we report several significant correlations which are consistent with 
prior stock liquidity literature. The turnover ratio is positively correlated with 
the firm size, while the bid–ask spread and the illiquidity ratio are negatively 
correlated with firm size. These correlations are consistent with the view that 
large firms tend to have more liquid stock (e.g., Chordia et al. 2004; Chung et 
al. 2010 ; Loukil et al. 2010). Bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio are 
negatively related to stock returns (Gopalan et al. 2012) but positively related 
to return volatility (Gopalan et al. 2012; Poon et al. 2013). However, an 
unexpected negative correlation exists between the turnover ratio and both 
profitability and growth opportunities. These results contradict the predictions 
that profitable and growing firms have more stock liquidity (Dass et al. 2011; 
Amihud and Mendelson 2012). However, all these correlation results should 
be viewed with caution as they do not control for several factors that 
influence liquidity. 
                                                             
27 These correlation patterns are consistent with the findings of previous studies (see, e.g., 
Rubin 2007). 
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Table 3.3 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of variables 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of yearly observations of the main variables of the study. Panel B reports the correlation coefficients among the dependent and 
independent variables. The sample consists of 8,780 firm-year observations over the period from 1996 to 2013. Spread denotes the proportional quoted bid–ask spread, 
Turnover is the turnover rate, Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. All of these variables are calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular year. Size is the 
firm size. Growth is the growth opportunities. Profitability is the firm profitability. Return is the average of daily returns over a year. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily 
returns over a year. DPS is the dividend per share. DIV is a dummy variable which equals 1 for dividend payers and zero otherwise. See Table 3.1 for variables measurement. 
The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  DPS DIV Turnover Spread Amihud Size Growth Profitability Return Volatility 
Observations 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 8780 
Mean     0.0907 0.7513 0.0035 0.0288 0.0018 12.5533 0.0496 0.0497 -0.0001 0.0207 
Median 0.0460 1.0000 0.0027 0.0197 0.0001 12.3502 0.0489 0.0788 0.0000 0.0187 
SD 0.1458 0.4323 0.0030 0.0314 0.0057 1.8127 0.2727 0.1798 0.0020 0.0180 
Min 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 0.0000 8.6149 -1.1676 -0.9234 -0.0083 0.0000 
Max 0.9410 1.0000 0.0169 0.1702 0.0415 17.4918 0.8016 0.3866 0.0055 0.0948 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
 DPS DIV Turnover Spread Amihud Size Growth Profitability Return Volatility 
DPS 1 
DIV 0.3581*** 1 
Turnover         0.0627*** -0.0388*** 1 
Spread -0.2908*** -0.4031*** -0.2468*** 1 
Amihud -0.1567*** -0.2803*** -0.1776*** 0.5938*** 1 
Size 0.4202*** 0.3357*** 0.3035*** -0.6149*** -0.3067*** 1 
Growth  0.0488*** 0.1465*** -0.0403*** -0.2268*** -0.2028*** 0.0861*** 1 
Profitability  0.2329*** 0.4815*** -0.0550*** -0.3990*** -0.2466*** 0.2568*** 0.4260*** 1 
Return 0.0198* 0.0473*** -0.0056 -0.0872*** -0.0852*** 0.0474*** 0.0589*** 0.0856*** 1 
Volatility -0.0748*** -0.1580*** 0.0413*** 0.1544*** 0.1185*** -0.1028*** -0.0171 -0.1154*** -0.3080*** 1 
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DPS has a positive correlation with firm profitability, indicating that as firm 
profitability increases, dividends also increase, thus firms with high 
profitability are more able to use internal sources of funds to pay dividends 
(Fama and French 2001; Denis and Osobov 2008). However, DPS is 
positively correlated with growth opportunities, which is inconsistent with the 
view that firms with high-growth opportunities tend to pay lower dividends 
(see, e.g., Fama and French 2001; DeAngelo et al. 2006). However, 
Aivazian et al. (2003) find similar results in the context of developing 
countries. Furthermore, firm size is positively related to DPS, suggesting that 
large firms are more likely to pay dividends (Al-Malkawi 2007; Kim and Jang 
2010). Similar results are reported for DIV dummy variables, which indicates 
that large, profitable high-growth firms are more likely to pay dividends. 
There does not appear to be high correlation between any two of the 
explanatory variables. The correlation coefficients are generally low (<0.5), 
implying an absence of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables. As 
a further check for multicollinearity, we use the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF): 
ܸܫܨ = 1/(1 − ܴଶ) 
where ܴଶ is the coefficient determination of a certain explanatory variable’s 
regression on all other explanatory variables. The explanatory variable is 
considered to be collinear with other explanatory variables if the ܸܫܨ 
coefficient of the variable is more than five (Berenson et al. 2009). However, 
if the ܸܫܨ coefficient for any explanatory variable is equal to one, then that 
variable is independent of other variables, i.e., collinearity does not have any 
significant effect on the relationship between the explanatory variable and 
the dependent variable. We perform a collinearity test between the 
explanatory variables (dividend policy variables, firm size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, returns and volatility) to test the presence of 
collinearity between the explanatory variables with a significant effect on the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable. 
The values of the ܸܫܨ were calculated by performing Collinearity Diagnostics 
(see Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4 Variance inflation factor (VIF) 
This table presents the VIF between the explanatory variables. Size is the firm size. Growth 
is the growth opportunities. Profitability is the firm profitability. Return is the average of daily 
returns over a year. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns over a year. DPS is 
the dividend per share. DIV is a dummy variable which equals one for dividend payers and 
zero otherwise. See Table 3.1 for variables measurement. 
Variable VIF Tolerance R-Squared 
DPS 1.3 0.7682 0.2318 
DIV 1.48 0.6771 0.3229 
Size 1.29 0.775 0.225 
Growth  1.23 0.8113 0.1887 
Profitability 1.59 0.6275 0.3725 
Return 1.11 0.9004 0.0996 
Volatility 1.13 0.8812 0.1188 
Mean 1.31     
 
 
Table 3.5 Means of stock liquidity across industry sectors 
This table presents the average of stock liquidity measures according to the industry 
classification over the sample period. For stock liquidity this study uses proportional bid–ask 
spread (Spread), turnover ratio (Turnover), and Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud). 
Industry Turnover Spread Amihud 
Basic Materials 0.0034 0.0255 0.0017 
Consumer Goods 0.0030 0.0280 0.0017 
Consumer Services 0.0039 0.0243 0.0016 
Health Care 0.0032 0.0363 0.0023 
Industrials 0.0031 0.0278 0.0017 
Oil & Gas 0.0036 0.0282 0.0011 
Technology 0.0042 0.0413 0.0027 
Telecommunications 0.0047 0.0186 0.0004 
 
 
Table 3.5 shows how stock liquidity varies across industries. Technology and 
health care companies have the highest proportional bid–ask spread 
(Spread), 4.13% and 3.63% respectively. In contrast, telecommunication 
companies have the lowest Spread with an average of 1.86%. Regarding the 
Amihud illiquidity ratio (Amihud), telecommunication companies have the 
lowest illiquidity ratio with an average of 0.04%. Nevertheless, health care 
and technology have the highest illiquidity ratios with an average of 0.23% 
and 0.27%, respectively. Regarding turnover ratio (Turnover), 
telecommunication firms have the highest turnover ratio average of 0.47%, 
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while consumer goods companies have the lowest average of 0.30%. We 
use industry dummies to control for the variations in liquidity across 
industries. 
3.6.2. Univariate results 
This section examines the effect of dividend policy on stock liquidity using 
univariate analysis. This analysis involves a comparison of the stock liquidity 
using three different measures for two sets of groups: dividend-paying stocks 
and non-dividend-paying stocks as well as high-dividend-paying stocks and 
low-dividend-paying stocks. Panel A of Table 3.6 contains descriptive data 
for dividend-paying stocks and non-dividend-paying stocks. The results show 
that the average (median) bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio for dividend-
paying stocks over the entire period are 2.2% (0.09%). These figures are 
lower than their counterparts of non-dividend-paying stocks which exhibit an 
average (median) bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio of 5.08% (0.46%). The 
t-test and the Mann Whitney test indicate that dividend payers exhibit 
significantly lower bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio than non-dividend 
payers. These results are consistent with our hypothesis (H1), which 
suggests that stocks of dividend-paying firms are significantly more liquid 
than those of non-dividend-paying firms. These results are consistent with 
Howe and Lin (1992) who find that, on average, dividend-paying stocks have 
a lower bid–ask spread than non-paying stocks. However, the turnover ratio 
of dividends paying stocks has an average (median) of 0.34% (0.26%), 
which is lower than non-dividend-paying stocks. This result contradicts our 
prediction of a positive association between dividend payment and trading 
activity, as dividend-paying firms are more favourable to large investors such 
as institutional investors (Allen et al. 2000; Grinstein and Michaely 2005). 
Institutional investors have the ability to trade more frequently and in large 
quantities and hence increase stock liquidity due to higher trading activity 
(Rubin 2007). However, this result may suggest that although financial 
institutions are more likely to buy dividend-paying stocks because of their 
preference for holding higher-yielding stocks, they tend to be more passive 
“buy and hold” investors (Hotchkiss and Lawrence 2007; IOSCO Emerging 
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Markets Committee 2007: 12), and hence their transactions occur less 
frequently. 
Table 3.6 Univariate analysis  
This table reports descriptive statistics of the yearly observations of the liquidity measures of 
dividend-paying stocks and non-dividend-paying stocks (Panel A) and high-dividend-paying 
stocks and low-dividend-paying stocks (Panel B). The t-tests and Mann Whitney tests are 
used to test the significance of the differences in the averages of the liquidity measures of 
the two sets of stocks. Spread denotes the proportional quoted bid–ask spread, Turnover is 
the turnover rate and Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. See Table 3.2 for 
variables measurement. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. non-dividend payers 
  Dividend-paying stocks 
Non-dividend-
paying stocks 
Differences between dividend-
paying and non-dividend-paying 
stocks 
Mean Median Mean Median t-Stat Mann Whitney 
Spread 0.0216 0.0163 0.0508 0.0394 30.5994*** 33.194*** 
Turnover 0.0034 0.0026 0.0037 0.0027 3.3470*** 0.985 
Amihud 0.0009 0.0001 0.0046 0.0005 17.6184*** 27.660*** 
Panel B: High-dividend payers vs. low-dividend payers 
  High-dividend-paying stocks 
Low-dividend-
paying stocks 
Differences between high-
dividend payers’ and low-dividend 
payers’ stocks 
Mean Median Mean Median t-Stat Mann Whitney 
Spread 0.0141 0.0092 0.0286 0.0236 29.967*** 32.550*** 
Turnover 0.0038 0.0029 0.0031 0.0024 -10.129*** -9.917*** 
Amihud 0.0003 0.0000 0.0012 0.0002 18.372*** 30.535*** 
 
 
Another univariate analysis is conducted to examine the effect of the amount 
of dividend on stock liquidity using two sets of stocks: high-dividend-paying 
(dividend per share>median) and low-dividend-paying (dividend per 
share<median) stocks. The results in Panel B of Table 3.6 show that high-
dividend-paying stocks exhibit an average (a median) bid–ask spread and 
illiquidity ratio of 1.41% (0.92%) and 0.03% (0.00%), respectively. These 
figures are lower than that of low-dividend-paying stocks. Moreover, high-
dividend payers have an average (a median) turnover ratio of 0.38% 
(0.29%), which is higher than that of low-dividend payers. The differences in 
the three liquidity measures of the two groups are significant, as confirmed 
by the t-test and the Mann Whitney. This provides evidence to support our 
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hypothesis (H2), which states that stocks of high-dividend payers are 
significantly more liquid than those of low-dividend payers.  
Thus, preliminary results suggest a positive effect of dividend policy 
decisions on the stock liquidity. However, the differences in stock liquidity 
measures may be attributable to changes in other factors (firm size, growth 
opportunities, profitability, etc). Therefore, to examine the relationship 
between stock liquidity and dividend policy decisions while accounting for the 
possible explanatory power of these variables on stock liquidity, we move to 
the second stage of the analysis.  
3.6.3. Multivariate results 
3.6.3.1. The impact of decisions to pay dividends on stock liquidity 
In this section, we examine the impact of dividend payment decisions on 
different aspects of stock liquidity while controlling for other factors that can 
affect this relationship. Table 3.7 presents the results of the pooled OLS 
regression analysis where dividend policy is measured by dividend payment 
decision dummy variable (DIV). The t-statistics shown in parentheses are 
based on robust standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and firm 
clustering. The coefficient on the dividend payment dummy (DIV) is 
negatively and statistically associated with both bid–ask spread and illiquidity 
ratio. These findings strongly support our first hypothesis (H1). This result is 
consistent with Howe and Lin (1992), who find that dividend-paying stocks 
have on average a lower bid–ask spread than non-paying stocks. It is also 
consistent with the view that a greater level of asymmetric information will 
result in a larger price impact (Amihud and Mendelson 2012). Mitra and 
Rashid (1997) conclude that the dividend payment decisions provide useful 
information to the market and hence reduce informational asymmetry. 
Consequently, bid–ask spread and price impact decrease and stock liquidity 
improves. The economic significance of these results is also important. For 
instance, dividend payers have bid–ask spread that is 0.35 standard 
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deviations lower than those of non-dividend payers.28 Likewise, Amihud’s 
illiquidity ratio (price impact) is 0.35 standard deviations lower for dividend 
payers compared to non-payers. 
Table 3.7 The effect of dividend payment decisions on stock liquidity: 
pooled OLS regression model 
This table presents the results of the pooled OLS regression of the effect of dividend 
payment decisions on stock liquidity. The dependent variable is stock liquidity and is 
measured by the following: (1) Turnover is the turnover rate, (2) Spread denotes the 
proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. All 
of these variables are calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular year. DIV 
is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the stock is dividend-paying and a value of 0 if 
otherwise. Size is the firm size. Growth is the growth opportunities. Profitability is the firm 
profitability. Return is the firm stock return and Volatility is stock return volatility. See Table 
3.2 for variables measurement. Year and industry dummies are included to control for year 
and industry effects. Numbers in parentheses represent t-values that are adjusted using 
standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. The 
asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Turnover Spread Amihud 
DIV -0.2141*** -0.3454*** -0.3498*** 
 (-3.47) (-7.10) (-6.09) 
Size 0.4483*** -0.4976*** -0.2518*** 
 (13.49) (-24.34) (-13.40) 
Growth 0.0029 -0.0829*** -0.1104*** 
 (0.19) (-5.86) (-5.80) 
Profitability -0.0516** -0.1572*** -0.0567** 
 (-2.27) (-7.28) (-2.47) 
Return -0.0162 -0.0753*** -0.0723*** 
 (-1.61) (-6.31) (-4.38) 
Volatility 0.0195 0.0273 0.0097 
 (0.98) (1.60) (0.56) 
Intercept -0.0744 0.4010*** 0.2311*** 
 (-0.82) (4.65) (2.61) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7739 7739 7739 
F-statistic 21.90*** 55.53*** 11.99*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.2636 0.4699 0.1828 
 
 
                                                             
28 Given that variables are standardized, the coefficient is interpreted as standard deviation 
changes in the dependent variable resulting from one standard deviation in the independent 
variable. 
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However, dividend payment decisions are found to have negative and 
significant impacts on turnover ratio. The coefficient on DIV is negative (-
0.2141) and significant (t=3.47). This result does not support our prediction 
that dividend payment decisions improve trading activity, and it is consistent 
with the view that although institutions are more likely to buy dividend-paying 
stocks because of their preference for holding higher-yielding stocks, they 
tend to be more passive “buy and hold” investors (Hotchkiss and Lawrence 
2007). Also, it is in line with the report of the International Organization of 
Securities' Commissions (IOSCO) Emerging Markets Committee (December 
2007), which states that dividend policy should to be taken into account 
when evaluating a stock’s liquidity and that stocks with high dividends tend to 
be bought and held by their investors and hence their transactions occur less 
frequently. 
The coefficient estimates for the control variables are also mostly consistent 
with our expectations. The coefficient on stock Returns is negative and 
significant in the regressions where bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio are 
used as the dependent variables. This is in line with the view that firms with 
lower market performance have less liquid stock (Gopalan et al. 2012; 
Charoenwong et al. 2014). We also show that Size is significantly and 
positively associated with turnover ratio, and significantly and negatively 
associated with both bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio. This may reflect the 
fact that large firms are more likely to be followed by analysts and attract 
investors and hence experience a lower degree of information asymmetry 
than small ones (Kadapakkam et al. 1998). Moreover, a large firm is more 
able to disclose a lot of information thus reducing the level of information 
asymmetry and improving stock liquidity (Loukil et al. 2010). Our results are 
in line with the findings of many studies, including Chung et al. (2010), 
Gopalan et al. (2012), Poon et al. (2013), Prommin et al. (2014), and Hillert 
et al. (2016), who find that large firms tend to have higher levels of stock 
liquidity compared to small firms. Growth is significantly negatively related to 
bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio suggesting that stock liquidity tends to be 
more valuable for firms with more growth opportunities. For example, Amihud 
and Mendelson (2012) argue that firms with high growth opportunities are 
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more likely to follow ways to make their stock more liquid in order to reduce 
their cost of capital. Consistent results are found in Dass et al. (2011) and 
Gopalan et al. (2012). Profitability is negatively and significantly associated 
with bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio. These results are in line with 
previous studies that show that more profitable firms and firms with better 
operating performance tend to have higher stock liquidity than their loss-
making counterparts (Gopalan et al. 2012; Andres et al. 2014; Charoenwong 
et al. 2014).  
3.6.3.2. The impact of the amount of dividend decision on stock 
liquidity 
We now turn to estimate the impact of the amount of dividend decision on 
the level of stock liquidity using the sub-sample of dividend-paying stocks 
only. Table 3.8 shows the pooled OLS estimation results of our main model 
where the HighDPS dummy variable is used as a proxy for the amount of 
dividend decision. The results show that HighDPS has a negative impact on 
liquidity. The coefficients on HighDPS in regressions with the bid–ask spread 
and illiquidity ratio as the dependent variable are -0.0961 (t=-2.96) and -
0.1382 (t=-4.11), respectively. This indicates that firms that pay a high 
amount of dividends are more liquid than those firms that pay a low amount 
of dividends, which is consistent with our second hypothesis (H2). These 
results are economically significant. The bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio of 
firms that pay high dividends are, respectively, 0.096 and 0.138 standard 
deviations lower than those of firms that pay a low amount of dividends. 
These results are consistent with Howe and Lin (1992) who find that bid–ask 
spread is significantly negatively related to dividend amount.  
With regards to the control variables, the results are generally in line with 
previous studies. The size of the firm has a positive and significant impact on 
stock liquidity, consistent with Chung et al. (2010), Gopalan et al. (2012), 
Poon et al. (2013), Prommin et al. (2014), and Hillert et al. (2016). As 
expected, the profitability variable has a significantly positive impact on the 
turnover ratio but a significantly negative impact on both bid–ask spread and 
illiquidity ratio, indicating that firms with better operating performance have 
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higher stock liquidity (Gopalan et al. 2012; Andres et al. 2014; Charoenwong 
et al. 2014). The growth opportunities variable has a significant and positive 
effect on stock liquidity, in line with Amihud and Mendelson (2012). Stocks 
with higher return have higher stock liquidity, consistent with Gopalan et al. 
(2012), Andres et al. (2014), and Charoenwong et al. (2014).  
Table 3.8 The impact of the amount of dividends decision (HighDPS) on 
stock liquidity: pooled OLS regression model 
This table presents the results of the pooled OLS regression of the effect of the amount of 
dividends decision on stock liquidity. The dependent variable is stock liquidity and is 
measured by the following: (1) Turnover is the turnover rate, (2) Spread denotes the 
proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. All 
of these variables are calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular year. 
HighDPS is a dummy variable with a value of 1 with observations above the median DPS 
and 0 otherwise. Size is the firm size. Growth is the growth opportunities. Profitability is the 
firm profitability. Return is the firm stock return and Volatility is stock return volatility. See 
Table 3.2 for variables measurement. Year and industry dummies are included to control for 
year and industry effects. Numbers in parentheses represent t-values that are adjusted 
using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. The 
asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Turnover Spread Amihud 
HighDPS 0.0663 -0.0961*** -0.1382*** 
 (1.47) (-2.96) (-4.11) 
Size  0.4416*** -0.5896*** -0.3649*** 
 (12.24) (-23.79) (-14.90) 
Growth -0.0198 -0.0480*** -0.0912*** 
 (-1.41) (-3.67) (-6.32) 
Profitability 0.0499** -0.1961*** -0.1405*** 
 (2.15) (-11.63) (-7.67) 
Return -0.0112 -0.0696*** -0.0474*** 
 (-0.90) (-5.96) (-2.99) 
Volatility 0.0271 0.0014 -0.0197 
 (1.43) (0.09) (-1.27) 
Intercept -0.3608*** 0.2989*** -0.0001 
 (-3.62) (3.48) (0.00) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5713 5713 5713 
F-statistic 22.49*** 45.40*** 12.58*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.3275 0.4897 0.2376 
 
We further investigate the effect of the amount of dividend payment on stock 
liquidity by regressing stock liquidity measures on a continuous dividend 
variable measured by the dividend per share (DPS). Table 3.9 shows that 
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the coefficient on DPS is significantly negative with respect to both bid-ask 
spread and illiquidity ratio. This indicates that firms that pay a high amount of 
dividends are more liquid than those firms that pay a low amount of 
dividends, which is consistent with our second hypothesis (H2). In terms of 
economic significance, the results suggest that a one standard deviation 
increases in dividend per share results in 0.016 and 0.022 standard 
deviations decrease in bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio, respectively.  
Table 3.9 The impact of the amount of dividends decision (DPS) on 
stock liquidity: pooled OLS regression model 
This table presents the results of the pooled OLS regression of the effect of the amount of 
dividends decision on stock liquidity. The dependent variable is stock liquidity and is 
measured by the following: (1) Turnover is the turnover rate, (2) Spread denotes the 
proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. All 
of these variables are calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular year. DPS 
is a continuous variable measured as the dividend per share. Size is the firm size. Growth is 
the growth opportunities. Profitability is the firm profitability. Return is the firm stock return 
and Volatility is stock return volatility. See Table 3.2 for variables measurement. Year and 
industry dummies are included to control for year and industry effects. Numbers in 
parentheses represent t-values that are adjusted using standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Turnover Spread Amihud 
DPS -0.0201 -0.0155*** -0.0221* 
 (-0.69) (-2.94) (-1.98) 
Size  0.4348*** -0.5374*** -0.2779*** 
 (14.19) (-24.69) (-13.49) 
Growth 0.0053 -0.0773*** -0.1061*** 
 (0.35) (-5.42) (-5.51) 
Profitability -0.0838*** -0.2156*** -0.1108*** 
 (-3.82) (-11.21) (-5.14) 
Return -0.0156 -0.0735*** -0.0712*** 
 (-1.56) (-6.05) (-4.26) 
Volatility 0.0280 0.0418** 0.0237 
 (1.40) (2.30) (1.30) 
Intercept -0.23287*** 0.14759* -0.02736 
 (-2.92) (1.92) (-0.36) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7739 7739 7739 
F-statistic 22.20*** 55.49*** 11.44*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.2585 0.4564 0.1695 
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Using a subsample discards part of the information contained in the non-
paying firms. To account for this, we conduct a regression with both DIV that 
separates payers (low and high) from non-payers and HighDPS separates 
high payers from both low and non-payers using the full sample. The results 
are reported in Table 3.10. The results continue to hold.  Stock liquidity is 
found to be positively related to whether the stock is dividend payer or not as 
well as to have positive relationship with the amount of dividends. The 
coefficients on DIV and HighDPS are negative with respect to both Spread 
and Amihud. 
Table 3.10 The impact of both dividend payment (DIV) and amount of 
dividends decisions (HighDPS) on stock liquidity: pooled OLS 
regression model 
This table presents the results of the pooled OLS regression of the effect of both dividend 
payment decision and the amount of dividends decision on stock liquidity. The dependent 
variable is stock liquidity and is measured by the following: (1) Turnover is the turnover rate, 
(2) Spread denotes the proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity ratio. All of these variables are calculated as the averages of daily values 
over a particular year. DIV is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the stock is dividend-
paying and a value of 0 if otherwise. HighDPS is a dummy variable with a value of 1 with 
observations above the median DPS and 0 otherwise. Size is the firm size. Growth is the 
growth opportunities. Profitability is the firm profitability. Return is the firm stock return and 
Volatility is stock return volatility. See Table 3.2 for variables measurement. Year and 
industry dummies are included to control for year and industry effects. Numbers in 
parentheses represent t-values that are adjusted using standard errors corrected for 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Turnover Spread Amihud 
DIV -0.2306*** -0.2946*** -0.2796*** 
(-3.71) (-5.66) (-4.66) 
HighDPS 0.0339 -0.1041*** -0.1439*** 
 (0.82) (-3.52) (-4.84) Size  0.4441*** -0.4846*** -0.2338*** 
 (13.23) (-23.60) (-12.76) Growth 0.0039 -0.0860*** -0.1146*** 
 (0.26) (-6.06) (-5.98) 
Profitability -0.0529** -0.1532*** -0.0511** 
 (-2.31) (-7.63) (-2.23) Return -0.0160 -0.0758*** -0.0730*** 
 (-1.60) (-6.35) (-4.43) Volatility 0.0201 0.0257 0.0074 
 (1.01) (1.50) (0.43) 
Intercept -0.0795 0.4165*** 0.2525*** 
 (-0.87) (4.84) (2.83) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7739 7739 7739 
F-statistic 21.24*** 54.05*** 11.68*** 
Adj R-squared 0.2636 0.4714 0.1855 
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3.6.4. Robustness checks 
3.6.4.1. Endogeneity issues 
The analysis of the impact of dividend policy decisions on stock liquidity is 
not straightforward, because dividend decisions are not randomly determined 
(Li and Prabhala 2005; Khang and King 2006; Turkiela 2014), and they may 
be affected by factors that are also related to stock liquidity, suggesting that 
stock liquidity itself may impact the decision to pay (see, e.g., Banerjee et al. 
2007; Griffin 2010; Kuo et al. 2013). In the existing literature on the 
relationship between corporate finance and stock liquidity, different studies 
regard the endogeneity issue as the most important concern (see, e.g., 
Rubin 2007; Lipson and Mortal 2009; Poon et al. 2013). In fact, Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) suggest that a variety of financing decisions could be 
influenced by liquidity effects. Therefore, it seems worthwhile to investigate 
whether endogeneity is a cause for concern.  
Roberts and Whited (2012) point out that the endogeneity problem mainly 
results from two sources: unobservable heterogeneity and simultaneity. On 
the one hand, unobservable heterogeneity, also known as omitted variables, 
occurs when the relationship between two or more variables in the 
regression model is influenced by other variables that should be included in 
the vector of explanatory variables, but for various reasons are not (Roberts 
and Whited 2012). If there is a correlation between these omitted variables 
and other variables in the model, in this case we are dealing with an 
endogeneity problem in our regression model (Hsiao 2003). In the dividend 
policy–liquidity relationship, firm-specific characteristics – also known as firm-
fixed effects– could influence dividend policy variables, but are unobservable 
and difficult to measure. We argue that the decisions of the firm’s 
management regarding dividends are not exogenous (Khang and King 2006; 
Turkiela 2014); rather, they can be affected by variables that are also related 
to stock liquidity. Hence, dividend-paying firms (or payers of high dividends) 
and non-paying firms (or payers of low dividends) may have different 
characteristics. If this is the case, a simple comparison between stock 
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liquidity of dividend-paying firms (or payers of high dividends) and non-
paying firms (or payers of low dividends) will be biased.  
On the other hand, simultaneity arises when the dependent variable and one 
or more of the explanatory ones are jointly determined. In this case, the first 
variable causes the other(s), and the reverse is true (Roberts and Whited 
2012).29 Previous literature on dividend policy has found a causal relation 
between stock liquidity and dividends. Many studies document a negative 
association between stock market liquidity and dividend payment decision. 
Many studies, including Banerjee et al. (2007), Kuo et al. (2013), and 
Alphonse and Tran (2014), show that stock liquidity has a significant effect 
on dividend policy and that firms with more (less) stock liquidity are less 
(more) likely to pay dividends. This suggests that relationship may run from 
stock liquidity to dividend policy.  
Using lagged independent variables30 and the inclusion of year and 
industries dummies31 in our main model mitigate but do not eliminate 
endogeneity. To further control for endogeneity, we adopt two additional 
models: a two-stage regression approach and firm fixed-effects model.  
Two-stage regression approach32 
This approach allows the recovery of causal estimates in the presence of 
non-random assignment to treatment. In the first stage, the probability of 
being selected in the treatment group is estimated from exogenous 
instruments. In the second stage, the main model is estimated by adding a 
                                                             
29 According to Gujarati (2004:753-754), a “simultaneity problem arises because some of the 
regressors are endogenous and are therefore likely to be correlated with the disturbance, or 
error term”. 
30 Many previous finance studies use the lagged independent variables to control for 
endogeneity; see for example, Brockman et al. (2009) and Gopalan et al. (2012). 
31 For example, Poon et al. (2013) use industry and firm fixed-effect specifications to account 
for omitted variables in the relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity. They 
state that “To alleviate concerns about endogeneity and spurious inferences, in addition to 
including the control variables that the literature identifies as important determinants of 
market liquidity, all model specifications include industry fixed effects to control for time-
invariant omitted industry-level factors that affect liquidity. We also include year effects to 
control for cross-sectional dependence, that is, market-wide factors that affect a stock’s 
market liquidity” (p.93). 
32 See Gul et al. (2010) for a similar approach in the context of audit quality and price 
synchronicity and Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) in the context of cross listing and stock 
price informativeness. 
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control variable that captures the difference between treatment and control 
group resulting from unmodelled sources of variance in the selection 
process. Therefore, the correlation between the error term and selection is 
removed, and consistent estimators can be obtained (see Antonakis et al. 
2014). 
The first stage of this estimation method estimates the likelihood of a firm 
paying dividends (or high dividends) given firm characteristics: 
ܲݎ݋ܾܾ݈ܽ݅݅ݐݕ	(ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧) = ݂	(ߜܼ௜௧)                                 (3.2) 
where ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ is the dividend policy variable measured by (1) ܦܫ ௜ܸ௧ 
which is the dividend paying dummy variable with a value of 1 if the stock is 
dividend-paying in year t and 0 otherwise and (2) ܪ݅݃ℎܦܲ ௜ܵ,௧ which is the 
amount of dividend dummy variable with a value of 1 if the stock has a DPS 
in year t above the median and 0 otherwise. ܼ௜௧ are the control variables in 
addition to an instrumental variable. As an instrumental variable for the 
Dividend	policy dummy, we use the industry-median dividend per share. We 
believe that this may be a valid instrument because an industry-level 
dividend may affect the dividend decisions of a given firm within that industry, 
but it is unlikely to have a direct impact on this firm’s stock liquidity.33 We 
include all the exogenous regressors along with this instrument. Year and 
industry dummies are included to control for year and industry fixed effects. 
In the second stage, we estimate our main regressions in two different ways 
to deal with potential endogeneity biases arising from the fact that dividend 
policy decisions are endogenously determined and that some potential 
determinants affect both dividend policy and stock liquidity. First, we conduct 
an instrumental variable (IV) regression in which we estimate our main 
regressions with the fitted value of ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ which are the estimated 
probability of Dividend policy from the first-stage probit regression (Equation 
3.2) as an instrument for the dividend policy decision variable in the main 
model. Second, we follow the Heckman (1979) two-stage treatment effect 
                                                             
33 Similar studies that use industry-level variables as instruments are Jiraporn et al. (2011) 
and Kini and Williams (2012). 
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procedure.34 More specifically, the coefficient estimates from the probit 
model are used to compute the Inverse Mills Ratios (IMRs) (λ୧୲),
35 which are 
the probability density function divided by the cumulative distribution function 
of a distribution, for each observation in the sample: 
for ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ୧,୲ = 1, λ୧୲ = 	
ம(ஔ୞౟౪)
஀(ஔ୞౟౪)
                                       (3.3) 
for ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ୧,୲ = 0, λ୧୲ = 	−
ம(ஔ୞౟౪)
ଵି஀(ஔ୞౟౪)
                                (3.4) 
λ୧୲ is the IMR;  is the standard normal probability density function; and  is 
the cumulative distribution of the standard normal function. Then we estimate 
our main model while including the estimated IMRs to account for the 
endogeneity bias and get reliable parameter estimates.  
Table 3.11 presents the results of the two-stage regressions for the decision 
to pay dividends (DIV). Column (1) reports the probit estimates of the first 
stage. The industry–dividend median variable is positively and statistically 
significant, indicating that the higher the level of dividend per share within a 
particular industry, the more likely firms are to pay dividends.36 In Column 
(2), we report the second-stage results. Panel A reports second-stage results 
from IV regression with predicted value of DIV included,37 while Panel B 
presents those from the Heckman model with the IMR included. Both Panels 
                                                             
34 The description ‘‘Heckman’s two-stage procedure’’ may make some confusion with the 
Heckman’s sample selection correction. In the thesis we do not use the Heckman’s sample 
selection model as we have stock liquidity information for both dividend payers and non-
payers. The aim of sample selection corrections is different from that of treatment effect. For 
the sample selection problem, the aim is to estimate β. However, in estimating an average 
treatment effect we are interested in the causal effect that dividend decisions (DIV/HighDPS) 
has on stock liquidity. See Guo and Fraser (2015) for more details about the difference 
between these two procedures and Campa and Kedia (2002) for an application of the 
procedure in the context of diversification 
35 The IMR is an estimate of the non-selection hazard that addresses the probability of a 
stock with characteristics Z୧୲ being a dividend payer. 
36 To test the validity of our instrument, we look at the first stage (see Larcker and Rusticus 
(2010: 192) and Antonakis et al. (2014: 32)). The first-stage F-tests that the instruments are 
jointly zero exceed critical value for a weak instrument (F=8.96 for the case with one 
instrument) as developed in Stock et al. (2002). Moreover, our instrument is highly 
significant in the first stage OLS regressions with a t-statistic of 3.20 and 3.49 for DIV and 
HighDPS, respectively. These alleviate the concern that our estimation suffers from bias 
introduced by having weak instruments. 
37 This was carried out using the treatreg command in STATA 13 since the endogenous 
variable is a dummy. The treatment regression considers the effect of an endogenously 
chosen binary treatment on another endogenous continuous variable (Cong and Drukker 
2001).  
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involve the three stock liquidity measures. As shown in both Panels, results 
continue to hold. Consistent with H1, the coefficients on DIV are significantly 
negative, at varying levels of statistical significance. The dividend-paying 
firms have lower bid–ask spread and lower illiquidity ratio and hence higher 
stock liquidity. However, the dividend-paying firms are found to have lower 
turnover ratio, suggesting that dividends may decrease liquidity on some 
dimensions. This result is consistent with the view that stocks of dividend-
paying firms may be purchased and hold by investors (Hotchkiss and 
Lawrence 2007; IOSCO Emerging Markets Committee December 2007). 
 
Table 3.12 represents the results of the two-stage regressions for the 
amount of dividend decision (HighDPS). The first-stage regression results 
are in Column (1) and the second-stage regressions are in Column (2). The 
results of Column (1) show that the industry–dividend median variable is 
positively and statistically significant. This result indicates that the higher the 
level of dividend per share within a particular industry, the more likely firms 
are to pay high dividends. Column (2) shows that payers of high dividends 
have a significantly higher stock liquidity than payers of low dividends.  
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Table 3.11 The effect of dividend payment decision on stock liquidity: two-stage regressions 
This table reports the results of two-stage regressions in which the DIV dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for dividend-paying stocks and 0 otherwise, is assumed to 
be endogenous. Columns (1) and (2) report the first- and second-stage regression results, respectively. The first-stage regression is a probit regression with the DIV dummy 
being the dependent variable. We instrument for this variable using the industry-median DPS variable. Panel A reports the results from the IV approach, and Panel B reports 
the results from the Heckman approach. The dependent variable is stock liquidity and measured by the following: (1) Turnover is the turnover rate, (2) Spread denotes the 
proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio All of these variables are calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular 
year. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman model. The other variables are defined in Table 3.2. Year and industry dummies are included to control for year and industry 
effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
First stage Second stage 
(1) (2) 
Panel A: IV approach with the predicted DIV  Panel B: Heckman approach with inverse Mills ratio included 
Turnover Spread Amihud  Turnover Spread Amihud 
DIV -0.2795** -0.4600*** -0.4983***  -0.2853 -0.7873*** -1.1217*** 
(-2.45) (-10.17) (-10.33)  (-1.44) (-4.65) (-5.53) 
Size 0.4553*** 0.4454*** -0.5075*** -0.2501***  0.4460*** -0.4741*** -0.1866*** 
 (19.35) (28.35) (-53.36) (-23.76)  (12.88) (-20.68) (-8.82) Growth -0.0678*** -0.0555*** -0.0850*** -0.1075***  -0.0556*** -0.0896*** -0.1164*** 
 (-2.98) (-4.34) (-7.91) (-7.79)  (-3.58) (-6.48) (-6.97) Profitability 0.7505*** -0.0434* -0.1466*** -0.0509***  -0.0424 -0.0926*** 0.0519 
 (18.21) (-1.80) (-9.23) (-2.67)  (-1.08) (-2.66) (1.30) Return -0.0259 0.0080 -0.0164* -0.0279**  0.0079 -0.0177* -0.0304*** 
 (-1.37) (0.68) (-1.73) (-2.36)  (0.76) (-1.93) (-2.64) Volatility -0.1722*** 0.0449*** 0.0431*** 0.0325**  0.0447** 0.0305* 0.0084 
 (-9.21) (3.69) (4.23) (2.40)  (2.13) (1.90) (0.50) Industry-median DPS 0.3103***  
 (3.20)  IMR  0.0169 0.2543*** 0.4428*** 
  (0.14) (2.76) (4.17) Intercept 0.8259*** -0.1167 0.3705*** 0.2819***  -0.1124 0.6136*** 0.7448*** 
 (8.59) (-1.23) (6.88) (4.38)  (-0.69) (4.10) (4.33) Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8780 8780 8780 8780  8780 8780 8780 
F/Chi2 1492.9*** 2334.91*** 5193.41*** 783.75***  22.33*** 57.88*** 12.40*** 
Pseudo R2/R2 0.3466  0.2682 0.5035 0.2127 
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Table 3.12 The effect of the amount of dividend decision on stock liquidity: two-stage regressions 
This table reports the results of two-stage regressions in which the HighDPS dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 for observations with above the median DPS and 0 
otherwise, is assumed to be endogenous. Columns (1) and (2) report the first- and second-stage regression results, respectively. The first-stage regression is a probit 
regression with the HighDPS dummy being the dependent variable. We instrument for this variable using the industry-median DPS variable. Panel A reports the results from 
the IV approach, and Panel B reports the results from the Heckman approach. The dependent variable is stock liquidity and measured by the following: (1) Turnover is the 
turnover rate, (2) Spread denotes the proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. All of these variables are calculated as the 
averages of daily values over a particular year. IMR is the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman model. The other variables are defined in Table 3.2. Year and industry dummies 
are included to control for year and industry effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
First stage Second stage 
(1) (2) 
IV approach with the predicted DIV Heckman approach with inverse Mills ratio included 
Turnover Spread Amihud Turnover Spread Amihud 
HighDPS 0.8385*** -0.7000*** -0.4719*** 3.2060*** -2.2422*** -1.3222*** 
(12.89) (-15.29) (-14.19) (6.98) (-5.76) (-3.08) 
Size  0.5741*** 0.2738*** -0.4993*** -0.3273*** -0.1671* -0.2121*** -0.1690** 
 (29.35) (16.17) (-37.49) (-27.30) (-1.79) (-2.71) (-1.94) Growth -0.0719*** -0.0707*** -0.0730*** -0.0855*** -0.0087 -0.1135*** -0.1077*** 
 (-3.88) (-5.17) (-7.09) (-7.30) (-0.48) (-7.84) (-6.59) Profitability 0.3182*** -0.0539*** -0.1702*** -0.1404*** -0.2953*** -0.0129 -0.0537 
 (15.74) (-3.63) (-14.71) (-10.77) (-5.70) (-0.29) (-1.11) Return -0.0281 -0.0019 -0.0296*** -0.0343** 0.0195* -0.0435*** -0.0420*** 
 (-1.52) (-0.14) (-2.77) (-2.53) (1.65) (-4.27) (-3.35) Volatility -0.0415** 0.0622*** 0.0027 -0.0085 0.0928*** -0.0172 -0.0195 
 (-2.24) (4.92) (0.26) (-0.63) (4.92) (-1.11) (-1.11) Industry-Median DPS 0.3622*** 
 (3.49) IMR -1.9360*** 1.2748*** 0.7171*** 
 (-6.98) (5.44) (2.78) Intercept -0.7464*** -0.6922*** 0.4042*** 0.1240** -1.59921*** 0.9951*** 0.4498** 
 (-5.84) (-12.21) (7.96) (2.43) (-8.21) (-5.94) (2.55) Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 
F/Chi2 1240.59*** 2047.2*** 5193.41*** 977.72*** 22.92*** 63.22*** 15.51*** 
Pseudo R2/R2 0.1723 0.3451 0.5321 0.2612 
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Firm fixed-effects model38 
We further address the endogeneity concern using the firm fixed-effects 
regression which allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity due to 
time-invariant omitted variables that are constant over time but differ across 
firms. Brooks (2008) and Li and Prabhala (2005) show that panel 
regressions with firm fixed effects can control for endogeneity stemming from 
unobserved attributes that are fixed over time. Table 3.13 presents the 
estimation results of firm fixed-effect regression.39 In Panel A, we find again 
that trading cost (Spread) and price impact (Amihud) are negatively and 
significantly related to DIV, while trading activity (Turnover) is positively but 
not significantly related to DIV. These results suggest that stock liquidity 
improves with payment of dividends. Panel B shows that HighDPS is 
negatively related to trading costs (Spread) but positively related to trading 
activity (Turnover). These results are significant at the 10% level, providing 
further evidence that amount of dividend decision has a positive impact on 
stock liquidity.  
Overall, our finding that dividend payers (payers of high dividends) have 
higher liquidity than non-payers (payers of low dividends) is further robust 
with regard to endogeneity concerns resulting from unobserved 
heterogeneity and reverse causality. 
                                                             
38 Roberts and Whited (2012) argue that one of the most common causes of endogeneity in 
empirical corporate finance is omitted variables, and omitted variables are a problem 
because of the considerable heterogeneity present in many empirical corporate finance 
settings. Many previous finance studies use firm fixed effects to control for endogeneity 
including Jiraporn et al. (2011), Ferreira et al. (2011), Chang et al. (2015), Ben-Nasr and 
Alshwer (2016), and Firth et al. (2016).  
39 To choose between random effect and fixed effect, we perform the Hausman test. The 
untabulated results confirm the appropriateness of fixed effect. 
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Table 3.13 The effect of dividend policy decisions on stock liquidity: fixed-effects regressions 
This table reports the results of the fixed-effects regression. Panel A reports the results for the dividend payment decision, and Panel B reports the results for 
amount of dividend decision. DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend-paying stocks and 0 otherwise. HighDPS is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for stocks with above the median DPS and 0 otherwise. The dependent variable is stock liquidity and measured by the following: (1) 
Turnover is the turnover rate, (2) Spread denotes the proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. All of these 
variables are calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular year. The other variables are defined in Table 3.2. Year dummies are included to 
control for year effects. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Dividend payment decision  Panel B: Amount of dividend decision 
  Turnover Spread Amihud   Turnover Spread Amihud 
DIV 0.0664 -0.3241*** -0.2908***  HighDPS 0.0803* -0.0669* -0.0348 
 (1.29) (-6.18) (-3.64) 
 
 (1.90) (-1.92) (-0.83) 
Size 0.5232*** -0.3660*** -0.4004***  Size  0.5581*** -0.2931*** -0.2979*** 
 (8.80) (-6.99) (-5.13) 
 
 (7.96) (-4.44) (-4.16) 
Growth 0.0047 -0.0361*** -0.0461**  Growth -0.0083 -0.0196* -0.0542*** 
 (0.36) (-2.62) (-2.46) 
 
 (-0.72) (-1.90) (-4.55) 
Profitability -0.0537** -0.1089*** -0.0316  Profitability 0.0100 -0.0881*** -0.0770*** 
 (-2.54) (-4.68) (-1.11) 
 
 (0.72) (-5.09) (-3.66) 
Return -0.0102 -0.0586*** -0.0707***  Return -0.0060 -0.0457*** -0.0502*** 
 (-1.14) (-5.40) (-4.16) 
 
 (-0.57) (-4.04) (-2.99) 
Volatility 0.0247* -0.0069 -0.0502**  Volatility 0.0308** -0.0088 -0.0548*** 
 (1.84) (-0.49) (-2.41) 
 
 (2.21) (-0.69) (-3.14) 
Intercept -0.1743*** 0.2611*** 0.0410  Intercept -0.2366*** 0.0928** -0.1471*** 
 (-2.99) (4.29) (0.45) 
 
 (-4.79) (1.97) (-3.18) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes  Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7739 7739 7739  Observations 5713 5713 5713 
F-statistic 24.85*** 29.75*** 11.45***  F-statistic 26.91*** 28.27*** 9.37*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.2469 0.1893 0.1095  Adj. R-squared 0.3288 0.2173 0.1302 
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3.6.4.2. Effect of firm size 
As a robustness check, we examine whether the relationship between 
dividend policy decisions and stock liquidity varies according to firm size. In 
fact, this check allows us to determine whether the nature of the relationship 
between stock liquidity and dividend policy depends on the level of 
asymmetric information. By doing this, we can provide further evidence 
consistent with the arguments based on asymmetric information.40 Large 
firms have lower information asymmetry than smaller firms and hence higher 
stock liquidity due to their access to capital markets (Anderson and Fraser 
2000). Additionally, larger firms, on average, release more information than 
smaller firms (Loukil et al. 2010) and have more analyst following and are 
thus subject to more scrutiny by the investment community than smaller firms 
(Brennan and Subrahmanyam 1996; Riahi et al. 2013). We expect that the 
effect of dividend policy on stock liquidity varies with the size of the firm. 
We consider sub-samples of firms according to firm size by constructing a 
dummy variable (Large) which takes the value of 1 for observations with 
above the median size and 0 otherwise. Table 3.14 presents the results for 
models using the Large dummy variable and its interaction term with the 
DIV/HighDPS dummy. We expect small firms to have greater information 
problems and thus to have less stock liquidity. Panel A of Table 3.14 shows 
that the DIV dummy variable continues to have a negative and significant 
effect on bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio, in line with our earlier findings. 
While Large is significantly negative, its interaction term with the DIV dummy 
is significantly positive. Consistent with our conjecture, this finding suggests 
that small firms have a higher bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio than their 
large counterparts. Further, within the group of small firms, those that are 
non-dividends payers have more bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio than 
those that are dividends payers. Panel B of Table 3.14 shows that the 
coefficient on HighDPS dummy variable remains statistically negative with 
respect to bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio, consistent with our earlier 
                                                             
40 Firm size has been used widely in finance research as a proxy for the level of asymmetric 
information (see, e.g., Bharath et al. 2009; Leary and Michaely 2011). 
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findings. Furthermore, small firms have a higher bid–ask spread and 
illiquidity ratio than their large counterparts. Further, within the group of small 
firms, those that are low-dividend payers have more bid–ask spread and 
illiquidity ratio than those that are high-dividend payers. Put together, our 
results suggest that the impact of dividend policy decisions on stock liquidity 
varies with the firm size. 
Considering that large firms are associated with lower levels of asymmetric 
information than small firms, our finding is in line with the argument based on 
asymmetric information. Overall, our results suggest the difference in the 
level of stock liquidity of dividend-payer and non-payer firms as well as high-
dividend payers and low-dividend payers varies with the levels of 
informational asymmetries facing these firms. 
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Table 3.14 The effect of dividend policy decisions on stock liquidity: impact of firm size 
This table presents the impact of firm size on the effect of dividend policy decisions on stock liquidity. The dependent variable is stock liquidity and measured by the following: 
(1) Turnover is the turnover rate, (2) Spread denotes the proportional quoted bid–ask spread and (3) Amihud is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio. All of these variables are 
calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular year. Large is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for observations with above the median size, and 0 
otherwise. Panel A reports the results for the dividend payment decision, and Panel B reports the results for amount of dividend decision. DIV is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for dividend-paying stocks and 0 otherwise. HighDPS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for observations with above the median DPS and 0 otherwise. 
The other variables are defined in Table 3.2. Year and industry dummies are included to control for year and industry effects.  Numbers in parentheses represent t-values that 
are adjusted using standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the firm level. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Dividend payment decision   Panel B: Amount of dividend decision 
  Turnover Spread Amihud   Turnover Spread Amihud 
DIV -0.1931*** -0.5069*** -0.5381*** HighDPS 0.0066 -0.2060*** -0.3096*** 
(-3.42) (-7.87) (-6.72) (0.14) (-3.76) (-5.34) 
Large 0.3893*** -0.7913*** -0.7342*** Large 0.4304*** -0.5395*** -0.5218*** 
(3.04) (-10.64) (-9.63)  (5.13) (-10.34) (-8.71) 
Large*DIV -0.0736 0.4494*** 0.5139*** Large*HighDPS 0.1067 0.2193*** 0.3364*** 
(-0.60) (5.91) (6.79) (1.36) (3.68) (5.33) 
Size  0.3229*** -0.3358*** -0.1318*** Size 0.2503*** -0.4253*** -0.2325*** 
(7.38) (-14.14) (-5.72)  (4.99) (-14.69) (-8.26) 
Growth -0.0027 -0.0741*** -0.1029*** Growth -0.0229* -0.0445*** -0.0879*** 
(-0.18) (-5.40) (-5.58)  (-1.68) (-3.46) (-6.24) 
Profitability -0.0494** -0.1473*** -0.0429* Profitability 0.0528** -0.1940*** -0.1365*** 
(-2.23 ) (-7.38) (-1.86) (2.38 ) (-11.85) (-7.65) 
Return -0.0195* -0.0707*** -0.0687*** Return -0.0124 -0.0691*** -0.0472*** 
(-1.95) (-6.12) (-4.22)  (-1.00) (-6.03) (-2.98) 
Volatility 0.0228 0.0215 0.0046 Volatility 0.0316* -0.0020*** -0.0221 
(1.16) (1.32) (0.27) (1.66) (-0.13) (-1.47) 
Intercept -0.2678*** 0.7388*** 0.5266*** Intercept -0.5882*** 0.5458*** 0.2252*** 
( -2.83) (8.56) (5.55) ( -5.97) (6.45) (3.52) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7739 7739 7739 Observations 5713 5713 5713 
F-statistic 22.34*** 72.23*** 13.91*** F-statistic 23.37*** 63.23*** 15.36*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.2741 0.4938 0.2003 Adj. R-squared 0.3492 0.5112 0.2571 
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3.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we examine the impact of dividend policy, specifically how 
the firm’s dividend policy decisions affect stock liquidity. We hypothesize that 
dividend policy decisions result in higher stock liquidity as they lead to lower 
levels of asymmetric information. Our analysis yields the following results: 
First, the univariate analysis shows that dividend-paying and non-dividend-
paying stocks tend to have significant differences in their levels of stock 
liquidity. More specifically, dividend-paying stocks tend to have lower bid–ask 
spreads and lower illiquidity ratios. However, dividend-paying stocks have 
lower turnover ratio. Similarly, stocks of high-dividend-paying firms are 
significantly more liquid than those of low-dividend-paying firms.  
Second, after controlling for other factors that potentially affect stock liquidity, 
the results of the multivariate analysis show that stocks of dividend payers 
exhibit significantly lower bid–ask spread and illiquidity ratio than their non-
dividend payer counterparts. This evidence implies that stock liquidity is 
affected by whether or not a firm pays dividends. Similar results are found for 
high-dividend-paying stocks. More specifically, stocks that pay high 
dividends tend to have higher stock liquidity compared to those stocks that 
pay low dividends. These findings are in line with the predictions of the 
asymmetric information hypothesis of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and 
Rock (1985), which posits that paying dividends signals information to the 
market and hence decreases the level of information asymmetry leading to 
higher stock liquidity. These findings are also consistent with the model of 
Easterbrook (1984), which suggests that dividend-paying firms are more 
likely to visit the capital market leading to more monitoring and hence more 
information being released to the market. Our findings are also consistent 
with those of Howe and Lin (1992), who find that dividend-paying stocks 
have lower bid–ask spreads than non-paying stocks, and with those of Mitra 
and Rashid (1997), who provide evidence of lower bid–ask spreads following 
dividend initiations.  
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However, contradictory to our hypothesis that payment of dividend should 
result in higher trading activity as dividend-paying firms are more favourable 
to large investors such as institutional investors (Allen et al. 2000; Grinstein 
and Michaely 2005) which have the ability to trade in large quantities (Rubin 
2007), we find a significantly negative association between stock turnover 
and dividend payments. This is consistent with the view that although 
institutions are more likely to buy dividend-paying stocks because of their 
preference for holding higher-yielding stocks, they tend to be more passive 
“buy and hold” investors and they are less subject to pressures based on 
short-term performance measures (Hotchkiss and Lawrence 2007). Also, it is 
in line with the report of the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) Emerging Markets Committee (December 2007) 
which states that dividend policy should be taken into account when 
evaluating a stock’s liquidity and that stocks with high dividends tend to be 
bought and held by their investors and hence their transactions occur less 
frequently. This evidence suggests that the higher liquidity of dividend-paying 
firms comes primarily from the reduction in trading costs of those firms rather 
than from an increase in the trading activity of their stocks.  
These findings are robust to alternative estimation methods and model 
specifications. We also find that the impact of being a dividend payer (high-
dividend payer) on stock liquidity varies with the size of the firm, which is 
consistent with the argument based on asymmetric information. Our results 
thus show that the relationship between dividend policy decisions and stock 
liquidity varies with the degrees of asymmetric information facing these firms. 
Overall, the findings of this chapter show that the dividend policy of UK firms 
can have a significant impact on the different liquidity aspects of their stocks. 
Moreover, these findings should be of considerable importance to both 
companies and investors. From the perspective of the firm, stock liquidity 
directly affects trading costs which, in turn, have an effect on the firm’s cost 
of equity capital. The results suggest that dividend policy could enhance firm 
value through its effect on stock liquidity. From the investors’ perspective, 
such findings suggest that they could trade the stocks of dividend payers and 
payers of high dividends at a lower transaction cost. 
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Chapter 4: Dividend Policy and Systematic Liquidity 
Risk 
4.1. Introduction 
A primary area of research in the field of corporate finance centres on the 
relationship between dividend policy and firm value. The positive value 
effects of dividend policy decisions are well documented in the literature. For 
example, many studies find strong evidence that dividend increases can 
result in positive abnormal returns (Abeyratna et al. 1996; McCluskey et al. 
2006; Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011) and positive abnormal volume (Gurgul et al. 
2003; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011). In recent decades, risk 
has become an important factor in explaining the well-known value effects of 
payout policies (Grullon et al. 2002; Eije et al. 2014). According to Eije et al. 
(2014), changes in risk levels may constitute a major channel through which 
dividend policy influences firm value. The risk-based explanation is 
corroborated by empirical observations that dividend payments are 
correlated with lower risk (Pástor and Pietro 2003; Bartram et al. 2012) and 
that payout policies may impact firm systematic risks (Grullon et al. 2002). 
Furthermore, by conducting a survey, Brav et al. (2005) find that managers 
tend to believe that there is a causal relation between higher dividends and 
risk reductions. We build on this literature and examine the effect of dividend 
policy on systematic liquidity risk, a type of risk that has been shown to be 
priced both in the USA and across the world (e.g., Acharya and Pedersen 
2005; Lee 2011; Li et al. 2014; Ho and Chang 2015).  
Existing literature provides various explanations for the relationship between 
dividend policy and liquidity risk. First, several studies show that dividend 
payments are associated with higher stock liquidity. For example, it has been 
documented that stocks of dividend payers have lower bid–ask spread than 
their non-payer counterparts (Howe and Lin 1992) and that the spread 
declines following dividend increase (Mitra and Rashid 1997). In a similar 
vein, Gurgul et al. (2003) and Dasilas and Leventis (2011) find that trading 
volume increases following dividend increases.  
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Numerous early studies, such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and 
Chalmers and Kadlec (1998), find a positive relationship between individual 
stock liquidity and stock returns and that liquidity is a source of non-
diversifiable risk that should be reflected in expected asset returns (see, e.g., 
Chordia et al. 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001; Huberman and Halka 2001; 
Brockman and Chung 2002). Hence, motivated by the latest development in 
the liquidity literature, we argue that given that liquidity is priced, a higher 
(lower) liquidity associated with dividend policy decisions may result in lower 
(higher) liquidity risks leading to lower (higher) cost of equity. We 
hypothesize that non-dividend-paying firms will have a higher liquidity risk 
than their dividend-paying counterparts. Similarly, low-dividend-paying firms 
will have a higher liquidity risk than high-dividend-paying firms.  
Second, it has been argued that when market liquidity declines, there is a 
decline in the demand of investors for stocks with greater adverse selection 
and uncertainty (Chordia et al. 2000; Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). As discussed in more detail in Section 2, 
by reducing uncertainty about fundamental value and adverse selection 
when trades occur, dividends have the potential to affect liquidity risk. Non-
dividend-paying firms tend to be associated with higher uncertainty (Gordon 
1963; Fuller and Goldstein 2011) and higher adverse selection compared to 
dividend-paying firms (Lucas and McDonald 1998; Igan et al. 2006; Turki and 
Dereeper 2012). Dividends can serve as a mechanism to reduce information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders, leading to a low degree of 
adverse selection (Howe and Lin 1992; Hussainey and Walker 2009; Hail et 
al. 2014). Many studies, including Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), Vayanos 
(2004), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), show that liquidity can 
shrink because of a ‘‘flight to quality’’,41 where liquidity providers fly from 
assets with a high degree of uncertainty regarding fundamental value to 
assets with lower uncertainty. Due to the fact that dividends provide 
information about, for example, future cash flows, they reduce uncertainty 
about fundamental value as well as adverse selection, potentially reducing 
                                                             
41 According to Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), flight to quality refers to a sharp 
increase in the market’s risk aversion during periods of turmoil. 
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the sensitivity of stock to market shocks. During large market downturns, 
liquidity tends to be mostly low because capital is limited and overall 
uncertainty is high. As a result, non-paying stocks will be particularly 
sensitive to the effects of exogenous shocks to liquidity. Therefore, investors’ 
demand for dividend-paying stocks, and thus the value of such stocks 
relative to non-paying stocks, is higher when market liquidity is low (Banerjee 
et al. 2007). Consequently, we expect dividend-paying stocks and stocks 
with high dividends to have lower return sensitivity to innovations in market 
liquidity.  
Our empirical analysis is divided into two main parts. The first part focuses 
on the effect of dividend policy decisions on systematic liquidity risk. We use 
a liquidity factor (LIQ hereafter) and the market return (MKT hereafter) to 
produce the liquidity risk from a two-factor liquidity augmented model 
(LCAPM hereafter). To construct our LIQ, we follow Liu (2006). Specifically, 
LIQ represents a mimicking liquidity factor that is defined as the payoff from 
taking a long position in most liquid portfolio and short position in least liquid 
portfolio. Then, we perform univariate and multivariate analysis to estimate 
the impact of dividend policy decisions on systematic liquidity risk. 
Specifically, we investigate whether stocks of dividend payers and/or stocks 
of firms with high dividends exhibit greater or lower liquidity risk than 
comparable stocks of non-dividend payers and/or stocks of firms with low 
dividends. 
Using a sample of UK firms for the period 2000-2013,42 we find that non-
dividend-paying firms exhibit significantly higher systematic liquidity risk than 
their dividend-paying counterparts. We also find that the systematic liquidity 
risk of dividend payers is significantly negatively associated with the amount 
of dividend payments. These findings remain robust after controlling for other 
determinants of liquidity risk.  
We subject our findings to a battery of robustness checks. First, a major 
concern with our analysis is the likelihood that the relation between dividend 
                                                             
42 The data obtained start from January 1996. Our analysis starts from 2000 because we 
use five-year monthly returns to calculate liquidity risk. 
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policy and systematic liquidity risk is endogenously determined. In other 
words, firms with lower systematic liquidity risk could be more likely to pay 
dividends. Another issue is that the relation could be an outcome of omitted 
variables. To address these concerns, we conduct a two-stage regression 
approach using an instrumental variable (IV) model and Heckman-type 
model. Our main results are robust to these model specifications as we 
document a significant difference between dividend payers and non-payers 
and between payers of high dividends and payers of low dividends. We also 
account for endogeneity resulting from omitted or unobserved factors by 
applying a fixed-effects model. Our results continue to show a significantly 
lower liquidity risk for dividend payers than for non-payers as well as a lower 
liquidity risk for payers of high dividends than for payers of low dividends.  
Second, we examine the impact of the dividend policy decisions on the 
systematic liquidity risk for sub-samples of firms with different characteristics 
that proxies for the amount of information, namely firm size and growth 
opportunities. The amount of information available can influence the trading 
decisions of investors since they affect the level of uncertainty and adverse 
selection they face (Ng 2011) and thereby affect systematic liquidity risk. 
When liquidity declines, investors are less likely to demand stocks that are 
associated with higher asymmetric information (Ng 2011). Small, low-growth 
firms are associated with lower levels of information and hence uncertainty 
and adverse selection will be more severe in these firms, as compared to 
large, low-growth firms. Therefore, investors are more likely to sell off the 
stocks of these firms during low market liquidity. Hence, we should expect 
the effect of dividend policy on liquidity risk to be stronger in these firms. We 
find that compared to non-dividend-paying stocks, dividend-paying stocks 
have a significantly lower systematic liquidity risk, especially when they are 
small and have more growth opportunities.  
Finally, we estimate our main models using liquidity risk that is measured 
using alternative proxies for liquidity. Liquidity is a multifaceted concept and 
can be viewed from different aspects of trading behaviour. Stoll (2000) also 
points out that there is no consensus on the best liquidity proxy, and each 
liquidity proxy captures a particular element of liquidity and trading 
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behaviour. The findings show that liquidity risk is significantly associated with 
dividend policy when other liquidity measures, such as bid–ask spread and 
turnover ratio, are used to measure liquidity risk. However, the magnitude of 
the effect varies with different measures. Furthermore, similar results are 
reported when we use liquidity risk that is estimated using alternative models 
rather than LCAPM such as the Fama-French three-factor and the four-factor 
models. Dividend payers and payers of high dividends continue to exhibit 
lower liquidity risk compared to non-payers and payers of low dividends. 
Overall, this study suggests that systematic liquidity risk is significantly 
associated with dividend policy decisions. These findings are consistent with 
the predictions of the asymmetric information theory of Bhattacharya (1979) 
and Miller and Rock (1985), which suggests that dividend payments are 
associated with lower asymmetric information and hence higher liquidity. Our 
result is also in line with the arguments of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), and Liu (2006), who suggest that since 
liquidity is priced, an increase in liquidity will lead to lower liquidity risk and, 
therefore, lower expected returns. Our findings are also consistent with the 
flight-to-quality phenomenon (Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen 2009) in which adverse liquidity shocks force investors to sell 
off assets that are associated with higher uncertainty, asymmetric 
information and trading costs, leading to a decline in asset prices. Banerjee 
et al. (2007) argue that during periods of low market liquidity, the demand of 
investors for dividend-paying stocks, and thus the value of such stocks 
relative to non-paying stocks, is higher.  
This chapter makes at least two contributions. First, many studies show that 
systematic liquidity risk is related to different areas of corporate finance such 
as stock split (Lin et al. 2009), information quality (Ng 2011), seasoned 
equity offerings (Bilinski et al. 2012), ownership structure (Cao and Petrasek 
2014) and index revisions (Mazouz et al. 2014). We contribute to this 
growing literature by investigating the impact of dividend decisions on 
systematic liquidity risk. Second, we contribute to the literature on the 
valuation effects of dividend policy (Al-Yahyaee et al. 2011; Bozos et al. 
2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011; Liu and Chen 2015). Recent literature in 
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finance suggests that liquidity risk is a non-diversifiable systematic risk that 
affects stock returns.  Many studies find that expected stock returns are 
positively related to the sensitivities of returns to fluctuations in aggregate 
liquidity (Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Liu 
2006) Liquidity risk is also significant and priced in different  markets, 
suggesting that it is a persistent risk that affects firm value (Lee 2011).To the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce systematic liquidity risk 
as an important factor by which dividend policy can affect firm value. 
Our study is related to the work of Banerjee et al. (2007), who show that 
systematic liquidity risk declines following dividend initiations. Our study, 
however, differs from the research by Banerjee et al. (2007) in at least two 
ways. First, their empirical analysis focuses only on dividend initiations, and 
in particular, on the effect of the decision as to whether the firm pay a 
dividend (and not how much to pay). Thus, while the findings of Banerjee et 
al. (2007) might explain the effects of dividend initiation on systematic 
liquidity risk, they cannot explain the effect of dividend levels. This is a 
substantial shortcoming because the empirical research on dividend 
decisions suggests that firm managers are more likely to face decisions 
related to the level of dividends than decisions to either introduce dividends 
for the first time or eliminate existing dividends (Li and Lie 2006). The second 
difference between this study and that of Banerjee et al. (2007) concerns the 
empirical results. Their results are based on univariate analysis.43 We posit 
that, like any other financial factor, the systematic liquidity risk will not have a 
uniform effect across all firms. Rather, the firm’s return sensitivity to market 
liquidity might depend on other factors such as firm-specific variables. Thus, 
a univariate analysis may not reveal the true effect of dividend policy on 
systematic liquidity risk. A multivariate analysis is necessary to understand 
whether, and why, individual firms with different characteristics display 
varying sensitivity to market liquidity. 
                                                             
43 They create two value-weighted portfolios. The first portfolio includes firms in the three 
years prior to dividend initiation and the second portfolio consists of the same firms but after 
dividend initiation. Then, they estimate the liquidity risk of each portfolio using the market 
model, the three-factor model and the four-factor model while including liquidity factor. Then, 
they use a univariate analysis to compare the liquidity beta of pre-dividend portfolio to that of 
post-dividend portfolio. 
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We review the literature in 
Section 4.2 and state the hypotheses to be tested in Section 4.3. We 
describe our methodology and data in Section 4.4. We present the empirical 
findings in Section 4.5 and conclude the chapter in Section 4.6.  
4.2. Related literature  
4.2.1. Liquidity risk and assets pricing 
The existing research on asset pricing assumes that illiquid securities have 
higher liquidity risk compared to liquid securities. Therefore, the CEC 
increases due to the higher demand of investors for a higher liquidity 
premium. Prior literature on asset pricing has focused on the CAPM of 
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). According to this model, the systematic 
risk of a firm can be measured solely by the market beta (the sensitivity of a 
firm’s stock return to the returns of total market), and there is a positive 
relationship between a security’s expected return, its systematic risk and the 
expected market premium. 
The CAPM model has received considerable empirical support. However, it 
was then challenged due to incompleteness by a number of papers including 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), 
Chordia et al. (2000), Amihud (2002), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Liu (2006). Fama and French (1993) 
show that the systematic risk cannot be completely measured by market beta 
and therefore it should be accompanied by its sensitivity to other factors such 
as market capitalization and book-to-market ratio of firms. They argue that 
these non-market risk factors are priced and propose a three-factor model 
that incorporates, in addition to the market factor, a size factor (SMB), which 
represents the difference between the returns on the small and big size 
portfolios, and a value factor (HML), which represents the difference between 
the returns on the high and low book-to-market-ratio portfolios. Carhart 
(1997) further includes another risk factor, which is the momentum factor 
constructed by the difference between the returns on the high and low prior 
return portfolios. 
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Amihud and Mendelson (1986) are the first to examine the role of liquidity in 
asset pricing using the bid–ask spread as a measure for liquidity. They 
propose a model in which rational investors ask for high expected return for 
stocks with large bid–ask spreads. By analysing portfolios of NYSE stocks 
over the period 1961-1980, Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find empirical 
evidence for their model. They show a positive relationship between 
expected return and illiquidity. They explain this relationship on the basis that 
investors would expect to sell their shares at some point in the future, and 
that by doing so, they will be subject to transactions costs. If these 
transactions costs are high, rational investors would claim a high discount 
rate to the underlying stock. This view is confirmed by various empirical 
studies, which show that large bid–ask spread, large price impact, and low 
turnover ratio are associated with higher expected returns (Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam 1996; Brennan et al. 1998; Amihud 2002). Recently, 
international evidence further shows that illiquidity premium also presents in 
international markets (Lam and Tam 2011; Chai et al. 2013; Amihud et al. 
2015).  
Chordia et al. (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and 
Halka (2001) propose a new area for investigating the relationship between 
liquidity and market return. They show that individual stock liquidity co-moves 
with market-wide liquidity. This co-movement between individual stock 
liquidity and market-wide liquidity is known as “commonality in liquidity” or 
“liquidity risk”. Using 30 stocks from the Dow Jones Industrial Average(DJIA), 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) examine common factors in prices, order flows 
and liquidity. They find an association between common factors and both 
returns and order flows and that approximately two-thirds of the commonality 
in returns is explained by the common factors in the order flow. However, 
their results suggest less support for the existence of significant commonality 
in liquidity. Chordia et al. (2000), however, provide a conflicting result after 
examining the sources of commonality in the changes of different daily 
liquidity measures using 1169 US stocks. They argue that individual stock 
liquidity measured commove with market-wide liquidity. Using a market 
model for liquidity, they find a negative relationship between stock’s bid–ask 
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spread and the aggregate level of market liquidity. They explain this finding 
as an indication of a reduction in inventory risk due to greater market trading 
which is most likely driven by uninformed traders. The presence of 
commonality also results from the effect of information asymmetry which is 
induced by informed traders who attempt to hide their activities by splitting 
block trades into a small number of transactions. Using 240 US stocks, 
Huberman and Halka (2001) investigate the commonality in liquidity, using 
depth and bid–ask spread as liquidity measures, and provide similar results 
to Chordia et al. (2000).  
The development of the commonality in liquidity notion has focused the 
attention of liquidity studies towards systematic liquidity risk. For example, 
the commonality in liquidity has motivated further research to investigate 
whether the aggregate market liquidity is an important factor in explaining 
stock returns. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) are the first to provide direct 
evidence that stock returns co-vary significantly with aggregate market 
liquidity. They develop a measure of market-wide liquidity as the equally 
weighted average of the liquidity measures of individual stocks on the NYSE 
and AMEX, using daily data within the month. They show that stocks whose 
returns are more sensitive to market liquidity require a higher rate of return 
than stocks whose returns are less sensitive to market liquidity factor. This 
result suggests that a stock’s liquidity risk measured by beta, which is the 
return sensitivity to the aggregate liquidity, plays an important role in asset 
pricing. In particular, stocks with higher liquidity betas have higher expected 
returns.  
The work of Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) was followed by several studies 
that examine the same issue. For example, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) 
examine how asset prices are influenced by liquidity risk. They present a 
liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing model and show that a stock’s required 
rate of return depends on its expected liquidity and on the covariances of its 
own return and liquidity with the market return and liquidity. The model also 
shows that a negative shock to a security’s liquidity results in low 
simultaneous returns and high predicted future returns. Liu (2006) develops 
a two-factor model that incorporates both a market factor and a liquidity 
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factor (LCAPM) and shows that liquidity is a significant source of priced risk. 
He argues that the two-factor model performs better than the three-factor 
model of (Fama and French 1993). LCAPM considers the liquidity premium 
that both CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor model fail to capture. 
Moreover, liquidity risk can capture distress risk more directly than the size 
and the book-to-market factors.  
Systematic liquidity risk has also been documented to be priced in markets 
other than the USA. Using the liquidity risk proxy suggested by Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003), Martınez et al. (2005) investigate whether aggregate 
market liquidity is priced in the Spanish stock market. They show that 
systematic liquidity risk is priced only when the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio 
is used as a measure for liquidity. Luo and Jing (2011) examine the same 
issue in the Chinese stock market and find that the aggregate market liquidity 
risk is priced. Lam and Tam (2011) use nine measures of liquidity to examine 
the relationship between return and liquidity in the Hong Kong stock market. 
They find that liquidity is an important factor in explaining returns in Hong 
Kong. Moreover, using a sample of Japanese stocks, Li et al. (2014) 
examine whether liquidity is priced during the period 1975-2006 and find that 
liquidity is priced in the Japanese stock market. Ho and Chang (2015) 
examine whether liquidity is a source of priced systematic risk in stock 
returns of the Shanghai stock market. They find that the cross-sectional 
expected stock returns are related to the sensitivities of returns to 
fluctuations in aggregate market liquidity. 
4.2.2. Systematic liquidity risk and dividend policy 
The CAPM assumes a perfect world in which there are no transactions costs; 
therefore, investors can diversify without incurring costs. In such a perfect 
world, the only risk that is needed to fully explain cross-sectional differences 
in stock returns is the market beta. Recent research in finance argues that in 
practice, the costless trading assumption does not hold, and suggests that, in 
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addition to market risk, investors are also concerned with the liquidity risk of 
their portfolio (Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Sadka 2006; Ng 2011).44 
Given its importance, the systematic liquidity risk has captured the attention 
of several finance researchers. For example, many studies examine the 
impact of several market events on systematic liquidity risk, including Lin et 
al. (2009) in the context of stock split, Lin and Wu (2013) in the context of 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) and Mazouz et al. (2014) in the context of 
index revisions. Other studies link systematic liquidity risk to some firm 
characteristics such as information quality (Ng 2011) and ownership 
structure (Cao and Petrasek 2014). We extend this literature by linking 
systematic liquidity risk to dividend policy. In this study, we argue that both 
the decision to pay dividends and the amount of dividend payment affect 
liquidity risk. Our argument proceeds as follows.45 Systematic risk represents 
a covariation effect which indicates that a stock with higher systematic risk 
will perform relatively better during good economic conditions, but relatively 
worse during bad economic conditions. In the case of liquidity risk, the 
related economic condition is market liquidity.46 Any reduction in market 
liquidity generally indicates an economic status in which there is outflow of 
investor and market maker from the equity markets; this outflow refers to as 
a flight to safety/quality (e.g., Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen 2005; Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). At times of market 
liquidity decline, different stocks will exhibit different degrees of investor and 
market maker outflow.  
In 2000, Standard & Poor’s predicted a mended interest in dividends, 
declaring that “market weakness may boost interest in dividends as investors 
begin to see the value of a ‘bird in the hand’”.47 This statement indicates that 
investors’ preferences for dividend-paying stocks relative to non-dividend-
paying stocks differ over time conditional on the state of the market (Fuller 
                                                             
44 The difficulty of trading financial securities during the financial crisis (2007-2008) suggests 
further indication of the importance of liquidity risk. 
45 See Ng (2011) for similar insights into the effect of information quality on liquidity risk. 
46 Market liquidity can be defined as the ability to trade large quantities quickly, at low cost, 
and without moving the stock price (Kyle 1985; Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Liu 2006; Feng 
et al. 2016). 
47 See Fuller and Goldstein (2011). 
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and Goldstein 2011). According to Fuller and Goldstein (2011), there are 
several reasons why investors might condition their preference for dividend-
paying stocks on the state of the market. For example, Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) propose a theory which implies that people respond 
differently to certain versus probabilistic gains/losses and care more about 
losses than gains. Therefore, prospect theory indicates that investors may 
prefer the cash from dividend-paying stocks more when they expect future 
uncertainty or economic downturns, and less when the market is doing well. 
Dividend-paying stocks provide a return where at least part of the return is a 
certain gain over those non-dividend-paying stocks for which the gain/loss is 
uncertain. During periods of good macroeconomic conditions, while investors 
still value the more certain gain, they may value it less as the preference for 
loss avoidance is reduced. However, during economic downturn, investors 
prefer dividends as a cushion to their returns, especially if they are downside 
risk-averse. Such responses are based on the “flight to quality” phenomenon 
that is observed during market declines (Connolly et al. 2005; Brunnermeier 
and Pedersen 2009). To the extent that investors value dividends as a 
certain return, they may move from risky to less risky investments, in this 
case from non-dividend and/or low-dividend-paying stocks to dividend and/or 
high-dividend-paying stocks.  
Another possibility relates to the dividends’ ability to convey information. 
Existing literature suggests that dividend-paying firms are better able to 
signal managers’ expectations than non-dividend-paying firms48 and this 
signalling ability may be more valuable during bad times than during good 
times. During times of bad economic conditions, dividend-paying firms can 
provide a positive signal by just keeping dividend payments; in such times 
the commitment to pay dividends tends to be more valuable, hence 
increasing the value and significance of the signal. However, during times of 
good economic conditions, it is likely that firms will perform well and the 
chance of, and costs associated with, financial distress are lower. Therefore, 
                                                             
48 Dividends can either signal managers’ expectations regarding future earnings (e.g., 
Bhattacharya 1979; John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 1985) or signal that managers 
will not waste excess cash (e.g., Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Lang and Litzenberger 
1989).   
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the commitment to pay is less likely to be valuable, and thus the value of 
dividend signal is likely to be lower. It is argued, therefore, that a decision to 
pay dividends during good economic conditions conveys less information 
than a decision to pay dividends in market downturns.   
Based on the above discussion, we can argue that during periods of low 
aggregate liquidity, the outflow of investor and market maker tends to be 
more significant for non-dividend-paying stocks and/or stocks with lower 
dividend payment. This is due to a decrease in the demand of investors for 
stocks associated with higher adverse selection and uncertainty. 
Furthermore, market makers are less likely to provide liquidity to such stocks 
because of concerns about adverse selection which, in turn, might further 
reduce investors’ demand for these stocks. Therefore, the performance of 
these stocks is worse when market liquidity declines. On the other hand, at 
times of market liquidity increases, there is an inflow of investors and market 
makers, which leads to an increase the demand and liquidity of stocks 
associated with higher uncertainty and adverse selection. It is worth 
mentioning that the earlier arguments entail that the demand for dividend-
paying stocks and/or stocks with higher dividend payment is less likely to be 
affected by fluctuations in market liquidity. As a result, the returns of stocks 
with low or no dividends are expected to be more sensitive to changes in 
market liquidity. That is, dividend payment can affect liquidity risk. 
Furthermore, low levels of liquidity would make it difficult for investors to 
execute their trades, and they would require a higher risk premium to 
compensate them for this higher liquidity risk. However, stocks that pay cash 
dividends help investors to meet their liquidity needs with little or no trading 
and thus enable them to avoid trading costs. As a result, investors may have 
a preference for dividend-paying stocks and stocks that pay high dividends.49 
Thus, it is suggested that a firm that pays dividends would be less likely to be 
affected by lower liquidity during market downturns and would have a lower 
liquidity risk compared to a firm that does not pay dividends. Simply put, 
                                                             
49 Dong et al. (2005) present survey evidence that retail investors prefer dividends, partly 
because their costs of cashing in dividends are lower than the transaction costs associated 
with selling shares. 
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investors will require a smaller risk premium as compensation for having 
such stocks in their portfolio. 
Recently, Banerjee et al. (2007) studied the changes in systematic liquidity 
risk following dividend initiations where dividend initiation is defined as the 
first cash dividend payment. They use a large sample of US dividend-
initiating firms over the period 1966-1999 and construct two portfolios. One 
consists of non-paying firms in the last three years prior to dividend initiation 
and the second one consists of the same firms but after dividend initiation. 
By estimating the market model, the three-factor model and the four-factor 
model for each portfolio while considering the market-wide liquidity factor, 
they find that the sensitivity of stock returns to aggregate liquidity declines 
after dividend initiations.  
4.3. Hypothesis development 
In this study, we argue that dividend policy can influence systematic liquidity 
risk for several reasons. First, given that dividend payment affects stock 
liquidity (Howe and Lin 1992; Gurgul et al. 2003; Bozos et al. 2011), it is also 
expected to affect the liquidity risk premium. Barry and Brown (1985) claim 
that investors require a positive premium for illiquid stocks because of the 
higher uncertainty resulting from lack of information. Thereby securities with 
small amount of available information are found to have higher systematic 
risk. This argument is in line with Arbel and Strebel (1982) who find that any 
improvement in the information environment would reduce the adverse 
information costs. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Amihud (2002) show 
that expected returns are a decreasing function of liquidity as investors 
require compensation for incurring higher transaction costs because of 
holding less liquid markets. Several papers including Bekaert et al. (2007), 
Lam and Tam (2011), Chai et al. (2013), and Amihud et al. (2015) provide 
empirical evidence consistent with Amihud and Mendelson (1986) that 
liquidity is a determinant of expected returns. Chordia et al. (2000), 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001) have opened 
a new research area on the effect of liquidity on the cross section of stock 
returns. They suggest that liquidity risk represents a source of non-
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diversifiable risk which should be reflected in an asset’s expected returns 
(e.g., Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Korajczyk and Sadka 2008; Li et al. 
2014; Ho and Chang 2015). Second, dividend payment reduces uncertainty 
and adverse selection, and thereby could reduce liquidity risk by reducing the 
sensitivity of a firm’s share price to the non-diversifiable component of risk. 
For example, in times of a drop in market liquidity, there is generally selling 
pressure on equities (Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Ng 2011). Stocks with no 
or low dividends could experience more negative returns if buyers offer lower 
prices to sellers of these stocks because of the higher uncertainty and/or 
greater probability of adverse selection associated with a high level of 
asymmetric information. Furthermore, the relative returns of non-dividend- 
and low-dividend-paying stocks could be even more negative because: i) 
investors are likely to be more risk averse during periods of low market 
liquidity, and commonality in trading decisions generates pressure on stock 
prices (Pástor and Stambaugh 2003) and ii) investors who sell some stocks 
from their portfolios usually choose to mitigate risk by selling stocks with 
more uncertainty since investors perceive non-dividend (low-dividend) paying 
stocks as being riskier (see, e.g., Grullon et al. 2002; Hoberg and Prabhala 
2009; Fuller and Goldstein 2011; Eije et al. 2014).  
Furthermore, when the aggregate market liquidity is low, the liquidation cost 
of stocks becomes higher. As a result, investors are more likely to invest in 
dividend-paying firms and firms that pay high dividends because dividend 
payments help them avoid the high trading costs (Banerjee et al. 2007; Kuo 
et al. 2013). Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) suggest that when the aggregate 
liquidity is low, assets with high sensitivity of returns to aggregate liquidity 
lead to a reduction in the wealth of investor. Therefore, it is expected that the 
sensitivity of stocks returns to aggregate liquidity is lower in dividend-paying 
firms and firms that pay a high amount of dividends. This leads to the 
following testable hypotheses:  
H3: dividend-paying stocks have lower liquidity risk than non-dividend-
paying stocks. 
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H4: high-dividend-paying stocks have lower liquidity risk than low-
dividend-paying stocks. 
 
4.4. Methodology and data  
4.4.1. Empirical models 
First of all, we estimate the systematic liquidity risk using the following CAPM 
model augmented by a liquidity factor (LCAPM).50 More specifically, in each 
year, the liquidity beta is estimated from a regression of monthly stock 
returns on market risk factor and liquidity risk factor as follows:51 
ݎ௜௧ − ݎ௙௧ =∝௜+ ߚ௠௜൫ݎ௠௧ − ݎ௙௧൯ +  ௜௟௜௤௜	ܮܫܳ௧ + ߝ௜௧                   (4.1) 
where ݎ௜௧	 is the return on stock i in month t and ݎ௙௧ is the return on the three-
month UK T-Bills in month t; ݎ௠௧ is the return on the FTSE All SHARES in 
month t; ߚ௠௜ is the market risk “beta” for stock i, while ߚ௜௟௜௤௜		is the systematic 
liquidity risk “beta” for stock i. ܮܫܳ௧	is the stock liquidity factor. Similar to Liu 
(2006), we construct a mimicking liquidity factors as follows: at the beginning 
of each month from January and July 1996 to July 2013, all FTSE ALL 
SHARES ordinary common stocks are sorted in ascending order based on 
their liquidity measures to form two portfolios. The first contains the 35% of 
stocks with the lowest liquidity measure and the second includes the 35% of 
the stocks with the highest liquidity measure.52 These portfolios are held for 
six months after the portfolio formation period.53 Then, the mimicking liquidity 
factor LIQ are constructed as the difference in the monthly returns between 
the two portfolios. 
                                                             
50 Section 4.5.4 reports robustness tests using other liquidity risk model specifications. 
51 We estimate liquidity risk (β୧୪୧୯୧	) using firm monthly returns over the previous five years 
with a minimum of 36 available returns. We use monthly returns since short horizon returns 
are affected more by noise due to non-synchronicity trading and bid–ask spread. 
52 Many studies follow the same approach to construct the mimicking liquidity factor (see 
e.g., Liu 2006; Bilinski et al. 2012; Mazouz et al. 2014).  
53 As stated by Liu (2006), the six-month holding period is selected because it gives a 
moderate liquidity premium compared to the one- and 12-month holding period, which 
seems plausible for estimating the liquidity factor.  
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Mimicking portfolios have been used in several studies of economic factors. 
Breeden (1979) argues that mimicking portfolios can replace the state 
variables in the Merton (1973) model. For example, Chen et al. (1986) and 
Breeden et al. (1989) employ these portfolios for several macroeconomic 
factors, whereas Fama and French (1993) use mimicking portfolios to 
capture book-to-market and size effects. Balduzzi and Robotti (2010) 
compare linear factor models using non-traded factors and mimicking 
portfolios. They find that mimicking portfolios allow the characteristics-based 
explanation of the cross section of stock returns to be turned into a risk-
based explanation and conclude that estimating linear models with mimicking 
portfolios is favoured. 
In order to estimate the liquidity risk factor as the difference in returns 
between illiquid and liquid stocks, the stocks have to be sorted according to 
their liquidity. We measure stock liquidity using Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. 
Amihud (2002) proposes measuring illiquidity for a given stock on a given 
day as the ratio of absolute percentage price change per dollar of daily 
trading volume. This is comparable to Kyle’s lambda as given by the 
response of price to order flow. Hasbrouck (2009) finds that among the 
liquidity measures constructed from daily data, Amihud’s illiquidity ratio is the 
best one among the high-frequency dynamic price impact measures of 
liquidity. Likewise, by comparing several measures of liquidity, Goyenko et 
al. (2009) conclude that Amihud’s illiquidity ratio produces significant results 
in capturing the price impact of trade. They find that it is comparable to 
intraday estimates of price impact such as Kyle’s lambda. Therefore, we use 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio as the main liquidity proxy in our study. 
While the study mainly uses Amihud’s illiquidity ratio, an obvious question is 
whether the main results hold using other measures of liquidity. It is well 
recognized that liquidity can be measured in various ways and that some 
measures could produce somewhat different results because they could 
capture different aspects of liquidity (see, e.g., Korajczyk and Sadka 2008). 
Therefore, as a robustness check, we use two additional measures of 
liquidity: proportional bid–ask spread and turnover ratio to reflect trading 
costs and trading activity aspects of liquidity, respectively. 
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Second, we regress liquidity betas on dividend variables while controlling for 
several control variables:  
ߚ௜௟௜௤௜,௧	 = ߛ଴ + ߛଵܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ + ߛଶܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ + (ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) +
(ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) + ݑ௜௧      (4.2) 
where ߚ௜௟௜௤௜,௧	 is the liquidity beta for stock i in year t and ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ 
is a dummy variable that relates to a firm’s dividend policy. We define 
ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧ିଵ in two ways: (i) as a dummy variable that equals 1 if a 
dividend payer and zero otherwise (DIVi,t-1); and (ii) as a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the stock is a high-dividend payer and zero otherwise (HighDPSi,t-
1). ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ	is a vector of control variables which may be correlated with 
liquidity risk. Consistent with the literature, the control variables include 
several characteristics such as stock liquidity, stock return, volatility54 and 
firm size. A stock liquidity beta has been found to be related to stock liquidity 
(Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and Pedersen 2005), and therefore 
we control for the level of stock liquidity. Stocks with different size could have 
different liquidity beta (Pástor and Stambaugh 2003). We use the market 
capitalization as a proxy for firm’s size. We also control for other firm 
characteristics which prior research has documented that liquidity risk is 
likely to be associated with. For example, there are arguments and evidence 
that liquidity risk varies with growth opportunities, profitability and leverage 
(Ng 2011; Cao and Petrasek 2014).55 All of the independent variables are 
lagged by one year to make sure that the information is available for 
investors to assess the stock before the covariation between stock return 
and changes in market liquidity takes place.56 All variables are standardized 
                                                             
54 According to Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and Ng (2011), the inclusion of returns and 
the volatility of returns allow some role for short-run return dynamics. 
55 To estimate the determinants of liquidity beta, Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) include 
several characteristics. They note on p.664 “the list of characteristics is necessarily 
arbitrary”. This arbitrariness arises because liquidity risk is a relatively new concept and prior 
literature provides limited guidance on its determinants. 
56 Furthermore, the use of explanatory variables that are lagged by one year can partially 
account for the potential endogeneity problem, consistent with the econometric point of view 
of previous studies including e.g., Ng (2011) and Cao and Petrasek (2014). 
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to have zero mean and unit variance in each year.57 Year and industry 
dummy variables are included to control for time and industry fixed effects. 
 
4.4.2. Sample description 
Our sample is based on the annual constituent of the FTSE ALL share index 
in DataStream over the period 1996-2013. Both stocks that survived the 
entire study period and those delisted anytime during the study period are 
included. Several filters are imposed to obtain the final sample. First, as a 
common practice, financial and utilities firms are excluded, resulting in a 
sample of 1,169 non-financial and non-utilities firms over the period 1996-
2013.58 Next, we remove observations with missing variables of dividend per 
share. Finally and following Cao and Petrasek (2014), all variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th tails to alleviate the impact of outliers.59 This 
results in a final sample of 7,280 firm-year observations covering 870 
different firms.  
The estimation of liquidity risk using (LCAPM) model requires the monthly 
returns on UK Treasury bills (the risk-free rate) and the return on the FTSE 
ALL SHARE index. Moreover, it requires the closing price, the ask price, the 
bid price, the quantity trading volume, and the number of outstanding shares 
for each firm. All of these data and the data on other variables are obtained 
from DataStream.  
 
                                                             
57 Standardized coefficients enable us to compare the relative effects of two or more 
explanatory variables that have different units of measurement. We interpret the effects of a 
standardized variable as the standard deviation changes in Y results from an increase in one 
standard deviation in X (Sekaran and Bougie 2010). 
58 The data obtained start from January 1996. Our analysis starts from 2000 because we 
use five-year monthly returns to calculate liquidity risk. The selection criteria and distribution 
of the sample across time and industries are presented in Table 3.1. 
59 Winsorization is a statistical procedure help in reducing the impact of outliers in the 
sample. This procedure can be conducted in two ways: trimming the sample, which involves 
deleting a certain percentage of values in one or both sides of the distribution, or redefining 
the most extreme values in the tail(s) of the distribution to the closest extreme values (Yale 
and Forsythe 1976). 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics 
This table reports summary statistics of the variables under consideration for the full sample. 
At each December between 2000 and 2013, the liquidity beta for each stock is computed. 
The liquidity beta is estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling for market 
returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data (with a 
minimum of 36 months). Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio (Amihud), bid–
ask spread (Spread) and turnover ratio (Turnover). DPS is the amount of dividend paid per 
share. DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend payers, and 0 
otherwise. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total book 
assets. The return is the average of daily stock returns. The volatility is the standard 
deviations of daily returns. Book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of total 
shareholder equity divided by the market value of equity. Profitability is the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets. Firm size is the market capitalization in millions of 
Pounds. 
  Observations Mean SD Median Min Max 
Liquidity beta (Amihud) 7280 0.677 0.933 0.495 -1.032 3.853 
Liquidity beta (Spread) 7280 0.706 0.961 0.483 -0.955 3.890 
Liquidity beta (Turnover) 7280 0.763 0.869 0.483 0.000 4.493 
Amihud 7090 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.048 
Spread 7188 0.029 0.033 0.020 0.001 0.178 
Turnover 7049 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.018 
DPS 7280 0.095 0.151 0.046 0.000 0.949 
DIV 7280 0.737 0.440 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Leverage 7250 0.198 0.176 0.173 0.000 0.802 
Return (%) 7060 -0.010% 0.210% 0.000% -0.870% 0.440% 
Volatility (%) 6888 1.980% 1.770% 1.810% 0.000% 9.110% 
Book-to-market 7156 0.660 0.664 0.503 -1.111 3.704 
Profitability 7193 0.045 0.170 0.073 -0.867 0.352 
Firm size (£ millions) 5729 2.443 9.388 0.208 0.004 72.400 
 
Table 4.1 reports the summary statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables of the full sample.60 The dependent variable is the liquidity risk 
estimated from the LCAPM model using Amihud’s illiquidity ratio as a main 
liquidity measure. The systematic liquidity risk has a positive mean of 0.677. 
Moreover, using bid–ask spread and turnover ratio as alternative liquidity 
measures, the liquidity beta has a mean of 0.706 and 0.763, respectively. 
The average illiquidity ratio is 0.002, suggesting that, on average, stock price 
moves by 0.2% for each one dollar of trading volume. The average of the 
stock turnover ratio is 0.004 and the mean proportional bid–ask spread is 
2.9%, which is higher than the 1.1% reported by Agarwal (2007) in the US 
                                                             
60 Appendix C.2 reports the summary statistics of the sample of dividend-paying stocks. 
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market. Approximately 74% of firm-years have dividend payments with an 
average dividend per share of £0.095. The standard deviation of daily returns 
is 1.98%, which is lower than that of the US firm. For example, Ng (2011) 
and Cao and Petrasek (2014) find an average standard deviation of 2.3% 
and 3.9%, respectively. The average daily return is -0.013%. The average 
(median) size of sample firms is £2.443 million (£0.208 million). UK firms are 
moderately levered since the mean of leverage (debt-to-asset ratio) is 
19.8%, and this is equivalent to the average of 20% reported by Cao and 
Petrasek (2014) in the case of the US firms. The book-to-market ratio is 0.66, 
which is somehow comparable to that of US firms. For example, Ng (2011) 
find an average book-to-market value of 0.54 and Cao and Petrasek (2014) 
find an average of 0.52. As for profitability, an average firm would have 4.5% 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the Pearson pairwise correlation matrix between the 
variables used in this study. The correlation coefficients between main 
variables, DIV, DPS and the different measures of liquidity betas are largely 
consistent with expectations. The correlation coefficients between DIV, DPS 
and all liquidity beta measures are negative. Furthermore, multicollinearity 
does not appear to be a problem, as all correlation coefficients are low with a 
maximum value of 0.464. To confirm this, we use the variance inflation 
factor. With all the key variables included in the model, none of the VIF 
values exceed the rule of thumb of 10 (with a maximum of 2.03), implying 
that multicollinearity is not a serious concern in our model. 
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Table 4.2 Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlations for dividend variables and control variables. DPS is the amount of dividend paid per share. DIV is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for dividend payers, and 0 otherwise. Amihud is the Amihud illiquidity ratio. Turnover is the turnover ratio. Spread is the proportional bid–
ask spread. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total book assets. The return is on the average of daily stock returns. The 
volatility is the standard deviations of daily returns. Book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of total shareholder equity divided by the market value of 
equity. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Firm size is the market capitalization in millions of Pounds. 
Liquidity beta 
(Amihud) 
Liquidity 
beta 
(Spread) 
Liquidity 
beta 
(Turnover) 
 
DIV -0.1500*** -0.1767*** -0.1651***  
DPS -0.1504*** -0.1655*** -0.1090***  
 
DIV DPS Leverage Amihud Turnover Spread Profitability Volatility Return Firm size VIF 
DIV           1.50 
DPS 0.375*** 
         
1.32 
Leverage 0.023* 0.085*** 
        
1.05 
Amihud -0.285*** -0.161*** -0.003 
       
1.56 
Turnover -0.018 0.046*** 0.163*** -0.176*** 
      
1.16 
Spread -0.411*** -0.298*** -0.051*** 0.578*** -0.255*** 
     
2.03 
Profitability 0.464*** 0.252*** -0.005 -0.242*** -0.067*** -0.393*** 
    
1.41 
Volatility -0.144*** -0.067*** 0.017 0.129*** 0.036*** 0.151*** -0.120*** 
   
1.11 
Return 0.091*** 0.058*** -0.063*** -0.119*** -0.039*** -0.140*** 0.160*** -0.220*** 
  
1.13 
Firm size 0.119*** 0.348*** 0.009 -0.073*** 0.042*** -0.187*** 0.103*** -0.055*** 0.038*** 
 
1.12 
Book-to-market -0.126*** -0.156*** -0.102*** 0.204*** -0.065*** 0.244*** -0.170*** 0.039*** -0.159*** -0.064*** 1.12 
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4.5. Empirical results 
In this section, we present the results of the impact of the firm’s two dividend 
policy decisions (decision to pay dividends and amount of dividend paid) on 
its systematic liquidity risk. First, we report the univariate regarding the 
difference in systematic liquidity risk between dividend- and non-dividend- 
paying stocks as well as high- and low-dividend-paying stocks. Next, we 
present the multivariate regression results.  
4.5.1. Univariate analysis 
Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the results from our univariate analysis. 
Dividend payers have a mean systematic liquidity risk of 0.59 (median 0.44), 
which is lower than that of non-dividend payers (mean of 0.91 and median of 
0.67). The difference in the systematic liquidity risk of the two groups is 0.32 
(median of 0.23) and is significant, as confirmed by our statistical tests. This 
provides the first evidence to support our hypothesis (H3), which predicts 
that dividend payers have lower systematic liquidity risk than non-dividend 
payers.  
Panel B of Table 4.3 shows that high-dividend payers have a mean 
systematic liquidity risk of 0.48 (median 0.32) and that low-dividend payers 
have a mean of 0.71 (median 0.58). The difference in the systematic liquidity 
risk of the two groups is 0.23 (median of 0.26), which is significant at 1% or 
better. This provides evidence to support our hypothesis (H4), which 
suggests that high-dividend payers have lower systematic liquidity risk than 
low-dividend payers. 
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Table 4.3 Univariate analysis 
This table presents the univariate analysis of the systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers 
and non-dividend payers as well as high-dividend- and low-dividend-paying stocks using the 
t-test for differences in mean and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for differences in median. 
At each December between 2000 and 2013, the liquidity beta for each stock is computed. 
The liquidity beta is estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling for market 
returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data (with a 
minimum of 36 months). Liquidity is measured by Amihud’s illiquidity ratio (Amihud).  
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. Non-dividend payers 
Liquidity risk Dividend payers Non-dividend payers 
Mean 
test 
Median 
test 
Mean 0.5931 0.9108 11.4003*** 
Median 0.4394 0.6693   9.594*** 
Panel B: High-dividend payers vs. Low-dividend payers 
Liquidity risk High-dividend payers 
Low-dividend 
payers 
Mean 
test 
Median 
test 
Mean 0.4725 0.7046 10.352***  
Median 0.3228 0.5842   9.900*** 
 
We also observe significant differences in other characteristics of dividend- 
and non-dividend-paying stocks, consistent with the literature.61 For example, 
dividend-paying stocks are larger and more profitable than non-dividend-
paying firms (see, e.g., Fama and French 2001; Banerjee et al. 2007; Kuo et 
al. 2013; Chang et al. 2016; Firth et al. 2016). Moreover, dividend payers 
have lower volatility in their returns compared to non-dividend payers, 
indicating that dividend-paying stocks tend to be less risky (Baskin 1989; 
Allen and Rachim 1996; Hussainey et al. 2011; Eije et al. 2014; Chang et al. 
2016; Firth et al. 2016). Non-dividend payers have higher averages of both 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio and bid-ask spread, suggesting that non-dividend 
payers are less liquid than dividend payers (Howe and Lin 1992; Agarwal 
2007).  
Similar significant differences are also observed for high- and low-dividend-
paying stocks. More specifically, stocks that pay a high amount of dividends 
tend to be larger and more profitable than their counterparts (Jabbouri 2016). 
Furthermore, payers of a high amount of dividends are less risky (Aivazian et 
al. 2003; Brav et al. 2005; Chang et al. 2016; Firth et al. 2016) and more 
liquid (Howe and Lin 1992) than low-dividends payers. Stocks that pay a high 
                                                             
61 These results are reported in Appendix C.3. 
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amount of dividends tend to have a higher leverage ratio. This is in line with 
the view that higher leverage might simply be a proxy for older, larger, more 
stable, and more profitable companies that are better able to afford to pay 
dividends (Von Eije and Megginson 2008). The growth opportunities variable 
shows that high-dividend payers have a higher mean and median than low-
dividend-paying firms. This is consistent with Aivazian et al. (2003), who 
show a positive relationship between dividends and growth opportunities 
using a sample of developing countries. They suggest that market-to-book 
value may be a sign of a high cash flow ratio resulting from the present value 
of current investment opportunities, and hence reflect the current 
performance of the firm. 
4.5.2. Multivariate analysis 
Table 4.4 reports the regression results for model (4.2), in which we regress 
liquidity betas on the decision to pay dividend variable (DIV) and other 
control variables. In the first two columns, we simply regress systematic 
liquidity risk on the DIV dummy without controlling for firm-specific 
characteristics. The results in Column (1) show that the coefficient on DIV is 
negative (-0.32) and highly significant (t-value = -9.84), suggesting that the 
systematic liquidity risk of dividend-paying firms is significantly lower than 
that of non-dividend-paying firms. In Column (2), we include year and 
industry effects to account for unobserved common time trends and industry-
level heterogeneity. We find that the difference in the systematic liquidity risk 
between dividend- and non-dividend-paying firms decreases (-0.28), but 
remains statistically significant (t-value = -8.14). Column (3) includes the 
control variables, but not the industry and year dummies, while Column (4) 
includes control variables and accounts for both year and industry fixed 
effects. The results show that the relation between systematic liquidity risk 
and the dividend payment are not sensitive to the model specification. The 
coefficients on DIV are significantly negative in both Columns (3) and (4), 
implying that stocks that pay dividends have a lower systematic liquidity risk 
on average than those that do not pay. The difference in systematic liquidity 
risk of dividend- and non-dividend-paying firms varies between 0.18 and 0.12 
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and is both statistically and economically significant. The coefficient on DIV 
in Column (4) suggests that, on average, dividend-paying stocks have a 
liquidity risk that is 0.12 standard deviations lower than those of non-
dividend-paying stocks.62 These findings strongly support H3, which 
suggests that dividend payers have lower systematic liquidity risk than their 
nonpayer counterparts.  
The results of the control variables are broadly consistent with the literature. 
The illiquidity ratio (Amihud) has a positive coefficient, indicating that illiquid 
stocks have higher systematic liquidity risk (see, e.g., Pástor and 
Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Cao and Petrasek, 2014). 
The effect of firm size on liquidity risk is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, which is consistent with findings of earlier studies (see, e.g., Pástor 
and Stambaugh 2003; Ng 2011). Further, liquidity betas are larger for stocks 
with lower profitability ratios and higher return volatility (Ng 2011). This 
finding is consistent with the flight-to-quality dynamics, which suggests that 
volatile stocks and stocks with low profitability are perceived by investors to 
be more risky. Therefore, they tend to be sold off to a greater extent 
compared to stocks with lower standard deviation of returns and higher 
profitability during periods of downturns. Finally, the coefficient on the book-
to-market ratio is positive and significant, consistent with the view that a high 
book-to-market ratio reflects persistent distress and low liquidity (see, e.g., 
Ng 2011; Acharya et al. 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
62 As indicated before, all variables except dummy variables are standardized. 
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Table 4.4 Difference in systematic liquidity risk between dividend 
payers and non-dividend payers 
This table reports the regression results for model (2), which captures the difference in 
systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers and non-dividend payers. The dependent variable 
is systematic liquidity risk, estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling for 
market returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data 
(with a minimum of 36 months). DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
dividend payers, and 0 otherwise. Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio 
(Amihud). Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total book 
assets. The return is the average of daily stock returns. The volatility is the standard 
deviations of daily returns. Book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of total 
shareholder equity divided by the market value of equity. Profitability is the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets. Firm size is the market capitalization in millions of 
Pounds. All variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DIV -0.319*** -0.278*** -0.184*** -0.115*** 
 
(-9.84) (-8.14) (-4.11) (-2.57) 
Leverage 
  
0.024 0.054*** 
   
(1.46) (3.19) 
Liquidity (Amihud) 
  
0.015 0.032 
   
(0.70) (1.15) 
Profitability 
  
-0.134*** -0.084*** 
   
(-6.41) (-3.96) 
Volatility 
  
0.177*** 0.204*** 
   
(8.98) (9.93) 
Return 
  
-0.045*** -0.074*** 
   
(-2.56) (-3.79) 
Firm size 
  
-0.208*** -0.184*** 
   
(-9.71) (-9.54) 
Book-to-market 
  
0.009 0.056*** 
   
(0.50) (2.92) 
Intercept 0.226*** 0.248** 0.225*** 0.169** 
 
(7.62) (4.36) (5.79) (2.31) 
Year effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 6410 6410 4632 4632 
F-statistic 96.73*** 21.26*** 53.02*** 27.99*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.0189 0.0665 0.1158 0.1636 
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Table 4.5 presents the results for models using HighDPS as a dummy 
variable for the amount of dividend paid. We stratify the sub-sample of 
dividend-paying firms into two groups according to their dividend per share 
(DPS). HighDPS takes a value of 1 for observations with above median DPS 
and 0 otherwise. Column (1) shows that the coefficient on HighDPS is 
negative and highly significant, implying that systematic liquidity is 
significantly negatively associated with amount of dividends. This finding 
remains robust to alternative model specifications (see Columns (2) to (4)). 
The coefficient on HighDPS ranges between -0.21 and -0.14, depending on 
the model specification. These figures are both statistically and economically 
significant. For example, the results in Column (4) suggest that, on average, 
the liquidity risk of stocks that pay high dividends is 0.14 standard deviations 
lower than those that pay low dividends. These findings strongly support H4, 
which posits that high-dividend-paying stocks have lower liquidity risk than 
their low-dividend-paying counterparts.  
As for the control variables, the coefficient illiquidity ratio (Amihud) is positive 
and significant. This finding is consistent with earlier studies which document 
a negative association between liquidity level and liquidity risk (Pástor and 
Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and Pedersen 2005; Cao and Petrasek 2014). 
Moreover, liquidity betas are higher for stocks with higher volatility and 
smaller market capitalization (Ng 2011; Cao and Petrasek 2014), and higher 
book-to-market ratios (Ng 2011; Acharya et al. 2013). 
We further investigate the effect of the amount of dividend payment on 
liquidity risk by regressing liquidity beta on a continuous dividend variable 
measured by the dividend per share (DPS). Table 4.6 shows that the 
coefficient on DPS is significantly negative, regardless of the model 
specification. In terms of economic significance, the results in Column (4) 
suggest that a one standard deviation increases in dividend per share results 
in 0.07 standard deviations decrease in the liquidity risk. These findings are 
again consistent with the predictions of H4.  
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Table 4.5 Difference in systematic liquidity risk between high-dividend 
payers and low-dividend payers 
This table reports the difference in liquidity risk of high-dividend payers and low-dividend 
payers. The dependent variable is systematic liquidity risk, estimated as the slope coefficient 
on LIQ while controlling for market returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five 
years of monthly data (with a minimum of 36 months). HighDPS is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for stocks with DPS higher than median, and 0 otherwise. DPS is the 
amount of dividends paid per share. All other variables are defined in the notes to Table 4.4. 
All variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HighDPS -0.280*** -0.213*** -0.212*** -0.144*** 
 
(-10.35) (-7.85) (-5.85) (-3.96) 
Leverage 
  
-0.014 0.016 
   
(-0.76) (0.83) 
Liquidity (Amihud) 
  
0.109*** 0.147*** 
   
(5.06) (6.66) 
Profitability 
 
-0.047** -0.012 
   
(-2.26) (-0.58) 
Volatility 
  
0.192*** 0.228*** 
   
(8.44) (9.69) 
Return 
 
-0.040* -0.072*** 
   
(-1.94) (-3.12) 
Firm size 
  
-0.249*** -0.226*** 
   
(-12.26) (-11.48) 
Book-to-market 
 
0.030 0.068*** 
   
(1.48) (3.31) 
Intercept 0.139*** 0.183*** 0.168*** 0.254*** 
 
(6.90) (2.88) (6.45) (3.10) 
Year effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 5364 5364 3379 3379 
F-statistic 107.15*** 17.38*** 55.82*** 26.3*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.0194 0.0561 0.1279 0.1719 
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Table 4.6 The impact of the dividend per share on liquidity risk 
This table reports the impact of dividend per share on liquidity risk. The dependent variable 
is systematic liquidity risk, estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling for 
market returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data 
(with a minimum of 36 months). DPS is a continuous variable that represents the amount of 
dividend paid per share. All other variables are defined in the notes to Table 4.4. All 
variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DPS -0.130*** -0.099*** -0.098*** -0.072*** 
 
(-9.21) (-7.41) (-5.70) (-4.28) 
Leverage 
  
-0.011 0.02 
   
(-0.59) (1.04) 
Liquidity (Amihud) 
  
0.116*** 0.151*** 
   
(5.44) (6.98) 
Profitability 
  
-0.050** -0.014 
   
(-2.41) (-0.66) 
Volatility 
  
0.196*** 0.230*** 
   
(8.62) (9.81) 
Return 
  
-0.045** -0.074*** 
   
(-2.18) (-3.24) 
Firm size 
  
-0.241*** -0.219*** 
   
(-12.13) (-11.32) 
Book-to-market 
  
0.034* 0.071*** 
   
(1.66) (3.47) 
Intercept -0.011 0.145** 0.057*** 0.189** 
 
(-0.76) (2.12) (3.40) (2.36) 
Year effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 4652 4652 3379 3379 
F-statistic 84.88*** 17.44*** 61.93*** 27.6*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.0157 0.0557 0.1256 0.1715 
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4.5.3. Dealing with endogeneity issues 
A major concern in this study is endogeneity problems. Dividend policy 
decisions, of course, are not exogenous and may correlate with other omitted 
(unobserved) firm-specific variables that simultaneously determine dividends 
and systematic liquidity risk. In the presence of endogeneity, any estimates 
obtained using standard statistical approaches would be subject to a bias.  
Using lagged independent variables in our main model alleviates but does 
not eliminate issues related to endogeneity in the OLS approach. Therefore, 
in order to further address the potential endogeneity issue, we conduct a 
two-stage regression approach using two alternative models, such as an IV 
regression model and Heckman-type two-step model (Heckman 1979).63 
These models involve two stages and allow recovering causal estimates in 
the presence of non-random assignment to treatment. In the first stage, the 
probability of being selected in the treatment group is estimated from 
exogenous instruments. In the second stage, the main model is estimated by 
adding a control variable that captures the difference between treatment and 
a control group resulting from unmodelled sources of variance in the 
selection process. Therefore, the correlation between the error term and 
selection is removed and consistent estimators can be obtained (see 
Antonakis et al. 2014). 
IV regression model 
The first method used to conduct the two-stage approach to address the 
potential endogeneity problem of dividends with respect to systematic 
liquidity risk is the IV regression model. In this model, the 
ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜,௧		dummy variables are treated as endogenous. Formally, 
the approach involves estimating the following models in two stages:64 
ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ௜௧	 = ߛ଴ + ߛܼ௜௧ +߱௜௧                                         (4.3) 
                                                             
63 See Yu et al. (2009), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) and Gul et al. (2010) for similar 
approaches to deal with endogeneity. 
64 See Gao et al. (2013) for an application of similar IV approaches in the context of public 
and private firms’ cash policy.  
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ߚ௜௟௜௤௜,௧	 = ߛ଴ + ߛଵܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	௜௧
∗ + ߛଶ ௜ܺ௧ +	ߝ௜௧                     (4.4) 
In the first stage, we estimate a probit model (4.3), which captures the 
dividend policy (i.e., dividend payment decision (DIV) or the amount of 
dividends decision (HighDPS)). The second stage involves estimating model 
(4.4), in which systematic liquidity risk is regressed on the fitted values of the 
ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ dummy variable	(ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ	௜௧
∗ ), estimated from the first 
stage, and the control variables. As an instrumental variable for the 
ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ dummy variables, we use the industry-median dividend per 
share. We believe that this may be a valid instrument because an industry-
level dividend may affect the dividend decisions of a given firm within that 
industry, but it is unlikely to have a direct impact on this firm’s systematic 
liquidity risk.65  
We present the IV regression results in Table 4.7.66 Panel A presents the 
results for the dividend payment decision (DIV) where the first-stage 
regression results are in Column (1) and the second-stage regression results 
are in Column (2). The industry-median dividend variable in Column (1) is 
positive and significant, indicating that the higher the level of dividend within 
an industry, the more likely that a firm pays dividends.67 The results in 
Column (2) suggest that dividend payers have a significantly lower 
systematic liquidity risk than non-payers. The coefficient on DIV is -0.52%, 
which is larger than that of the baseline regression (Table 4.4). This finding 
implies that failure to control for the endogeneity issue may underestimate 
the impact of the dividend payment decision on the systematic liquidity risk. 
                                                             
65 Similar studies that use industry-level variables as instruments are: Jiraporn et al. (2011) 
and Kini and Williams (2012). 
66 This was carried out using the treatreg command in STATA 13 since the endogenous 
variable is a dummy. The treatment regression considers the effect of an endogenously 
chosen binary treatment on another endogenous continuous variable (Cong and Drukker 
2001).  
67 To test the validity of our instrument, we look at the first stage (see Larcker and Rusticus 
(2010:192) and Antonakis et al. (2014:32)). The first-stage F-tests that the instruments are 
jointly 0 exceed critical value for a weak instrument (F=8.96 for the case with one 
instrument) as developed in Stock et al. (2002). Moreover, our instrument is highly 
significant in the first-stage OLS regressions with a t-statistic of 2.10 and 3.36 for DIV and 
HighDPS, respectively. These alleviate the concern that our estimation suffers from bias 
introduced by having weak instruments. 
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Table 4.7 Dividend policy decisions and liquidity risk: endogeneity 
regressions 
This table reports the results of the IV regression models (4.3) and (4.4), as well as the results of the 
Heckman model. Panel A represents the results for the dividend payment decision in which the DIV 
dummy variable, takes the value of 1 for dividend-paying firms, and 0 otherwise. Panel B represents 
the results for the amount of dividend decision in which HighDPS dummy variable takes the value of 1 
for stocks with DPS higher than median, and 0 otherwise. Column (1) & (4) report the first-stage 
regression which is a probit regression with the DIV and HighDPS dummy being the dependent 
variable, respectively. We instrument for these variables using the industry–dividend median variable. 
IMR is the inverse Mills ratio in the Heckman model. All other variables are defined in the notes to 
Table 4.4. Columns (2)-(3) & (5)-(6) report the second stage regression of the IV and Heckman-type 
model, respectively. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-
consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. Non-dividend payers 
  Probit IV regression 
Heckman-type 
regression 
  (1) (2) (3) 
DIV 
 
-0.519** -0.993*** 
  
(-2.78) (-5.17) 
Leverage -0.058** 0.050*** 0.046*** 
 
(-2.18) (2.97) (2.72) 
Liquidity (Amihud) -0.257*** 0.004 -0.029 
 
(-7.86) (0.16) (-1.17) 
Profitability 0.587*** -0.024 0.045 
 
(12.79) (-0.72) (1.35) 
Volatility -0.198*** 0.183*** 0.158*** 
 
(-7.37) (8.13) (7.19) 
Return -0.035 -0.077*** -0.080*** 
 
(-1.24) (-3.88) (-4.09) 
Firm size 0.628** -0.166*** -0.146*** 
 
(2.38) (-8.25) (-7.80) 
Book-to-market -0.098*** 0.046** 0.035* 
 
(-3.65) (2.33) (1.18) 
Industry–dividend median 0.655** 
 
(2.10) 
Intercept 0.721*** 0.451*** 0.781*** 
 
(4.74) (3.09) (5.16) 
IMR 
  
0.517*** 
   
(4.71) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4632 4632 4632 
F/Chi2 820.44*** 777.4*** 927.03*** 
Pseudo R2/R2 0.306 
 
0.173 
 
 138 
 
Table 4.7 (Continued) 
Panel B: High-dividend payers vs. Low-dividend payers 
  Probit IV regression 
Heckman-type 
regression 
  (4) (5) (6) 
HighDPS 
 
-0.918*** -0.855** 
  
(-4.2) (-2.27) 
Leverage 0.029 0.024 0.023 
 
(1.14) (1.18) (1.19) 
Liquidity (Amihud) -0.352*** 0.076** 0.082* 
 
(-7.89) (2.51) (1.93) 
Profitability 0.206*** 0.039 0.035 
 
(7.22) (1.48) (1.06) 
Volatility -0.046* 0.215*** 0.216*** 
 
(-1.70) (8.71) (8.84) 
Return 0.026 -0.065*** -0.065*** 
 
(0.99) (-2.70) (-2.82) 
Firm size 0.187*** -0.179*** -0.183*** 
 
(3.23) (-8.55) (-6.53) 
Book-to-Market -0.174*** 0.024 0.027 
 
(-5.98) (0.96) (0.90) 
Industry–dividend median 0.442*** 
  
 
(3.36) 
 
Intercept -0.332** 0.679*** 0.644*** 
(-2.15) (4.49) (2.90) 
IMR 
  
0.436* 
   
(1.89) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3379 3379 3379 
F/Chi2 431.38*** 756.57*** 24.89*** 
Pseudo R2/R2 0.140 
 
0.180 
 
 
Panel (B) of Table 4.7 presents the results for the amount of dividend 
decision (HighDPS). The first-stage regression results are in Column (4) and 
the second-stage regression results are in Column (5). The results in Column 
(4) show that the industry-median dividend variable is positively and 
statistically significant, implying that the higher the level of dividend within an 
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industry the more likely it is that a firm will pay a high amount of dividends. 
Column (5) shows that payers of a high amount of dividends have a 
significantly lower systematic liquidity risk than payers of a low amount of 
dividends. HighDPS has a negative coefficient of -0.92%, which is larger 
than that found in Table 4.5. This result indicates that failure to control for the 
endogeneity issue may underestimate the impact of the amount of dividend 
decision on the systematic liquidity risk.  
Heckman-type two-step model 
Our second model to conduct a two-stage regression approach is similar to 
that of Heckman (1979). The first stage of this estimation procedure involves 
a probit model that estimates the likelihood of a firm paying dividends/high 
amount dividends; see model (4.3). Then, the coefficient estimates obtained 
from the probit model are used to compute the Inverse Mills Ratios (MRs) 
(λ୧୲),
68 which are the probability density function (ϕ) divided by the 
cumulative distribution function of a distribution (Θ), for each observation in 
the sample:  
for 	ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ୧୲ = 1, λ୧୲ =	
ம(ஔ୞౟౪)
஀(ஔ୞౟౪)
                             (4.5) 
for 	ܦ݅ݒ݅݀݁݊݀	݌݋݈݅ܿݕ୧୲ = 0, λ୧୲ =	−
ம(ஔ୞౟౪)
ଵି஀(ஔ୞౟౪)
                       (4.6) 
In the second stage of the estimation procedure we run our main multivariate 
regression (Model 4.2) while adding the estimated IMRs as an independent 
variable in order to account for the endogeneity and obtain consistent 
parameter estimates. The results are reported in Columns (3) and (6) of 
Table 4.7 for dividend payment decision (DIV) and amount of dividend 
decision (HighDPS), respectively. The coefficients on the DIV and HighDPS 
dummy variables continue to be negative and significant, indicating that the 
decision pay and the amount of dividend payments are negatively associated 
with liquidity risk. The statistical significance of the IMR implies that there 
exists endogeneity bias, and if we did not include it in the OLS regressions 
                                                             
68 The IMR is an estimate of the non-selection hazard that addresses the probability of a 
stock with characteristics Z୧୲ being a dividend payer/a high-dividend payer. 
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then the estimates would be biased and inconsistent. In summary, after 
controlling for the endogeneity of both dividend policy decisions, our main 
findings on the liquidity risk remain qualitatively unchanged. Dividend payers 
(payers of high dividends) have lower systematic liquidity risk than non-
payers (payers of low dividends).  
Table 4.8 Dividend policy decisions and liquidity risk: fixed-effects 
regressions 
This table reports the results of the firm fixed-effect regressions. Panel A represents the 
results of the payment decision, which is measured by DIV, and Panel B represents the 
results of the amount of dividend decision, which is measured by both HighDPS (Column 2) 
and DPS (Column 3). DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend payers, 
and 0 otherwise. HighDPS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for stocks with DPS 
higher than median, and 0 otherwise. DPS is the amount of dividend paid per share. The 
dependent variable is liquidity risk, estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling 
for market returns where the regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly 
data (with a minimum of 36 months). Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio 
(Amihud). All other variables are defined in the notes to Table 4.4. All variables are 
standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Independent variable 
Panel A: Payment decision  
 
Panel B: Amount of dividend decision 
(1) 
 
(2) (3) 
DIV -0.139* 
 
HighDPS -0.180** DPS -0.116** 
 
(-1.83) 
  
(-2.38) 
 
(-2.29) 
Leverage 0.080** 
 
Leverage 0.054 Leverage 0.060 
 
(2.19) 
  
(1.27) 
 
(1.40) 
Liquidity (Amihud) 0.012 
 
Liquidity (Amihud) 0.054** Liquidity (Amihud) 0.053** 
 
(0.58) 
  
(2.47) 
 
( 2.43) 
Profitability -0.021 
 
Profitability -0.038 Profitability -0.036 
 
(-0.93) 
  
(-1.62) 
 
(-1.49) 
Volatility 0.069*** 
 
Volatility 0.052 Volatility 0.051 
 
(2.61 ) 
  
(1.59) 
 
(1.57) 
Return -0.042*** 
 
Return -0.032* Return -0.036** 
 
(-2.95) 
  
(-1.8) 
 
(-2.02) 
Firm size -0.058 
 
Firm size -0.064 Firm size -0.026 
 
(-1.46) 
  
(-1.17) 
 
(-0.47) 
Book-to-market -0.023 
 
Book-to-market -0.020 Book-to-market -0.012 
 
(-0.76) 
  
(-0.58) 
 
(-0.36) 
Intercept 0.246*** 
 
Intercept 0.219*** Intercept 0.114** 
 
(3.60) 
  
(3.73) 
 
(2.10) 
Year effects Yes 
 
Year effects Yes Year effects Yes 
Observations 4632  Observations 3379 Observations 3379 
F-statistic  4.22*** 
 
F-statistic  3.15*** F-statistic  3.20*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.039 
 
Adj. R-squared 0.035 Adj. R-squared 0.035 
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Fixed-effects regression 
Finally, to further address the concern that our results are subject to 
endogeneity issues due to omitted or unobserved factors that may affect the 
liquidity risk, we further perform a firm fixed-effects regression, which 
controls for unobservable characteristics that remain constant over time. 
Basically, a fixed-effects regression focuses only on the variation within firms 
over time, not the cross-sectional variation across firms. Li and Prabhala 
(2005) demonstrate that panel regressions with firm fixed effects can control 
for endogeneity stemming from unobserved attributes that are fixed over 
time. The results are reported in Table 4.8. The coefficients of all variables of 
dividend decisions remain significant. The fixed-effects result shows that, 
within firms, over time, both dividend policy decisions have a significant 
negative effect in systematic liquidity risk. This finding provides further 
support to our hypotheses (H3 and H4). 
4.5.4. Additional robustness checks 
Information effects 
Here, we examine whether the impact of dividend policy decisions on 
systematic liquidity risk depends on the level of information opacity. The 
amount of information available can influence trading decisions of investors 
since they affect the level of uncertainty and adverse selection they face (Ng, 
2011) and thereby affect systematic liquidity risk. 
To test this prediction, we employ two commonly-used measures of amount 
of information, namely firm size and growth opportunities.69 Large firms are 
typically better known and hence face lower information asymmetry and 
uncertainty (Frank and Goyal 2003; Leary and Michaely 2011). Growth firms 
are associated with more uncertainty and adverse selection as their 
                                                             
69 Many studies use firm size and growth opportunities as proxies for the amount of 
information; see, e.g., Leary and Michaely (2011) and Bharath et al. (2009). Amount of 
available information can also be proxied by other variables such as analysts earning 
forecast; however, we are unable to use this proxy due to the lack of data availability and 
access to the I/B/E/S file. 
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managers seem to possess better information of the firm’s investment 
opportunities and expected future cash follows (Smith and Watts 1992), and 
growth opportunities are more difficult for outsiders to value (Leary and 
Michaely 2011). Given that small, low-growth firms are associated with lower 
levels of information, we expect that uncertainty and adverse selection will be 
more severe in small and high-growth firms, as compared to large and low-
growth firms. Therefore, investors are more likely to sell off the stocks of 
small and high-growth firms during low market liquidity and we therefore 
expect the effect of dividend policy on liquidity risk to be stronger in these 
firms. 
In Table 4.9, we examine whether the dividend policy effect on systematic 
liquidity risk varies according to their growth opportunities and firm size using 
dummy variables and their interaction terms with DIV/HighDPS. The High 
dummy variable takes the value of 1 for observations with below the median 
book-to-market and 0 otherwise while the Large dummy variable take the 
value of 1 for observations above the median size and 0 otherwise. Panel A 
reports the results regarding the effect of whether the stock pays dividends 
or not (DIV), while Panel B reports the results of the effect of dividend 
amount (HighDPS). The results of Panel A show that firms with high growth 
and small firms tend to have more liquidity risk than those with the opposite 
characteristics. Further, within these groups of firms, those that are non-
dividend payers have a higher level of liquidity risk. Non-dividend payers that 
are small and have high growth opportunities face higher degrees of 
information problems, which may explain why these firms have higher 
liquidity risk. Moreover, Panel B shows that firms with high growth and small 
firms tend to have more liquidity risk than those with the opposite 
characteristics. However, within these groups of firms, those that are non-
dividend payers have a higher level of liquidity risk. Non-dividend payers that 
are small and have high growth opportunities face higher degrees of 
information problems, which may explain why these firms have higher 
liquidity risk.  
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Table 4.9 The effect of dividend policy on systematic liquidity risk and 
information opacity 
This table presents the effect of dividend policy on liquidity risk conditional on growth 
opportunities and firm size as proxies for amount of information. The dependent variable is 
systematic liquidity risk, estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling for market 
returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data (with a 
minimum of 36 months). DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend 
payers, and 0 otherwise. HighDPS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for stocks 
with DPS higher than median, and 0 otherwise. DPS is the amount of dividends paid per 
share. Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity (Amihud). High is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 for observations with above the median growth opportunities, and 0 
otherwise. Large is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for observations with above 
the median size, and 0 otherwise. All other variables are defined in the notes to Table 4.4. 
All variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. This table reports from 
the pooled regression with time and industry fixed effects. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. Non-dividend payers 
Growth opportunities  Firm size 
DIV -0.0561*  DIV -0.0129** 
(-1.84)  (-1.98) 
High 0.2089***  Large -0.5310*** 
(2.81)  (-7.53) 
High*DIV -0.3826***  Large*DIV 0.1726** 
(-4.98)  (2.27) 
Leverage 0.0553***  Leverage 0.0886*** 
(3.27)  (5.37) 
Liquidity (Amihud) 0.0337  Liquidity (Amihud) -0.0160 
(1.60)  (-0.77) 
Profitability -0.0706***  Profitability -0.0644*** 
(-3.35)  (-3.26) 
Volatility 0.2021***  Volatility 0.1644*** 
(9.96)  (8.12) 
Return -0.0768***  Return -0.0382** 
(-3.96)  (-1.97) 
Firm size  -0.1821***  Firm size -0.1208*** 
(-9.83)  (-9.22) 
Book-to-market 0.0424*  Book-to-market 0.0291 
(1.85)  (1.53) 
Intercept 0.0829  Intercept 0.4511*** 
(1.05)  (5.87) 
Year effects Yes  Year effects Yes 
Industry effects Yes  Industry effects Yes 
Observations 4631  Observations 4507 
F-statistic 28.72***  F-statistic 55.58*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.1703   Adj. R-squared 0.2470 
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Table 4.9 (Continued) 
Panel B: High-dividend payers vs. Low-dividend payers 
Growth opportunities   Firm Size 
HighDPS -0.0812* HighDPS -0.0358* 
(-1.68) (-1.70) 
High 0.0512** Large -0.7429*** 
(1.83) (-15.04) 
High*HighDPS (-0.1238* Large*HighDPS 0.0793* 
(-1.80) (1.69) 
Leverage 0.0177 Leverage 0.0768*** 
(0.94) (4.26) 
Liquidity (Amihud) 0.1522*** Liquidity (Amihud) 0.0615*** 
(6.87) (2.90) 
Profitability -0.0045 Profitability -0.0124 
(-0.22) (-0.65) 
Volatility 0.2289*** Volatility 0.1856*** 
(9.77) (8.18) 
Return -0.0719*** Return -0.0375* 
(-3.16) (-1.68) 
Firm size -0.2225*** Firm size -0.1443*** 
(-11.44) (-9.83) 
Book-to-Market 0.0358 Book-to-Market 0.0427** 
(1.42) (2.16) 
Intercept 0.2801*** Intercept 0.5650*** 
(3.27) (7.03) 
Year effects Yes Year effects Yes 
Industry effects Yes Industry effects Yes 
Observations 3378 Observations 3286 
F-statistic 25.62*** F-statistic 49.24*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.1740 Adj. R-squared 0.277598 
 
Taken together, non-dividend payers that are small and have high growth 
options face higher degrees of asymmetric information and uncertainty, 
which may explain why these firms have higher liquidity risk. This finding is 
consistent with previous evidence documenting the impact of asymmetric 
information and uncertainty on liquidity risk. Small firms are likely to be 
associated with higher adverse selection and uncertainty since they have a 
lower amount of information than large firms. Moreover, high-growth firms 
also tend to be associated with lower levels of information and hence a 
higher degree of adverse selection and uncertainty, and investors are more 
 145 
 
likely to sell off their stocks in such firms. Therefore, investors are more likely 
to sell off these stocks at a discount during a period of low liquidity.  
Alternative liquidity measures 
Liquidity is multi-dimensional and is difficult to capture with a single proxy 
(Liu 2006; Banerjee et al. 2007; Vu et al. 2015). To address this concern, we 
consider another two measures of stock liquidity, namely, the proportional 
bid–ask spread and turnover ratio. Using these two measures, we construct 
another two liquidity factors (LIQ) and use them in the LCAPM to estimate 
liquidity betas and then re-estimate our main models of the relationship 
between liquidity betas and dividend policy decisions. 
Table 4.10 Univariate analysis using alternative liquidity measures 
This table presents the univariate analysis of the systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers 
and non-dividend payers as well as high-dividend- and low-dividend-paying stocks using the 
t-test for differences in mean and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for differences in median. 
At each December between 2000 and 2013, the liquidity beta for each stock is computed. 
The liquidity beta is estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling for market 
returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data (with a 
minimum of 36 months). Liquidity is measured by bid–ask spread (Spread) and turnover 
ratio (Turnover).  
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. Non-dividend payers 
  Liquidity risk (Spread) Liquidity risk (Turnover) 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Dividend payers 0.605 0.427 0.678 0.447 
Non-dividend payers 0.990 0.725 1.003 0.640 
Mean test 13.457*** 
 
12.099*** 
 
Median test 
 
11.902*** 
 
9.171*** 
Panel B: High dividend payers vs. Low-dividend payers 
  Liquidity risk (Spread) Liquidity risk (Turnover) 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
High-dividend payers 0.465 0.294 0.608 0.421 
Low-dividend payers 0.738 0.551 0.738 0.478 
Mean test 11.881*** 
 
6.487*** 
 
Median test 
 
11.514*** 
 
6.653*** 
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In Table 4.10, Panel A shows that dividend payers have a mean systematic 
liquidity risk of 0.61 and 0.68 using bid–ask spread and turnover ratio, 
respectively, which is lower than that of non-dividend payers. In both cases, 
the difference in the systematic liquidity risk of the two groups is significant at 
1% or better. This provides further evidence to support H3. Panel B shows 
that high-dividend payers have a mean systematic liquidity risk (0.47 in case 
of bid–ask spread and 0.61 in case of turnover ratio) that is lower (0.74 in 
case of bid–ask spread and 0.74 in case of turnover ratio) than that of low-
dividend payers. These results provide a strong support to H4. 
Table 4.11 presents the results of the regressions that examine how dividend 
payment decisions are associated with liquidity risk, which is measured using 
bid–ask spread and turnover ratio as alternative liquidity measures. Panel A 
reports the results for the dividend payment decision (DIV), Panel B reports 
the results for the amount of dividend payment decision (HighDPS) and 
Panel C reports the results for DPS as a continuous variable, respectively. 
The findings suggest that liquidity risk is negatively associated with dividend 
policy when other liquidity measures are used. However, the magnitude of 
the effect varies with different measures. For example, Panel A shows that 
based on liquidity risk estimated using bid–ask spread and turnover ratio, the 
coefficients on DIV are negative (-0.044 and -0.034, respectively), indicating 
that the liquidity risk of dividend payers is lower than that of non-payers. 
Consistent with the findings for the Amihud ratio, the results based on 
liquidity risk estimated from bid–ask spread and turnover ratio show that the 
difference in liquidity beta of those stocks that pay a high amount of dividend 
per share and their counterparts is 0.098 and 0.13, respectively (see Panel 
B). Furthermore, Panel C shows that the amount of dividend per share has a 
negative impact on liquidity risk. All of these differences are negative and 
statistically significant, supporting our hypotheses (H3 and H4), except for 
model in Column (1) in the case of bid–ask spread.  
Overall, our results based on the alternative liquidity measures are similar to 
those based on our main measure (Amihud illiquidity ratio). Dividend payers 
and payers of high dividends continue to have lower liquidity risk than their 
counterparts. 
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Table 4.11 Multivariate analysis using alternative liquidity measures 
This table reports the multivariate regression results for model (2), which captures the difference in systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers and non-dividend payers (Panel 
A), as well as high-dividend and low-dividend payers (Panel B). Panel C reports the impact of dividend per share on liquidity risk. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the results 
using bid–ask spread as the liquidity measure. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report the results using turnover ratio as the liquidity measure. The dependent variable is liquidity risk, 
estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while controlling for market returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data (with a minimum of 36 
months). DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend payers, and 0 otherwise. HighDPS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for stocks with DPS 
higher than median, and 0 otherwise. DPS is the amount of dividends paid per share. Liquidity is measured by the bid–ask spread (Spread) and turnover ratio (Turnover). All 
other variables are defined in the notes to Table 4.4. All variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard 
errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. Non-payers Panel B: High-dividend payers vs. Low-dividend payers Panel C: Amount of dividends (DPS) 
  Spread Turnover     Spread Turnover   Spread Turnover 
  (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
DIV -0.044 -0.337*** HighDPS -0.098*** -0.125*** DPS -0.041** -0.039** 
 (-1.02) (-7.75)  (-2.82) (-3.67)  (-2.38) (-2.50) Leverage 0.036** -0.029* Leverage 0.021 -0.062*** Leverage 0.023 -0.060*** 
 (2.08) (-1.77)  (1.12) (-3.40)  (1.26) (-3.28) 
Liquidity 0.125*** 0.110*** Liquidity 0.234*** 0.116*** Liquidity 0.240*** 0.111*** 
 (5.99) (6.15)  (10.69) (5.20)  (11.17) (5.04) 
Profitability -0.093*** -0.070*** Profitability -0.016 -0.024 Profitability -0.017 -0.029 
 (-4.48) (-3.11)  (-0.81) (-1.22)  (-0.89) (-1.45) Volatility 0.201*** 0.167*** Volatility 0.235*** 0.195*** Volatility 0.236*** 0.198*** 
 (10.07) (8.03)  (10.43) (7.71)  (10.48) (7.78) 
Return -0.086*** -0.080*** Return -0.083*** -0.092*** Return -0.084*** -0.094*** 
 (-4.57) (-4.43)  (-3.79) (-4.32)  (-3.85) (-4.42) Firm size  -0.178*** -0.050*** Firm size  -0.199*** -0.055*** Firm size  -0.195*** -0.055*** 
 (-8.93) (-5.05)  (-9.26) (-4.14)  (-9.03) (-4.01) 
Book-to-market 0.019 0.040** Book-to-market 0.035 0.054*** Book-to-market 0.037* 0.060*** 
 (1.03) (2.17)  (1.69) (2.67)  (1.81) (2.97) 
Intercept 0.02 -0.221*** Intercept 0.06 -0.409*** Intercept 0.011 -0.472*** 
 (0.29) (-3.37)  -0.75 (-5.55)  -0.14 (-6.72) 
Year effects Yes Yes Year effects Yes Yes Year effects Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Industry effects Yes Yes Industry effects Yes Yes 
Observations 4710 4636 Observations 3450 3381 Observations 3450 3381 
F-statistic 35.12*** 31.28*** F-statistic 33.3*** 18.55 F-statistic 33.76*** 18.48*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.2017 0.1831 Adj. R-squared 0.2195 0.1451 Adj. R-squared 0.2188 0.1429 
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Alternative models to estimate systematic liquidity risk 
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the liquidity beta using the three-
factor model of Fama and French (1993), and the four-factor model while 
also including the liquidity factor (LIQ). The three-factor model includes the 
market factor	(ݎ௠௧ − ݎ௙௧), the size factor	(ܵܯܤ), and the book-to-market 
factor	(ܪܯܮ). The four-factor model includes the three Fama-French factors 
plus a momentum factor (ܯܱܯ) as follows:70 
ݎ௜௧ − ݎ௙௧ =∝௜+ ߚ௠௜൫ݎ௠௧ − ݎ௙௧൯ + ߚ௜௟௜௤௜	ܮܫܳ௧ + ߚ௦௠௕௜	ܵܯܤ௧ + ߚ௛௠௟௜	ܪܯܮ௧ + ߝ௜௧   
(4.7) 
ݎ௜௧ − ݎ௙௧ =∝௜+ ߚ௠௜൫ݎ௠௧ − ݎ௙௧൯ + ߚ௜௟௜௤௜	ܮܫܳ௧ + ߚ௦௠௕௜	ܵܯܤ௧ + ߚ௛௠௟௜	ܪܯܮ௧ +
ߚ௠௢௠௜	ܯܱܯ௧ + ߝ௜௧                     (4.8) 
where ߚ௦௠௕௜, ߚ௛௠௟௜, and ߚ௠௢௠௜	are factor loadings on ܵܯܤ௧,	ܪܯܮ௧, and ܯܱܯ௧, 
respectively; ܵܯܤ௧	is the size risk factor in month t and is computed as the 
difference in returns of portfolios of small and large firms; ܪܯܮ௧	is the 
difference in returns between portfolios of high and low book-to-market 
stocks; ܯܱܯ௧	is the difference in returns of portfolios of winner stocks with 
high prior returns and loser stocks with low prior returns. The other 
parameters are already defined in section 4.4.1. 
Table 4.12 reports the results from the univariate analysis. Panel A shows 
that dividend payers have a mean systematic liquidity risk of 0.18 and 0.16 
using the liquidity beta from the three-factor model and four-factor model, 
respectively, which is lower than that of non-dividend payers. In both cases, 
the difference in the systematic liquidity risk of the two groups is significant, 
as confirmed by our statistical tests. This provides further evidence to 
support H3. Panel B shows that high-dividend payers have a mean 
systematic liquidity risk of 0.099 in the case of the three-factor model and 
0.089 in the case of the four-factor model. These are lower than that of low-
dividend payers, consistent with the prediction of H4. 
                                                             
70 We obtain the monthly Fama-French factors and the momentum factor from Xfi Centre for 
Finance and Investment website, University of Exeter. See 
http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index.php. 
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Table 4.12 Univariate analysis using liquidity beta estimated from 
alternative models 
This table presents the univariate analysis of the systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers and non-
dividend payers (Panel A) as well as high-dividend- and low-dividend-paying stocks (Panel B) using 
the t-test for differences in mean and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for differences in median. At each 
December between 2000 and 2013, the liquidity beta for each stock is computed as the slope 
coefficient on LIQ from the three Fama-French factors model and the four-factor model. The 
regressions are estimated using the past five years of monthly data (with a minimum of 36 months). 
Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio. 
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. Non-dividend payers 
  Liquidity risk (three-factor) Liquidity risk (four-factor) 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
Dividend payers 0.1758 0.0232 0.1639 0.0230 
Non-dividend payers 0.3882 0.1480 0.3401 0.0518 
Mean test 7.6798*** 
 
6.3100*** 
 
Median test  6.926***   5.028*** 
Panel B: High-dividend payers vs. Low-dividend payers 
  Liquidity risk (three-factor) Liquidity risk (four-factor) 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
High-dividend payers 0.0985 0.0029 0.0888 0.0030 
Low-dividend payers 0.2482 0.1012 0.2311 0.1023 
Mean test 6.8039*** 
 
6.3841*** 
 
Median test 6.825***   6.771*** 
 
Table 4.13 presents the results of the regressions that examine how dividend 
payment decisions are associated with the liquidity risk that is estimated 
using the three-factor and four-factor models. The coefficients on DIV in 
Panel A are negative (-0.038 for the three- and -0.041 for the four-factor 
model, respectively), indicating that the liquidity risk of dividend payers is 
lower than that of non-payers. However, the impact is not significant. 
Consistent with the findings based on liquidity risk estimated from the two-
factor model (LCAPM), the results based on liquidity risk estimated from the 
three- and four-factor models show that the difference in liquidity beta of 
those stocks that pay a high amount of dividend per share and their 
counterparts is 0.11 and 0.12, respectively (see Panel B). Furthermore, 
Panel C shows that the amount of dividend per share has a negative impact 
on liquidity risk. All these findings are statistically significant, supporting our 
hypotheses (H4) which posits that the amount of dividend decision has a 
negative impact on liquidity risk. 
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Table 4.13 Multivariate analysis using liquidity beta estimated from alternative models 
This table reports the multivariate regression results for model (2), which captures the difference in systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers and non-dividend payers (Panel 
A), as well as high-dividend and low-dividend payers (Panel B). Panel C reports the impact of dividend per share on liquidity risk. The dependent variable is liquidity risk, 
estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ from the three Fama-French factors model and the four-factor model. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of 
monthly data (with a minimum of 36 months). DIV is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for dividend payers, and 0 otherwise. HighDPS is a dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 for stocks with DPS higher than median, and 0 otherwise. DPS is the amount of dividend paid per share. Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio 
(Amihud). All other variable are defined in the notes to Table 4.4. All variables are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Dividend payers vs. non-dividend payers   Panel B: High-dividend payers vs. low-dividend payers   Panel C: Amount of dividends (DPS) 
 
Three-factor 
model 
Four-factor 
model     
Three-factor 
model 
Four-factor 
model     
Three-factor 
model 
Four-factor 
model 
  (1) (2)     (3) (4)     (5) (6) 
DIV -0.038 -0.041  HighDPS -0.113*** -0.117***   DPS -0.051*** -0.054*** 
 (-0.79) (-0.85)    (-2.96) (-3.05)    (-2.78)  (-3.03) Leverage -0.001 0.008  Leverage -0.008 0.007  Leverage -0.005 0.01 
 (-0.08) (0.44)   (-0.42) (0.37)   (-0.27) (0.53) Liquidity 
(Amihud) 0.039* 0.035  
Liquidity 
(Amihud) 0.183 0.171  
Liquidity 
(Amihud) 0.188*** 0.176*** 
 (1.78) (1.62)   (8.78)*** (8.28)***   (9.13) (8.62) Profitability -0.028 0.007  Profitability 0.024 0.045**  Profitability 0.022 0.043** 
 (-1.29) (0.32)   (1.11) (2.06)   (1.01) (1.97) Volatility 0.152*** 0.140***  Volatility 0.167*** 0.156***  Volatility 0.169*** 0.158*** 
 (6.96) (6.25)   (6.54) (6.04)   (6.62) (6.12) Return -0.089*** -0.076***  Return -0.044* -0.033   Return -0.046* -0.035 
 (-4.26) (-3.59)   (-1.79) (-1.34)     (-1.87) (-1.43) Firm size  -0.054*** -0.058***   Firm size  -0.044** -0.052***   Firm size  -0.040* -0.048** 
 (-4.36) (-4.83)   (-2.18) (-2.70)   (-1.94) (-2.43) 
Book-to-market -0.013 -0.014  Book-to-market 0.005 0.018  Book-to-market 0.008 0.021 
 (-0.61) (-0.66)   (0.23) (0.85)   (0.36) (0.98) Intercept 0.153*** 0.199***  Intercept 0.193** 0.291***  Intercept 0.140* 0.237*** 
 (1.96) (2.54)   (2.21) (3.38)   (1.65) (2.82) Year effects Yes Yes  Year effects Yes Yes  Year effects Yes Yes Industry effects Yes Yes  Industry effects Yes Yes  Industry effects Yes Yes Observations 4723 4723  Observations 3460 3460  Observations 3460 3460 F-statistic 13.66*** 10.25***  F-statistic 12.05*** 10.8***  F-statistic 12.06*** 10.81*** Adj. R-squared 0.0806 0.0575   Adj. R-squared 0.089 0.0759   Adj. R-squared 0.0885 0.0754 
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4.6. Conclusion 
While researchers identify the role of liquidity risk in asset pricing, a 
significant and yet unanswered question is why some stocks are more 
exposed to changes in market liquidity than others. In this chapter, we 
examine whether firm’s dividend policy affects its systematic liquidity risk. We 
focus on the two decisions of dividend policy, the decision to pay and the 
amount of dividend payment. We hypothesize that dividends are negatively 
related to systematic liquidity risk.  
The empirical results provide strong evidence to support this hypothesis. 
Specifically, we find that dividend payers and payers of higher dividends 
exhibit lower systematic liquidity risk than their counterparts. We also find 
that the systematic liquidity risk decreases with the amount of dividend per 
share. These results are robust to various model specifications, estimation 
methods, and liquidity measures. Furthermore, our empirical results continue 
to hold in additional tests in which we control for the endogeneity associated 
with dividend decisions and simultaneity bias due to the joint determination of 
dividends and liquidity risk. 
These results are consistent with the view that during periods of low market 
liquidity, investors demand for dividend-paying stocks, and thus the value of 
hese stocks relative to non-paying stocks, is higher (Banerjee et al. 2007). 
Banerjee et al. (2007) find that sensitivity of stock returns to aggregate 
liquidity declines after dividend initiations. We extend the results of Banerjee 
et al. (2007) in two ways. First, we examine whether their insight extends to 
dividend levels other than just initiations. After all, managers are more likely 
to face decisions related to dividend levels than initiations or omissions 
decisions (Li and Lie 2006), so any evidence held for dividends levels would 
provide clearer implications to financial managers. Second, we analyze the 
impact of dividend policy on liquidity risk using a firm-level analysis where we 
consider other factors that might affect liquidity risk. This would help us to 
understand whether, and why, individual firms display varying sensitivity to 
market liquidity. 
 152 
 
The results also support the flight-to-quality phenomenon (Acharya and 
Pedersen 2005; Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009) in which adverse liquidity 
shocks force investors to sell off assets that are associated with higher 
uncertainty, asymmetric information, and trading costs (in our case, non-/low- 
dividend-paying stocks), leading to a decline in asset prices. In further 
analyses, we provide some evidence that the effect of dividend policy 
decisions on liquidity risk is stronger for firms with a high level of information 
opacity. In particular, we find that the impact of being a dividend payer or a 
payer of high dividend on systematic liquidity risk is most pronounced for 
stocks of firms that are small and high-growth.  
The results of this chapter make significant contributions to the increasingly 
important literature studying the impact of dividend policy on firm value. We 
introduce systematic liquidity risk as an important driver of firm value and 
suggest that dividend policy results in lower systematic liquidity risk due to 
lower levels of uncertainty, adverse selection, and trading costs. We show 
that dividend policy decisions can impact firm value by lowering the firm’s 
systematic liquidity risk, which, in turn, lowers the cost of capital and 
increases firm value.  
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Chapter 5: Dividend Policy, Stock Price 
Informativeness and Stock Liquidity 
5.1. Introduction  
In the last decade, extensive research has been done to investigate the 
effects of stock markets on firm’s corporate actions that stem from the 
informational role of stock prices. A great attention among finance 
researchers has been paid to answer this question. Actually, understanding 
whether and how information flows from the stock market to firms is of vital 
importance in order to properly assess the impact of financial markets on the 
firm. This is based on the fact that information does not flow freely among 
firms and investors and hence various types of information that are not 
known by managers can be aggregated into the stock prices through the 
trading activities of different investors (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 
1985; Chen et al. 2007a; Kim and Cheong 2015). Therefore, market prices 
may incorporate some specific information which can help managers in the 
allocation of corporate resources more efficiently, and thus may contribute to 
increase firm value. Accordingly, the stock market can have real impact on 
corporate policies if managers observe information in the market with the aim 
of making better decisions.71 
Current literature offers important insights into the links between stock prices 
and managerial corporate decisions. So far, the literature has focused mainly 
on the role of stock prices in guiding corporate investment and cash savings. 
Particularly, numerous studies document that managers use the information 
incorporated into stock prices when they decide on, e.g., corporate 
investment (Durnev et al. 2004; Luo 2005; Chen et al. 2007a; Bakke and 
Whited 2010), cash savings (Frésard 2012), and labour investment (Ben-
Nasr and Alshwer 2016). However, to the extent that prices incorporate new 
information about the firm, this information should also affect other corporate 
decisions that managers have to make (Frésard 2012). 
                                                             
71See Bond, et al. (2012) for a comprehensive survey on the real effects of the stock 
markets from the informational role of market prices. 
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In this chapter, we extend this strand of literature by investigating whether 
the information contained in stock prices can have an effect on dividend 
decisions. In particular, we study whether more informative stock prices are 
associated with a lower level of dividends paid. Stock price informativeness 
may affect the amount of dividend paid in two ways. First, stock prices 
include information about future investment and growth opportunities, 
discount rates, and financing opportunities, which may affect dividend 
decisions (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985; Fama and French 
2001; Nissim and Ziv 2001; Grullon et al. 2002; Hoberg and Prabhala 2009; 
Abor and Bokpin 2010; Wang 2010; Ardestani et al. 2013). It is predicted that 
a low level of stock price informativeness is more likely to encourage firm 
managers to increase their dividend payments to provide positive signals 
about firms’ prospects and future cash flows. This positive news is expected 
to increase investors’ confidence regarding firm performance as suggested 
by prior studies. In contrast, when stock price informativeness is at a high 
level where investors are well informed about firms’ potential performance 
and earnings, firm managers are more likely to distribute a low level of 
dividend payment. Second, since more informative stock prices are 
associated with better monitoring of managers (Holmström and Tirole 1993; 
Ferreira et al. 2011), firms with high informativeness may be less reliant on 
dividends as a discipline mechanism (Liu 2002; Jiraporn and Ning 2006; 
Chae et al. 2009; Esqueda 2016). 
Recently, stock liquidity has been proposed to be significantly related to 
dividend policy. It has been documented that firms with illiquid stocks are 
more likely to pay dividends than liquid stocks (Banerjee et al., 2007; 
Brockman et al., 2008; Griffin, 2010; Kuo et al., 2013). According to these 
studies, when trading frictions exist, investors will have greater demand for 
cash dividends from the stocks they hold. In the absence of trading frictions, 
however, investors can cheaply create homemade dividends. As a result, 
firms with more (less) liquid stocks will be less (more) likely to pay dividends 
to their shareholders. Furthermore, stock liquidity can also relate to dividend 
policy through its relationship with asymmetric information level. Liquid 
stocks are associated with a lower level of asymmetric information (Glosten 
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and Milgrom 1985; Kyle 1985). At a low level of asymmetric information, 
firms are less likely to pay dividends (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 
1985). Hence, dividends are more important for firms with illiquid stocks. 
Given that stock liquidity is important for dividend policy, we provide a further 
analysis on the possible role that stock liquidity can play in the price 
informativeness–dividend relationship. 
A vital element to our analysis is to identify when stock prices cover more 
firm-specific information. In this chapter, we rely mainly on firm-specific 
return variation (or price non-synchronicity) as a measure of price 
informativeness. This measure was first proposed by Roll (1988) and 
computed based on the correlation between the stock’s return and the 
market and industry returns. If a significant percentage of a stock return 
variation is not explained by market and industry movements, i.e., if firm-
specific return variation is high, then the stock price is more likely to convey 
firm-specific information. An extensive research finds that firm-specific return 
variation and stock price informativeness are closely linked. Particularly, firm-
specific return variation is associated with more information about future 
earnings aggregated in stock prices (Durnev et al. 2003) and with more 
efficient capital allocation (Wurgler 2000; Durnev et al. 2004). 
Using a sample of UK firms over the period 1996-2013, we find that stock 
price informativeness is negatively related to amount of dividend paid. This 
implies that firm managers are more likely to maintain a relatively low level of 
dividends when investors are well informed of firms’ future cash flows and 
prospects (i.e., when price informativeness is high). This result also suggests 
that managers are less likely to use dividends as a discipline mechanism, as 
more informative stock prices result in a better monitoring of managers 
(Ferreira et al. 2011). We also find that the effect of price informativeness on 
dividends is consistent with both the signalling and agency costs arguments. 
More specifically, we find that the relationship between price informativeness 
and dividends is only evident in small firms, which is consistent with the 
argument based on the signalling model. Small firms typically face greater 
asymmetric information and hence are more likely to use dividends for 
signalling purpose in order to reduce informational asymmetries. Moreover, 
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there is evidence consistent with the argument based on the agency costs as 
the effect of price informativeness on dividends is only observed in low-
growth firms and those with low leverage. Low-growth firms and less-levered 
firms face high agency costs due to more excess cash in the firm, which they 
should mitigate by paying higher dividends. 
We perform several tests to ensure the robustness of our results. First, we 
re-estimate firm-specific return variation using the following models: (i) 
Brockman and Yan’s (2009) model and (ii) Fama and French’s (1993) three-
factor model. We find that our results are robust to the use of alternative 
estimates of firm-specific return variations as measures of stock price 
informativeness. Second, our finding remains robust when we control for 
endogeneity issues. Endogeneity can result in biased and inconsistent 
estimates that make reliable inferences almost impossible (Roberts and 
Whited 2012). Potential sources of endogeneity can be unobservable 
heterogeneity, simultaneity, and the possibility that the stock price 
informativeness is a function of dividends as firms with a high level of 
dividend payment could have greater stock price informativeness. Indeed, 
the result remains qualitatively unchanged when we use the firm fixed-effects 
model, change-in-variables approach and dynamic Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) model to control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity, and reverse causality.  
In the second part of our analysis, we address the role of stock liquidity in the 
relationship between stock price informativeness and amount of dividend 
paid. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the negative relationship 
between stock price informativeness and amount of dividend paid is stronger 
for firms with illiquid stocks, confirming our conjecture that the impact of 
stock price informativeness on the signalling and monitoring role of dividends 
is stronger in firms with higher trading frictions and asymmetric information. 
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature. First, this chapter 
contributes to the literature on dividend policy. Recent studies have 
significantly enhanced our understanding of the determinants of dividend 
policy and the capital market consequences of corporate dividend policy. 
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However, the literature has so far paid very little attention to whether and 
how capital markets affect dividend policy. By focusing on the role of stock 
prices on dividend policy, this chapter helps to fill part of this gap by adding 
stock price informativeness to the list of the determinants of amount of 
dividend paid by the firm. Dye and Sridhar (2002) note that in contrast to the 
usual view of the information flows between capital markets and firms as 
being one way (from firms to the capital markets), information also flows from 
capital markets to firms. Hence, corporate dividend policy both affects and is 
affected by capital markets. This chapter provides evidence in support of the 
effect of the informational content of stock prices on corporate dividend 
policy. In brief, this chapter highlights that the availability of information 
embedded in stock prices acts as a key determinant in explaining dividend 
policy.  
Second, it adds to the growing literature on the informational content of 
market prices and the real effects of financial markets (e.g., Bond et al. 2012) 
by investigating whether managers’ decision regarding the amount of 
dividends is influenced by the information content of prices. Some existing 
studies highlight the existence of an informative feedback going from the 
stock market to different corporate decisions such as investments (Chen et 
al. 2007a; Bakke and Whited 2010), cash savings (Frésard 2012), mergers 
and acquisitions (Luo 2005), and labour investments (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 
2016). This chapter contributes to this line of research by providing evidence 
that information contained in stock prices affects managers' decision on 
dividend policy, a means through which investor information is shown to 
affect other corporate decisions, including investments, mergers and 
acquisitions, and issues of debt (Allen and Michaely 2003).  
Recently, De Cesari and Huang-Meier (2015) found that changes in quarterly 
dividends are positively related to abnormal returns, and this relationship is 
stronger when stock returns are more likely to convey new private 
information to managers. However, our study differs from De Cesari and 
Huang-Meier (2015) in that their focus is on how the sensitivity of dividend 
changes to abnormal returns varies with information in stock prices. We, 
however, focus on the direct effect of information in stock prices on dividend 
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policy by studying the effects on amount of dividend paid. We propose that 
the information content of stock price affects firms’ choice of dividends as a 
signalling device and as a monitoring mechanism. Based on the signalling 
model and agency costs model, we show that stock price informativeness 
affects firms’ choice of dividends as a signalling device and as a monitoring 
mechanism. This adds a new explanation for using payout policies for 
signalling purposes (Bernheim and Wantz 1995; DeAngelo et al. 2000; 
Grullon et al. 2002; Hail et al. 2014) as well as contributes to the literature on 
the interaction between dividends and other monitoring mechanisms 
(Grinstein and Michaely 2005; Grullon and Michaely 2012; Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar 2014; Hoberg et al. 2014; Chang et al. 2016). To the best of our 
knowledge, this study is the first to examine the role of dividends as 
signalling and discipline mechanisms in the context of stock price 
informativeness.  
Finally, we argue that stock liquidity may play a role in the impact of stock 
price informativeness on dividend decisions. More specifically, the 
association between stock price informativeness and dividends is likely to be 
stronger in illiquid firms. Our argument is motivated by the evidence of the 
greater importance of dividends for firms with illiquid stocks than those with 
liquid stocks. Firms with illiquid stocks are more likely to pay dividends than 
those with liquid stocks (Banerjee et al. 2007, Kuo et al. 2013). Moreover, 
firms with illiquid stocks are associated with a higher level of asymmetric 
information (Welker 1995; Richardson 2000), and hence the need for 
dividends to reduce it is more valuable in these firms. Therefore, we further 
contribute to the literature by examining the effect of stock liquidity on the 
price informativeness–dividend relationship. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 evaluates 
the extant theoretical and empirical literature on stock price informativeness. 
Section 5.3 develops the hypotheses regarding the association between 
stock price informativeness and dividend policy as well as trying to determine 
whether the relationship is dependent on stock liquidity. Section 5.4 
describes our data and research methodology. We present our empirical 
findings in Section 5.5 and conclude the chapter in Section 5.6. 
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5.2. Related literature  
5.2.1. Stock price informativeness 
In this sub-section, we describe a main element of our empirical analysis 
which is the stock price informativeness.72 Theoretically, all information is 
incorporated into stock prices by the end of the trading day (Kyle 1985). 
Public announcements and financial disclosures are incorporated into stock 
prices directly whereas private information collected by informed investors is 
integrated into stock prices through trading activity (Piotroski and Roulstone 
2004; Heitzman and Klasa 2012). A stock return variation can be 
decomposed into three different components: a market-related variation, an 
industry-related variation, and a firm-specific variation. The former two 
components capture systematic variations while the last one measures firm-
specific variation (price non-synchronicity) (Chen et al. 2007a). In this 
chapter, we use firm-specific stock return variation as a proxy for the 
informativeness of stock price.  
The use of firm-specific return variation is based on a large bulk of empirical 
and theoretical literature. Roll (1988) was the first to document that a 
significant fraction of stock return variation is not explained by market 
movements. Roll (1988: 216) argues that “the extent to which stocks move 
together depends on the relative amounts of firm-level and market-level 
information capitalized into stock prices”. Actually, stock prices move upon 
the arrival of new information, which gets embedded into stock prices 
through two ways. The first one is through adjustments of prices after the 
release of public information, e.g., news on macroeconomic conditions or 
earnings announcements. The second one occurs through the trading 
behaviour of investors who have private information.  
Several studies find evidence consistent with the notion that a high level of 
stock price informativeness reflects more firm-specific information 
incorporated into price. Durnev et al. (2003) investigate the extent to which 
                                                             
72 Stock price informativeness, price non-synchronicity and firm-specific return variation are 
used interchangeably in this chapter.  
 
 160 
 
current returns reflect future earning for firms with high firm-specific return 
variation. They argue that the information that investors have is about the 
firm’s future earnings. Consistent with this argument, they find that firm-
specific return variation is highly correlated with future earnings indicating 
that stocks with more specific return variation incorporate more information 
about future earnings in their current prices. These stocks have prices that 
are more informative. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004:1120) define stock 
return synchronicity as “the extent to which market and industry returns 
explain variation in firm-level stock returns”. They show that firms exhibiting 
low (high) stock return synchronicity, ceteris paribus, have a relatively higher 
amount of firm-specific (market-level and industry-level) information 
impounded into their stock prices. All of these studies provide evidence that 
high firm-specific return variation (price non-synchronicity) is associated with 
more informative stock prices. 
5.2.2. Empirical findings related to stock price informativeness 
The use of firm-specific stock return variation as a measure of the relative 
degree of information reflected in stock price is empirically supported by 
several studies in different areas. For example, Morck et al. (2000) show that 
firm-specific return variation is lower in emerging markets than developed 
markets due to the lack of property protection rights, which makes arbitrage 
and information-based trading less profitable. Moreover, they argue that in 
well-developed financial markets, traders are more able to collect information 
on individual firms, and hence, prices reflect more private information. In a 
related study, Jin and Myers (2006) show that countries with developed and 
transparent financial markets have high firm-specific return variation because 
informed traders have high motivation to search for and use private 
information. 
A number of studies find that more efficient capital allocation is associated 
with high firm-specific return variation (Durnev et al. 2001; Durnev et al. 
2004). Durnev et al. (2004) show that industries with higher firm-specific 
return variation are more likely to allocate capital more efficiently. They argue 
that the private information in prices, as measured by price non-
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synchronicity, enhances investment efficiency. Similar results are reported by 
Wurgler (2000) in countries with high firm-specific return. In the context of 
cross-listing, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) show that firms that are cross-
listed on US exchanges exhibit higher firm-specific return variation than non-
cross-listed firms. They attribute this finding to the fact that a US cross-listing 
typically expands the set of informed investors. The findings in Fernandes 
and Ferreira (2008) help to explain why cross-listed firms in the US show 
higher investment sensitivity to stock prices than firms that were never cross-
listed (Foucault and Frésard 2012). They argue that a cross-listing improves 
managers’ dependence on stock prices because it makes stock prices more 
informative to them. Accordingly, US cross-listings that are more likely to 
enhance the informativeness of stock prices for managers exhibit a higher 
investment-to-price sensitivity. 
With regards to the literature on corporate governance, Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) use price non-synchronicity and examine the amount of 
firm-specific information integrated into price as a result of the actions of 
insiders, institutional investors, and financial analysts. They find that trading 
activities of insiders and institutional investors result in more firm-specific 
information being provided to the market whereas more analyst activities 
result in more industry information. In a related study, Chan and Hameed 
(2006) use data from emerging markets and find that analyst following 
decreases price non-synchronicity. Ferreira and Laux (2007) examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and stock price informativeness 
and find that firms with fewer anti-takeover provisions exhibit higher levels of 
stock price informativeness. According to Brockman and Yan (2009), US 
firms with block ownership tend to have access to more precise firm-specific 
information at a lower cost as opposed to diffuse shareholders, leading to 
higher firm-specific return variation. Yu (2011) shows that stock price 
informativeness (measured by firm-specific return variation) increased with 
the quality of firm-level corporate governance. Gul et al. (2011) show a 
positive association between gender diversity in corporate boards and stock 
price informativeness for US firms. They argue that gender-diverse boards 
enhance stock price informativeness by improving voluntary public 
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disclosures in large firms and by motivating the gathering of firm-specific 
information in small firms. Ding et al. (2013) examine the impact of mutual 
fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China and find a positive 
association between stock price informativeness and mutual fund ownership. 
Boubaker et al. (2014) examine the effect of controlling shareholders on 
stock price synchronicity in the context of France and find that stock price 
synchronicity increases with excess control, supporting the argument that 
controlling shareholders tend to disclose less firm-specific information to 
conceal opportunistic practices. Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn (2015) explore 
how powerful CEOs influence the extent of stock price informativeness and 
find that firms with more powerful CEOs experience lower stock price 
informativeness. This is consistent with the notion that more powerful CEOs 
are less likely to disclose information, resulting in more information 
asymmetry and therefore lower stock price informativeness. 
In another strand of literature, Sami and Zhou (2008) find that price non-
synchronicity increases around implementation of new auditing standards in 
China. Studies on the adoption of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), including Beuselinck et al. (2009) and Kim and Shi (2012), 
find an increase in price non-synchronicity following IFRS adoption. They 
claim that the financial statements under IFRS are of better quality, as prices 
reflect more firm-specific information. Moreover, Haggard et al. (2008) find 
that firms tend to have higher price non-synchronicity when they have higher 
disclosure quality scores. Haggard et al. (2008) demonstrate that their finding 
is consistent with the study by Jin and Myers (2006), as greater firm 
transparency is shown to improve stock price informativeness. 
All of the above studies provide indirect support for the use of firm-specific 
return variation (price non-synchronicity) as a measure of the relative amount 
of information impounded into prices. 
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5.3. Hypotheses development 
5.3.1. Dividend policy and stock price informativeness 
An existing strand of finance literature argues that stock markets can affect 
firms’ corporate actions through the valuable information about their 
prospects incorporated in their own stock price (Dow and Gorton 1997; 
Subrahmanyam and Titman 1999). This idea originates from Hayek (1945), 
who suggests that stock prices efficiently incorporate information from 
various market participants and hence enable better allocation of resources 
that can benefit the whole economy. The incorporation of information is 
facilitated through the trading activity of different speculators and investors 
(Grossman and Stiglitz 1980; Kyle 1985).  
Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) suggest that 
stock prices may contain some new information that managers do not have 
and managers, in turn, can benefit from this information to improve their 
corporate decisions. Dow and Gorton (1997) propose a model in which stock 
market traders hold vital information about the market value of future 
corporate investment opportunities that managers do not have and show that 
stock markets affect corporate investment by conveying valuable information 
to managers. In a similar vein, Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) highlight 
that stock markets can lead financing decisions by communicating 
information to managers. They examine the relationships between the 
informational content of stock prices and firms’ choice between private and 
public financing. They show that public financing is more beneficial in 
providing managers with information coming from the stock market. They 
attribute this to the fact that the aggregate information generated across 
many stock market participants could provide more meaningful signals and 
hence improve the allocation of scarce resources. Several other related 
studies, including Dye and Sridhar (2002), Goldstein and Guembel (2008), 
Foucault and Gehrig (2008), and Bond et al. (2012), show that financial 
markets do affect the real economy and are not just a sideshow.  
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Empirically, many studies document that corporate investment decisions are 
considerably influenced by the informational content of stock prices. For 
example, Durnev et al. (2004) show that firms tend to invest more efficiently 
when their stock price integrates more private information. Chen et al. 
(2007a) show that a firm’s corporate investment is more sensitive to stock 
price when the stock price informativeness is higher. They explain this result 
as an indication that stock prices reveal new private information that 
managers extract and use when deciding on corporate investment. 
Consistent results are found by Bakke and Whited (2010) who examine 
whether corporate investment decisions are determined by private 
information incorporated in stock prices or caused by mispricing. They show 
that investment decisions are not influenced by stock market mispricing and 
that managers incorporate private investor information when making 
investment decisions. Foucault and Frésard (2012) use a sample of foreign 
firms that cross-list on US exchanges and find that their investments are 
more sensitive to price than non-cross-listed firms. They interpret this results 
as evidence that cross-listing helps managers to collect more information 
and hence make better investment decisions. Ben-Nasr and Alshwer (2016) 
extend this research by focusing on the investment in human capital. They 
show that higher stock price informativeness is associated with higher labour 
investment efficiency. 
In other strands of literature, many studies also report that other corporate 
decisions are affected by the stock price informativeness. For example, 
Giammarino et al. (2004) document that the informational content of stock 
price can influence the acceptance of seasoned equity offering. Luo (2005) 
suggests that the abnormal returns around merger announcements are 
strong determinants of deal completion. He argues that the managers of the 
merging firm learn from observing the market reaction and adjust their 
actions accordingly. Frésard (2012) examines the effect of stock price 
informativeness on corporate cash savings and finds that cash savings are 
more sensitive to prices when the stock prices integrate more new 
information.  
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Existing literature also suggests that informative stock prices are associated 
with better corporate governance (Holmström and Tirole 1993; Ferreira et al. 
2011). In particular, informative stock prices can improve external monitoring 
mechanisms by disciplining managers. For instance, the announcement of 
value-decreasing investments decreases the stock price, making the firm a 
takeover target. Therefore, managers would be less likely to undertake 
value-destroying projects since prices react negatively to such actions (Ben-
Nasr and Alshwer 2016). Thus, stock markets play an important monitoring 
role (Ferreira et al. 2011). This point of view has been confirmed by Edmans 
et al. (2012), who show that stock prices have a significant impact on 
takeover activities. Their findings indicate that informative stock prices may 
discipline managers as they may be more likely to be replaced if the takeover 
succeeds (Holmström and Tirole 1993). Moreover, more informative stock 
prices may be associated with more efficient internal monitoring by the board 
of directors, since the latter learn new information from the stock market. In 
line with this view, Ferreira et al. (2011) conclude that more informative stock 
prices are associated with less board independence, indicating that stock 
price informativeness may reduce the monitoring role of the board. 
In summary, the above discussion indicates the presence of an informational 
channel going from stock prices to managerial corporate decisions. However, 
existing research pays little attention to the impact of stock price 
informativeness on dividend policy decisions. Actually, to the extent that 
stock prices incorporate new and valuable information about firm 
fundamentals, informative stock prices are expected to impact the different 
decisions that managers have to take. Building on this intuition, this chapter 
argues that decisions on dividend policy are particularly expected to be 
affected by the information incorporated into stock prices. Specifically, we 
argue that managers’ decisions on the amount of dividend payments are 
likely to be affected by the amount of information contained in their firms’ 
stock prices. This argument is mainly motivated by the following. Firms can 
use dividends as a mechanism which sends information to investors in the 
market or to its shareholders (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985). 
The information may reflect future cash flows, discount rates, and the 
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strategies that the firm is employing in the short run or long run. Managers of 
the firm can signal to the market information with regards to its future 
prospects through dividends. Many studies, including Aivazian et al. (2003), 
Grullon et al. (2005), and Asem and Alam (2015), confirm that dividend 
policy conveys relevant information about the firm. Alternatively, more 
informative stock prices lead to better corporate decisions if stock prices 
provide information above and beyond what managers can acquire directly. 
Stock prices include information about future investment and growth 
opportunities (Dow and Gorton 1997), financing opportunities 
(Subrahmanyam and Titman 1999), and future earnings (Durnev et al. 2003; 
Jiang et al. 2009), which may affect dividend policy (Fama and French 2001; 
Grullon and Michaely 2002; Grullon et al. 2002). Thus, stock markets 
perform a valuable informational role which can affect the need for dividends 
for signalling purposes.  
Additionally, Easterbrook (1984) suggests that dividends may reduce agency 
costs through increasing the firms’ dependence on external financing and 
therefore exposing firms to outside monitoring. Also, there is evidence that 
dividends can be used as substitutes with other non-dividend monitoring 
mechanisms. Many studies have presented evidence consistent with 
dividend policy acting as a corporate monitoring vehicle, and with substitution 
effects between dividends and other alternative control devices, such as 
managerial ownership, leverage, and growth (see, e.g., Hansen et al. 1994; 
Noronha et al. 1996; Grullon and Michaely 2012; Hoberg et al. 2014; Chang 
et al. 2016). The information contained in stock prices can enhance external 
governance mechanism (Holmström and Tirole 1993; Ferreira et al. 2011). 
Information revealed by prices allows external monitoring mechanisms to 
operate more efficiently. For example, when prices decrease due to the 
announcement of value-destroying projects, the firm becomes a cheaper 
takeover target. Managers who value control would be less likely to 
undertake such value-destroying projects. Consequently, stock markets can 
play an important role in monitoring (Ferreira et al. 2011), which could reduce 
agency-related problems. An improvement in the external corporate 
governance reduces the role of dividends in controlling agency costs, leading 
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to a decrease in dividends (Liu 2002; Jiraporn and Ning 2006; Chae et al. 
2009; Esqueda 2016).  
In sum, based on the asymmetric information and agency costs models of 
dividends, we predict that a lower level of stock price informativeness is more 
likely to induce managers to increase their dividend payments in order to 
provide positive signals about their firm’s future prospects and cash flows. 
This positive news is expected to increase investors’ confidence in view of 
the significance of dividends to firm performance as suggested by prior 
studies (Bhattacharya 1979; Miller and Rock 1985). In contrast, when stock 
price informativeness is high and investors are already well informed on the 
firm’s future prospects, managers are less likely to increase dividends 
further. Moreover, high levels of price informativeness can also enhance the 
monitoring of managers (i.e., reduce the agency problems), and thus 
managers are less likely to pay low dividends to reduce the agency-costs 
problems. Consequently, a negative relationship between stock price 
informativeness and dividend payments is predicted. 
H5: There is a negative relationship between stock price 
informativeness and the level of dividend payment. 
5.3.2. The role of stock liquidity 
Firms’ trading environment can play a significant role in determining its 
dividend policy (Banerjee et al. 2007; Brockman et al. 2008; Griffin 2010; 
Kuo et al. 2013). The seminal work of Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposes 
that in perfect capital markets, the total value of the firm is independent of its 
dividend policy. This irrelevance proposition has produced a large number of 
studies questioning the assumptions placed in the perfect capital market 
condition. One of the main assumptions of the irrelevance proposition of 
dividends is that in markets without trading friction, investors with liquidity 
needs can create homemade dividends at no cost by selling the proper 
amount of their stockholdings in the firm. In other words, investors are 
indifferent between receiving a dollar of dividends and selling a dollar of their 
investment. However, trading friction commonly exists in financial markets. 
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Stocks that pay cash dividends enable investors to meet their liquidity needs 
with little or no trading and thus enable them to avoid trading costs.  
In their paper, Banerjee et al. (2007) rely on the dividend irrelevance 
proposition to examine whether there is a link between firm dividend policy 
and stock liquidity. They find that in the US, firms with less liquid stocks (i.e. 
stocks with higher trading frictions, a high proportion of numbers of no 
trading days, and a high price impact of order flow) are more likely to pay 
dividends, relative to firms with more liquid stocks, after controlling for firm 
size, profitability, and growth opportunities. The explanation for this is that 
investors in markets with fewer trading frictions can cheaply meet their 
liquidity needs through the high trading activity of the firm’s stock and thus 
are willing to accept low dividends. Hence, dividend policy is less important 
in firms with liquid stocks. Similar results are found by Kuo et al. (2013) who 
examine a large sample of firms representing 18 countries and find that stock 
liquidity is an important determinant of dividend policy in the USA, France, 
UK and other European markets, as the effect of stock liquidity is significant 
in these markets. Consistent results are found in Brockman et al. (2008) and 
Griffin (2010) who confirm that stock liquidity plays a significant role in 
dividend decisions. Therefore, it can be argued that given that dividend 
policy is more important for firms with illiquid stocks, the relationship between 
stock price informativeness and dividend policy is stronger in firms with 
illiquid stocks.  
Moreover, trading environment and hence stock liquidity can also affect the 
relationship between dividend and stock price informativeness through its 
relationship to asymmetric information (Bardos 2011). At different points of 
time, managers can hold private information about the firm that investors do 
not have (Richardson 2000; Armstrong et al. 2010) leading to two main 
problems. The first relates to adverse selection or hidden information which 
results in a failure to detect the true value of the firm (Akerlof 1970; Healy 
and Palepu 2001). The second relates to moral hazard or hidden action 
which causes earnings management (Richardson 2000) and non-disclosure 
of information (Verrecchia 2001) to align with the personal interests of 
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managers. Information asymmetry can also occur among different types of 
investors and creates an adverse selection problem, as informed investors 
tend to trade on firm-specific information whereas uninformed investors rely 
more on publicly available information (Brown and Hillegeist 2007). The 
asymmetry of information among different parties affects the efficiency and 
transparency of the capital markets (Armstrong et al. 2010). Therefore, it is 
important to decrease information asymmetry and in turn increase stock 
liquidity (Bushman and Smith 2001). Glosten and Milgrom (1985) argue that 
the information revelation increases with trading activity, as informed traders 
trade aggressively on their information advantage for stocks with a high 
trading activity. As such, firms with liquid stocks are expected to be 
associated with low information asymmetry (Welker 1995; Richardson 2000). 
Given the relationship between information asymmetry and stock liquidity, 
this implies that a firm’s stock liquidity is a crucial input that may affect the 
relationship between dividend payment and stock price informativeness. The 
intuition is that the lower level of asymmetric information in liquid stocks 
results in a lower need for dividends to convey information and monitor 
managers, and that dividend payment is expected to be more valuable for 
illiquid stocks that face more severe asymmetric information. The models of 
Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), and Miller and Rock (1985) 
suggest a positive relation between information asymmetry and dividend 
policy. At a  higher degree of information asymmetry (lower stock liquidity), 
there is more need for dividends. Therefore, the relationship between stock 
price informativeness and dividend policy is stronger in firms with illiquid 
stocks. The above reasoning leads to the following hypothesis:  
H6: The relationship between stock price informativeness and the level 
of dividend payment is more likely to be stronger for firms with low 
stock liquidity. 
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5.4. Data and methodology 
5.4.1. Data 
Our sample consists of the annual constituents of the FTSE ALL SHARE 
index over the period 1996-2013. Both stocks that survived the entire study 
period and those delisted anytime during the study period are included in the 
analysis. As standard in the literature, we exclude financial and utilities 
firms.73 After dropping observations with missing values, there are 8,019 
firm-year observations remaining in our sample representing 1,039 firms. 
This sample includes firms that pay cash dividends as well as firms that do 
not pay cash dividends (see, e.g., Al-Malkawi 2008; Al-Najjar and Belghitar 
2014; Jabouri 2016). Finally, all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
tails to alleviate the impact of outliers. 
The primary dataset, which consists of both daily and annual data for all 
stocks (dead and live), is taken from DataStream. The daily data includes bid 
prices, ask prices, trading volume, market value and closing prices. As 
discussed in the following section, this daily data is used to calculate liquidity 
proxies: proportional bid–ask spread, turnover ratio, and Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity ratio (price impact). We also obtain daily returns on UK three-month 
Treasury bills (the risk-free rate) and the return on FTSE ALL SHARE index. 
These data are used to estimate the stock price informativeness variable 
which is the firm-specific return variations as discussed in the following 
section. Finally, annual data on dividends and other accounting variables are 
also extracted from DataStream. 
5.4.2. Model specification 
The first hypothesis (H5) of this chapter examines whether the level of stock 
price informativeness determines the amount of dividend paid by a firm. This 
is empirically tested using the following regression:  
                                                             
73 The selection criteria and distribution of the sample across time and industries are 
presented in Table 3.1. 
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ܦ ௜ܻ௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵߖ௜௧ିଵ + ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜௧ିଵ + (ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) + (ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) + ߝ௜௧                  
(5.1) 
where the dependent variable (ܦ ௜ܻ௧)	represents the amount of dividend paid 
measured by dividend yield of firm i in year t.74 Following previous studies 
such as Deshmukh et al. (2013) and Jain and Chu (2014), we measure this 
variable as the dividend per share divided by price per share in year t.  
The variable ߖ௜௧ିଵ	represents stock price informativeness, which is measured 
by firm-specific stock return variation (price non-synchronicity)75 for firm i in 
the year t-1. By taking lagged stock price informativeness, we can reduce the 
problem of endogeneity (see, e.g., Ferreira et al. 2011; Ben-Nasr and 
Alshwer 2016). The endogeneity problem may occur in several ways. For 
example, the dependent variable might impact one or more independent 
variables, which are referred to as reverse causality. Additionally, 
independent variables may be correlated with the error term (Gujarati 2004; 
Wooldridge 2010). However, using the lagged values of independent 
variables helps alleviate both these problems, because the current 
dependent variable does not impact the lagged values of independent 
variables, and the lagged values of independent variables may highly 
correlate with the current independent variables, but not with the current 
error term.76 
In this study, following previous studies, such as Chen et al. (2007a) and 
Frésard (2012), firm-specific stock return variation is measured based on a 
regression estimation of stock returns for each firm on the returns of the 
market index and industry returns as follows: 
                                                             
74 In unreported results, we also examine the effect of price informativeness on the firm’s 
probability to pay dividends using an independent dummy variable of 1 for dividend paying 
firms and 0 otherwise and find qualitatively similar results. More specifically, stocks of firm 
with low (high) price informativeness are more (less) likely to pay dividends. 
75 Finance researchers have very frequently used firm-specific return variation as a measure 
of stock price informativeness. See, e.g., Chen et al. (2007a), Bakke and Whited (2010), and 
Foucault and Fresard (2014) in the context of investments decisions, Fresard (2012) in the 
context of cash savings, Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) in the context of cross-listings, 
Ferreira and Laux (2007), and Ferreira et al. (2011) in the context of corporate governance. 
76 Alternative approaches to account for endogeneity concerns resulting from these two 
problems and others, e.g., dynamic endogeneity, are performed in the section of robustness 
checks. 
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ݎ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ଵݎ௠௧ + ߚ௜ଶݎ௜௡ௗ ௦௧௥௬௧ + ݁௜௧                           (5.2) 
where ݎ௜௧ is the stock return for firm i in day t, ݎ௠௧ is the return of the market 
index, and ݎ௜௡ௗ௨௦௧௥௬௧  is the industry returns. The market return is based on the 
FTSE ALL share index. The industry return is created using all firms within 
the same industry with firm i’s daily return omitted.77 ߙ௜ and ߚ௜ are 
coefficients estimated for each year using regression analysis. In this model 
ߚ௜ is assumed to capture all systematic risk while idiosyncratic risk is the 
variance of ݁௜௧.
78 
We calculate the stock’s relative firm-specific return variation as the ratio of 
idiosyncratic volatility to total volatility (ߪ௜,௘,௧
ଶ /ߪ௜,௧
ଶ ), which represents the 
percentage of volatility that is not explained by systematic components. It 
equals the value of (1 − ܴ௜௧
ଶ ) from regression (5.2), where ܴ௜௧
ଶ  is the coefficient 
of determination of firm i in year t. Since it is skewed and bounded within the 
intervals [0, 1] (Durnev et al. 2004), (1 − ܴ௜௧
ଶ ) is not appropriate for use as a 
variable in regressions. Therefore, as recommended by Theil (1971), we 
apply logistic transformation of the ratio (1 − ܴ௜௧
ଶ )/	ܴ௜௧
ଶ  and generate an 
unbound continuous variable with a more normal distribution.79 Formally, 
firm-specific stock return variation ߖ௜௧ is defined as: 
ߖ௜௧ = ln ൬
ଵିோ೔೟
మ
ோ೔೟
మ ൰                                                   (5.3) 
where ߖ measures the firm-specific stock return variation relative to market-
wide variation and ܴ௜௧
ଶ  is the coefficient of determination of firm i in year t. 
Firm-specific stock return variation is scaled by total variation in returns, as 
firms in some industries are more subject to economy-wide shocks, resulting 
in firm-specific activities being more intense (Ferreira and Laux 2007; 
Fernandes and Ferreira 2008). Higher values for ߖ imply higher firm-specific 
stock return variation relative to market-wide and industry-wide variation 
                                                             
77 According to Durnev et al. (2004), this omission “prevents spurious correlation between 
firm and industry returns in industries that contain few firms”. See, e.g., Gul et al. (2010); 
Fresard (2012); Chan and Chan (2014) for similar procedure. 
78 We have also computed firm-specific return variation using the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model and Brockman and Yan (2009) model. These results are given in the 
section of robustness checks. 
79 See also Morck et al. (2000), Durnev et al. (2004), Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), and 
Gul et al. (2011). 
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(higher price infromativeness) i.e., lower synchronicity with the market and 
the industry.80 
Following prior research (e.g., Fama and French 2001; Fama and French 
2002; Kim and Jang 2010; Jiraporn et al. 2011), our control variables 
(ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ)	include profitability, growth opportunities, and leverage ratio. We 
provide a detailed discussion of these variables in Section 5.4.3. All control 
variables are lagged by one year. Year and industry dummies are included in 
the model to control for time and industry fixed effects. We note that our 
model is similar to that used by Ferreira et al. (2011) to investigate the effect 
of price informativeness on board structure and Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 
(2016) to investigate the effect of price informativeness on labour 
investments. 
The coefficient ߙ଴ is the intercept while coefficient ߚଵ is the coefficient of 
interest. The first hypothesis of this chapter (H5) posits that the stock price 
informativeness is negatively associated with the amount of dividend 
payment. Therefore, the sign for the coefficient for firm-specific stock return 
variation, represented by	ߚଵ, is predicted to be negative. 
Next, to test the second hypothesis of this chapter (H6), we examine whether 
the relationship between stock price informativeness and dividend payment 
depends on the firm’s stock liquidity. We test H2 by evaluating the interaction 
effect of price informativeness and the stock liquidity. For this purpose, we 
estimate the following regressions: 
ܦ ௜ܻ௧ = ߚ଴ + ߚଵߖ௜௧ିଵ + ߚଶܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௜௧ିଵ +	ߚଷߖ௜௧ିଵ ∗ ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௜௧ିଵ + ߛܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜௧ିଵ +
(ܻ݁ܽݎܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) + (ܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕܦݑ݉݉݅݁ݏ) + ߝ௜௧                 (5.4) 
where ܦ ௜ܻ௧ 	is dividend yield in year t, ߖ௜௧ିଵ	is stock price informativeness, 
which is measured by firm-specific stock return variation for firm i in the year 
t-1, and ܮ݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௜௧ିଵ is stock liquidity. Prior studies have identified a number 
                                                             
80 There might be a problem with the economic meaning of ߖ=ln([1-R2]/R2). For example, 
doubling R2 does not double	ߖ. To address this and following some previous studies, e.g., 
Chen et al. (2007a), we repeat the regression using ߖ =1-R2  and we get qualitatively similar 
results.  
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of proxies to measure stock liquidity.81 We measure stock liquidity using 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio measured for a given stock on a given day as the 
ratio of absolute percentage price change per dollar of daily trading volume 
(Amihud 2002). Hasbrouck (2009) finds that among the liquidity measures 
constructed from daily data, Amihud’s illiquidity ratio is the best proxy for the 
high-frequency dynamic price impact measures of liquidity. Likewise, by 
comparing several measures of liquidity, Goyenko et al. (2009) conclude that 
Amihud’s illiquidity ratio produces significant results in capturing the price 
impact of trade. They find that it is comparable to intraday estimates of price 
impact such as Kyle’s lambda. Therefore, we use Amihud’s illiquidity ratio as 
the main liquidity proxy in our study. However, for a robustness check, we 
use two additional measures of liquidity – proportional bid–ask spread and 
turnover ratio – to reflect trading costs and trading activity aspects of liquidity, 
respectively.82  
In Equation (5.4), our focus is the coefficient	ߚଷ, which measures the 
sensitivity of the dividend/price informativeness relationship to the liquidity of 
the firm’s stock. As H2 conjectures that the relationship between the stock 
price informativeness and the amount of dividend payment is likely to be 
stronger for illiquid stocks (stocks with high illiquidity ratio), then H2 is 
supported if 	ߚଵ<0 and 	ߚଷ<0. A negative value indicates that higher illiquidity 
ratio (low stock liquidity) is likely to increase the amount of dividends in firms 
with less informative stock price. 
5.4.3. Control variables 
Consistent with the literature, a set of control variables for the amount of 
dividend paid is used in this study, as these factors have been strongly 
documented to influence dividend payment decisions. Existing studies have 
identified profitability, growth opportunities, and leverage ratios as mainly 
determinants of dividend policy (see, e.g., Fama and French 2001; Benito 
and Young 2003; Denis and Osobov 2008; Fatemi and Bildik 2012; Michaely 
and Roberts 2012). 
                                                             
81 See Goyenko et al. (2009) for more discussion. 
82 See Table 3.2 for measurements of the stock liquidity proxies. 
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Profitability 
The higher the firm’s profitability, the more cash available is for managers to 
spend. Thus, profitable firms are expected to pay dividends in order to 
reduce the agency costs of free cash flow (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). 
Consistent with this prediction, several studies show that firms with high 
profitability are more likely to pay dividends and have a higher payout ratio 
(see, e.g., Fama and French 2001; Aivazian et al. 2003; Denis and Osobov 
2008; Brockman and Unlu 2009). Following Banerjee et al. (2007) and Amidu 
and Abor (2006), we measure firm profitability as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets. 
Growth opportunities 
Rozeff (1982) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that the firm’s 
investment policy has a significant effect on its dividend policy as the costs of 
the external sources of finance will create competition between investment 
opportunities and dividend payments. Specifically, firms which have high 
growth opportunities may have lower dividend payments because new 
investments will consume large amounts of internally generated cash, which 
have lower costs than external funds. Firms which have high growth 
opportunities have profitable uses for their internal cash flows, and thus pay 
less dividends. This view is supported by the findings of many empirical 
studies (see, e.g., Fama and French 2001; DeAngelo et al. 2006; Brockman 
and Unlu 2009; Fuller and Blau 2010). Moreover, Barclay et al. (1997) argue 
that firms which have low investment opportunities would pay high dividends 
to reduce any overinvestment problem. However, firms which have high 
investment opportunities will have lower dividend payments to avoid the 
underinvestment problem because the cost of external sources of finance 
may prevent the firm from investing in positive net present value projects (Al-
Malkawi 2008; Cheng et al. 2014). Therefore, a negative relationship is 
expected between growth opportunities and dividends. Following Fama and 
French (2001), Fama and French (2002), Banerjee et al. (2007), and 
Hussainey et al. (2011), growth opportunities are measured as the ratio of 
the percentage changes in total assets.  
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Leverage ratio 
Many empirical studies have concluded that dividends are negatively 
affected by leverage (see, e.g., Faccio et al. 2001; Gugler and Yurtoglu 
2003; Al-Malkawi 2007). These studies argue that firms with high leverage 
use internal cash flow to meet their financial obligations and protect their 
creditors instead of paying the existing cash to their shareholders (Aivazian 
et al. 2003). This view is consistent with the agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976), which suggests that dividends and leverage act as 
substitute mechanisms for mitigating agency conflicts. Jensen (1986) argues 
that firms can use debt as an alternative to dividends to reduce agency cost. 
Following Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Von Eije and Megginson (2008), Al-
Najjar and Belghitar (2014), and Firth et al. (2016), this chapter employs total 
debt to total assets ratio as a proxy for leverage ratio.   
5.5. Empirical results 
5.5.1. Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics for all the variables included in our baseline 
specifications are presented in Table 5.1. The average value of dividend 
yield (DY) indicates that, on average, firms pay out £0.013 dividends relative 
to price share. The mean of ߖ is 2.75, which is higher than the 1.92 and 1.85 
found by Frésard (2012) and De Cesari and Huang-Meier (2015) for US 
firms, respectively. This figure corresponds to an average firm’s return-
specific variation of 88% (1-ܴଶ in yearly firm-level return regressions). This 
number is comparable to the 83% reported by Chen et al. (2007a) in the 
context of US firms. It is worth noting that the average ܴଶ	of the sample is 
0.116. The low ܴଶ is consistent with Roll’s (1988) finding that a large amount 
of stock price movement is driven by firm-specific information.83 However, 
                                                             
83 Roll et al. (1988) and Morck et al. (2000) interpret higher ܴଶ values (i.e., greater stock 
price synchronicity) as returns that reflect more market-wide information and lower ܴଶ values 
as returns that reflect more firm-specific information. A low ܴଶ is potentially due to firms’ 
returns capturing unique firm-specific information or reflecting greater idiosyncratic noise 
(Roll, 1988). 
 177 
 
the value is lower than the 0.193 reported by Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) 
in their sample of US firms.  
The descriptive statistics for our control variables indicate that, on average, 
total liabilities represent 19.7% of total assets with a standard deviation of 
0.177. These figures are comparable to those found by Al-Najjar and 
Belghitar (2014) in their sample. The percentage change in total assets is 
5.6% and profitability ratio is 5.2%, indicating that earnings before interest 
and taxes represent 5.2% of total assets. This is comparable to the reported 
average value of 5.8% in Henry (2011) for an Australian sample. 
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used 
in the study. DY is the dividend yield. 	ߖ = ݈݊	((1 − ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ is from a regression 
of the daily stock returns on daily market and industry returns. Leverage is the sum of 
current liabilities and long-term debt over total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Growth is the percentage change in total 
assets. 
  Mean SD Median Min Max 
DY 0.013 0.016 0.009 0.000 0.090 
ߖ 2.745 1.538 2.631 -0.299 7.167 
ܴଶ 0.116 0.129 0.067 0.001 0.572 
Leverage 0.197 0.177 0.172 0.000 0.835 
Profitability 0.052 0.182 0.083 -0.923 0.389 
Growth 0.056 0.271 0.054 -1.128 0.800 
 
 
Table 5.2 Correlation matrix 
This table reports the Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients between the regression 
variables. DY is the dividend yield. 	ߖ = ݈݊	((1 − ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ is from a regression of 
the daily stock returns on daily market and industry returns. Leverage is the sum of current 
liabilities and long-term debt over total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets. Growth is the percentage change in total assets. 
DY Infor Leverage Profitability Growth VIF 
DY 1  
ߖ -0.2146*** 1 1.02 
Leverage 0.0812*** -0.0226** 1 1.00 
Profitability 0.3010*** -0.1283*** 0.001 1 1.23 
Growth 0.0549*** -0.0975*** -0.0239** 0.4510*** 1 1.22 
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Table 5.2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between DY,	ߖ and the 
control variables. Consistent with our hypothesis (H5), we find that ߖ is 
significantly and negatively correlated with DY at the 1% level, implying that 
more informative stock prices lead to a lower level of dividend. As for the 
control variables, we find several significant correlations which are consistent 
with prior related dividend literature. In fact, DY is positively and significantly 
correlated at the 1% level with profitability, indicating that profitable firms pay 
a higher level of dividends (Jabbouri 2016). Furthermore, DY is positively 
and significantly correlated with leverage and growth opportunities. This 
result is counter to the theory. However, these results should be interpreted 
with caution because the analysis is conducted on each variable in isolation 
and further examined under multivariate analysis, which is presented later. ߖ 
is negatively correlated with Leverage, indicating that higher leverage firms 
have lower firm-specific return variation (e.g., Fernandes and Ferriera 2008; 
Kim and Shi 2012). Similarly, a negative correlation is found between ߖ and 
Growth, suggesting that growth firms have lower firm-specific return variation 
(Ferriera and Laux 2007; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 2016). Further, consistent 
with Gul et al. (2011) and Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014), more profitable firms 
tend to have less informative stock prices as the correlation between ߖ and 
Profitability is negative. In general, we report low correlation coefficients 
between ߖ and the control variables, thus alleviating multicollinearity 
concerns that may affect our regression results. The highest correlation 
between the explanatory variables is 0.45, which is considerably less than 
the 0.80 threshold above which multicollinearity threats could arise (Gujarati 
2004). To assess more directly whether the sample suffers from 
multicollinearity, the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) for each of the 
explanatory variables were calculated. We find no indication of a 
multicollinearity problem as the values of the VIF of the explanatory variables 
are found to be less than the cut-off value of 10 (Gujarati 2004). 
 179 
 
5.5.2. Dividends and stock price informativeness  
5.5.2.1. Main regression results  
Table 5.3 presents the results from several specifications of the dividend 
yield regression both with a restricted and a full set of explanatory variables. 
Column (1) presents the results of an OLS univariate regression of dividend 
yield on		ߖ. There is strong evidence of a negative and significant relation 
between dividend yield and		ߖ. The estimated ߖ coefficient is -0.0024. This 
effect is also economically significant: a one-standard deviation increase in ߖ 
predicts a decrease in dividend yield (DY) of 23.07% standard deviations.84 
In Column (2), we include industry and year dummies to control for 
unobserved industry and time fixed effects. The effect of ߖ		 remains 
negative and statistically significant. These findings support our hypothesis 
(H4).  
Controlling for firm characteristics that are related to dividend yield (DY) does 
not change the qualitative results, although the coefficients and the robust t-
statistics are attenuated. Column (3) of Table 5.3 reports the estimates for 
such a case. The estimated coefficient on ߖ in Column (3) is -0.0020. In 
Column (4), we further control for industry and time effects. The results show 
that ߖ is still significantly negative, consistent with the predictions of H5. We 
conclude that stock price informativeness displays a statistically significant 
negative relationship with the level of dividend paid. After controlling for firm 
characteristics and potential heterogeneity across industries and years, we 
find that a one standard deviation increase in ߖ is associated with a 
decrease in dividend yield of 20.19% standard deviation.85 
 
 
                                                             
84 Table 5.1 indicates that the standard deviation of DY is 0.016 and the standard deviation 
of ߖ is 1.538. The coefficient for ߖ is equal to -0.0024. Thus, a one standard deviation 
increase in ߖ is associated with a 23.07% standard deviation decrease in dividend yield 
(1.538*-0.0024/0.016)=-0.2307). 
85 The coefficient for ߖ is equal to -0.0021. Thus, a one standard deviation increase in ߖ is 
associated with a 20.19% standard deviation decrease in dividend yield (1.538*-
0.0021/0.016) = -0.2019). 
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Table 5.3 Dividends and stock price informativeness: main regression 
results 
The table reports the baseline regression results regarding the effect of stock price 
informativeness on amount of dividend payment. The dependent variable is DY measured 
by the dividend yield. 	ߖ = ݈݊	((1 − ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ is from a regression of the daily stock 
returns on daily market and industry returns. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and 
long-term debt over total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets. Growth is the percentage change in total assets. T-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ߖ -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0020*** -0.0021*** 
(-18.02) (-18.03) (-15.94) (-16.48) 
Leverage -0.0056*** -0.0039*** 
(-5.65) (-4.05) 
Profitability 0.0293*** 0.0250*** 
(32.00) (23.71) 
Growth -0.0054*** -0.0037*** 
-8.19 -5.43 
Intercept 0.0202*** 0.0209*** 0.01684*** 0.0173*** 
(46.31) (21.41) (36.89) (17.84) 
Year effects No Yes No Yes 
Industry effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 6980 6980 6980 6980 
F-statistic 324.73*** 47.27*** 362.59*** 76.52*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.0495 0.1193 0.1456 0.1806 
 
 
Our findings indicate that the increase in the information flow to the market 
leads to firms paying a lower amount of dividends. The explanation is that 
when stock prices are more informative about what is happening inside the 
firm (i.e., stock prices incorporate more information about future investment 
and growth opportunities, future relationship with stakeholders, and financing 
policies), this leads to a reduction in the informational role of dividends, as 
investors are already well informed and hence managers are less likely to 
pay dividends. Another explanation for our finding is that informative stock 
prices can act as a disciplinary mechanism of managers, and hence lead to 
better monitoring, which mitigate the agency problem, resulting in less of a 
need to use dividends as a means to reduce agency problem. 
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Regarding the control variables, we obtain results consistent with our 
expectations and previous empirical findings. The negative coefficient on 
leverage ratio is consistent with our prediction. It reinforces the conclusions 
of Jensen (1986) that leverage is a substitute for cash dividend in reducing 
agency costs and information asymmetry. Similar results are reported by 
Faccio et al. (2001), Aivazian et al. (2003), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), and 
Al-Malkawi (2008). As expected, the results reveal a negative relationship 
between growth opportunities and dividends since growth opportunities 
would exhaust cash available for dividend payments (Rozeff 1982; Fama and 
French 2002; Brockman and Unlu 2009). Moreover, paying low dividends is 
a means to sustain growth and decrease firms’ reliance on costly external 
financing (Dempsey and Laber 1992; Manos 2003; Abor and Bokpin 2010). 
Profitability is positively related to dividends, in line with previous research 
(Fama and French 2002; Aivazian et al. 2003; Al-Malkawi 2008; Brockman 
and Unlu 2009). This relationship is consistent with the signalling theory of 
dividends (Bhattacharya 1979; John and Williams 1985; Miller and Rock 
1985) which argues that managers pay larger dividends to signal a firm’s 
future profitability to the investors. It is also consistent with the view that the 
higher the firm’s profitability, the more cash is available for managers to 
spend; hence, more profitable firms would be more likely to pay high 
dividends to decrease the agency costs of free cash flow (Easterbrook 1984; 
Jensen 1986; Firth et al. 2016).  
 
5.5.2.2. Firm characteristics 
In this section, we examine whether the negative relationship between 
dividends and stock price informativeness is consistent with the arguments 
based on signalling and/or agency costs. If dividend signalling and 
monitoring roles become less valuable, we expect a weaker relationship. 
Firms with higher levels of asymmetric information tend to hold higher levels 
of dividends for signalling purposes (Michaely and Roberts 2011). We expect 
the impact of stock price informativeness on dividends to be more 
pronounced for firms with higher levels of asymmetric information. To test 
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this prediction, we employ two commonly-used measures of asymmetric 
information, namely firm size and growth opportunities (e.g., Bharath et al. 
2009; Leary and Michaely 2011); small- and high-growth firms are expected 
to have more asymmetric information.  
In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5.4, we divide our sample into two sub-
samples of large and small firms. The results in Column (1) show no 
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between stock price 
informativeness and dividend yield in large firms. In Column (2), however, 
there is a statistically significant relationship. This suggests that the negative 
effect of price informativeness on dividends is only evident in small firms, 
consistent with the signalling model. In Columns (3) and (4), we examine 
whether the effect of stock price informativeness on dividends varies with 
growth opportunities. The results show that the effect of the stock price 
informativeness on dividends is only seen in low-growth firms. Given that 
low-growth firms are likely to have lower asymmetric information (Bharath et 
al. 2009; Leary and Michaely 2011), this finding is inconsistent with our 
prediction based on the signalling model. 
 
On the other hand, as reviewed previously, agency theory suggests that the 
role of dividends as a monitoring role is more valuable in firms facing higher 
agency costs. Firms with low growth opportunities are facing higher agency 
costs since they are likely to have an overinvestment problem. Therefore, by 
paying dividends firms can limit management’s policy of overinvesting and 
hence enhance monitoring of managers (see Jensen 1986; Lang and 
Litzenberger 1989). This implies that firms facing higher agency costs should 
experience a more pronounced effect of stock price informativeness on 
dividends. Since growth opportunities can also be used as a proxy for the 
agency costs, our results in Columns (3) and (4), which show that effect of 
stock price informativeness on dividends only evident in low-growth, are 
consistent with the agency costs’ prediction. We further re-examine this 
prediction by using another measure of the agency costs. Firms with low 
debt are less subject to monitoring by capital markets and thus associated 
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with higher agency problems, leading to more needs for dividends. As 
suggested by Jensen (1986), debt can act as a means to reduce the agency 
costs of free cash flow. Specifically, when a firm obtains debt, it makes a 
fixed commitment to creditors, which reduces the funds available to 
managers and subjects them to the scrutiny of debt suppliers. This implies 
that highly levered firms are expected to have low dividend payouts (Leary 
and Michaely 2011). The results are reported in Columns (5) and (6). They 
show that while the stock price informativeness has a significantly negative 
effect on dividends for firms with low leverage, there is no evidence of this 
effect for firms with high leverage. Less-levered firms have higher agency 
costs and hence tend to pay higher dividends. 
To sum up, the effect of stock price informativeness on dividends is found to 
be significant only in small, low-growth, and less-levered firms, which is 
consistent with the arguments based on both signalling and agency costs. 
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Table 5.4 Dividends and stock price informativeness: firm characteristics 
This table presents the effect of stock price informativeness on dividends controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, and leverage ratio. Columns (1) and 
(2) present the models for the two sub-samples of firms with a size above and below the median. Columns (3) and (4) present the models for the two sub-
samples of firms with growth opportunities above and below the median. Columns (5) and (6) present the models for the two sub-samples of firms with a 
leverage ratio above and below the median. The dependent variable is DY measured by the. 	ߖ = ݈݊	((1 − ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ is from a regression of the daily 
stock returns on daily market and industry returns. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total book assets. Profitability is the ratio 
of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Growth is the percentage change in total assets. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors 
are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  Firm size Growth opportunities Leverage ratio 
  
Large  Small  High growth  Low growth High leverage  Low leverage  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ߖ -0.0017  -0.0005*** -0.0020 -0.0021*** -0.0021 -0.0019*** 
 
(-1.59) (-4.09) (-0.86) (-11.91) (-0.63) (-11.65) 
Leverage 0.0030** -0.0036*** 0.0074*** 0.0019 -0.0036** 0.0038* 
 
(1.96) (-3.00) (5.05) (1.43) (-2.29) (1.68) 
Profitability 0.0436524*** 0.0172*** 0.0240*** 0.0255*** 0.0294*** 0.0231*** 
 
(13.43) (18.54) (16.34) (16.9) (14.93) (18.3) 
Growth -0.0059*** -0.0019*** -0.0061*** -0.0021** -0.0020* -0.0051*** 
 
(-4.77) (-2.68) (-6.12) (-2.23) (-1.76) (-6.55) 
Intercept 0.0165*** 0.0087*** 0.0173*** 0.0169*** 0.0189*** 0.0165*** 
 
(11.81) (8.29) (12.92) (12.07) (14.08) (11.86) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3614 3366 3408 3572 3531 3449 
F-statistic 17.50*** 44.06*** 41.92***  39.44*** 25.00*** 52.47*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.1303 0.1708 0.1761 0.1962 0.1504 0.2225 
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5.5.2.3. Robustness checks 
Alternative measures of firm-specific return variation  
As a robustness check, we use two different firm-specific return variation 
proxies of stock price informativeness. Firstly, the firm-specific return 
variation (stock price informativeness) is re-estimated using Brockman and 
Yan’s (2009) model. We regress the firms’ daily return on contemporaneous 
and lagged daily market return, as well as contemporaneous and lagged 
daily industry return for each firm-year observation, as indicated in Equation 
5.5.86  
ݎ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ଵݎ௠௧ + ߚ௜ଶݎ௠௧ିଵ + ߚ௜ଷݎ௜௡ௗ௨௦௧ + ߚ௜ସݎ௜௡ௗ௨௦௧ିଵ + ݁௜௧                    (5.5) 
where ݎ௜௧	is the return of stock i in day t, ݎ௠௧ 	is the contemporaneous daily 
market return, ݎ௠௧ିଵ	is the lagged daily market return, ݎ௜௡ௗ௨௦௧ 	is the 
contemporaneous daily industry return, and ݎ௜௡ௗ௨௦௧ 	is the lagged daily 
industry return. The industry return for a specific day is created using all firms 
within the same industry excluding firm i’s return. Lagged market and 
industry return is included in the regression to control for informed trading 
that can affect the timing of incorporation of the market and industry 
information into stock prices (Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Chen et al. 
2007a; Brockman and Yan 2009; Frésard 2012; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 
2016). 
Secondly, following Ferreira et al. (2011), Gul et al. (2011), Frésard (2012), 
and Ben-Nasr and Alshwer (2016), the annual firm-specific return variation 
(price informativeness) is estimated by using the Fama and French three-
factor model. In particular, we regress the excess return, which is the 
difference between daily stock return and the risk-free rate, of each firm in 
our sample on the three factors from the model of Fama and French:  
ݎ௜௧ − ݎ௙௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜ଵܯܭ ௧ܶ + ߚ௜ଶܵܯܮ௧ + ߚ௜ଷܪܯܮ௧ + ݁௜௧               (5.6) 
                                                             
86 Such an approach was adopted by many studies including Ben-Nasr and Alshwer (2016), 
Fresard (2012), Gul et al. (2010), and Chen et al. (2007a). 
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where ݎ௜௧	is the return of stock i in day t, ݎ௙௧ 	is the risk-free rate in day t
87, 
ܯܭ ௧ܶ		is the market excess return in day t
88, ܵܯܮ௧	is the size risk factor in 
day t calculated as the difference between the daily returns of a portfolio of 
small vs. large firms, and ܪܯܮ௧	is the high-minus-low book-to-market factor 
daily return.89 Frésard (2012) argues that those factors are part of the 
systematic variation in individual returns. 
Table 5.5 Dividends and stock price informativeness: alternative 
measures of stock price informativeness   
This table reports the regression results of our main model using alternative measures of 
firm-specific return variations	(ߖ). ߖ = ݈݊	((1 − ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ in Column (1) is 
estimated using Brockman and Yan (2011) model and in Column (2) is estimated using the 
Fama and French (1993) model. The dependent variable is DY measured by. Leverage is 
the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total book assets. Profitability is the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Growth is the percentage change 
in total assets. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
  (1) (2) 
ߖ -0.0026*** -0.0018*** 
(-16.62) (-14.02) 
Leverage 0.0039*** 0.0041*** 
(4.06) (4.48) 
Profitability 0.0250*** 0.0255*** 
(23.69) (26.35) 
Growth -0.0038*** -0.0026*** 
(-5.56) (-3.94) 
Intercept 0.0180*** 0.0149*** 
(18.42) (16.47) 
Year effects Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes 
Observations 6977 8521 
F-statistic 77.04*** 87.66*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.1825 0.1660 
 
Table 5.5 tabulates the results using alternative measures of firm-specific 
returns variation. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the regression 
using the logistic transformation of the annual firm-specific return variation 
                                                             
87 Risk-free rate is based on three-month UK T-bills and obtained from the DataStream. 
88 MKT is the difference between the return on the FTSE All SHARES index and the risk-free 
rate. 
89 The data on the Fama and French three-factor model (1993) is obtained from Xfi Centre 
for Finance and Investment website, University of Exeter. 
 See: http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index.php.  
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(ߖ) estimated using the Brockman and Yan (2009) model and Fama and 
French (1993) model as the measure of price informativeness, respectively. 
The coefficients on ߖ are negative and significant at the 1% level, implying 
that firms with high price informativeness tend to pay less dividend. The 
effect of the alternative price informativeness measures on dividends is 
economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in firm-specific 
return variation reduces the level of dividends by roughly 20.74% (Column 
1)90 and 16.63% (Column 2)91, respectively. 
Endogeneity issues 
In this sub-section, we address issues related to endogeneity. It is possible 
that amount of dividend paid and stock price informativeness are 
endogenously determined, as firms with a high level of dividend payment 
could have greater stock price informativeness. In addition, the relationships 
could be spuriously caused by some omitted variables. As mentioned 
previously, using lagged independent variables in our main model alleviates 
but does not eliminate issues related to endogeneity in the OLS approach. 
Therefore, in order to better tackle the potential endogeneity issue, we 
conduct additional tests including a change-in-variables model92, firm fixed-
effects model93 and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system two-
step model.  
First, we regress the changes in the dividend yield on the changes in the 
firm-specific information proxy and changes in the other explanatory 
variables. The change-in-variables, or first differencing, approach explicitly 
considers how changes in firm-specific information affect changes in 
                                                             
90 This corresponds to a standard deviation of  ߖ of 1.276 and a standard deviation of DY of 
0.016. 
91 This corresponds to a standard deviation of  ߖ of 1.454 and a standard deviation of DY of 
0.016. 
92 Change-in-variables model has been used widely to control for endogeneity. See, e.g., 
Chan et al. (2013) in the context of stock return synchronicity and stock liquidity, Chang et 
al. (2015) in the context of institutional ownership and dividends, Chung et al. (2010), and 
Prommin et al. (2014) in the context of corporate governance and stock liquidity. 
93 See, e.g., Ferreira et al. (2011); Ben-Nasr and Cosset (2014); Chang et al. (2015); Ben-
Nasr and Alshwer (2016); and Firth et al. (2016) which use the firm fixed-effects model to 
control for endogeneity. 
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dividend payment over time.94 This model specification reduces concerns 
about omitted variables in our previous (levels) specification. Klock et al. 
(2005) suggest this method as appropriate to mitigate a potential feedback 
problem. Moreover, Chung et al. (2010) suggest that this method is more 
likely to provide better estimates than using level variables. The change 
model can be empirically tested using the following regression: 
∆ܦ ௜ܻ௧ = ߙ௧ + ߚଵ∆ߖ௜௧ିଵ + ߛ∆ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜௧ିଵ + ߝ௜௧                  (5.7) 
where 	∆ܦ ௜ܻ௧	is changes in dividend yield of firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
∆ߖ௜௧ିଵ	is changes in firm-specific return variation from year t-2 to year t-1, 
and ∆ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ is changes in a set of control variables from year t-2 to year t-
1. Year and industry dummies are included in the model while ε୧୲	is 
unspecific random factors. The coefficient 	ߚଵ	captures the difference in 
dividend yield one year after the changes in stock price informativeness, and 
the sign of ߚଵ indicates whether dividend yield increases or decreases 
following the changes in price informativeness. The sign of the coefficient 
βଵ	is predicted to be negative as the first hypothesis of this chapter (H4) 
conjectures that dividend yield is negatively associated with the stock price 
informativeness. Panel A of Table 5.6 represents the results for the change-
in-variables model. We find a negative and significant change in dividend 
yield following changes in stock price informativeness (a coefficient of -
0.0002 with t=-2.48). The results for the change-in-variables model lend 
further support for H5. 
Second, we account for the endogeneity issue by adopting a firm fixed-
effects model.95 A firm fixed-effects model is an alternative to the first 
difference model. Although both models generate unbiased estimators, the 
fixed-effects model is more efficient as long as any omitted variables are 
serially uncorrelated (Brockman and Yan 2009). According to Brooks (2008), 
                                                             
94 According to (Wooldridge 2013: 473), ‘‘differencing panel data over time, in order to 
eliminate a time-constant unobserved effect, is a valuable method for obtaining causal 
effects”. 
95 Roberts and Whited (2012) argue that one of the most common causes of endogeneity in 
empirical corporate finance is omitted variables, and omitted variables are a problem 
because of the considerable heterogeneity present in many empirical corporate finance 
settings. Panel data can sometimes offer a partial solution to this problem. 
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fixed effect regression is appropriate to control for omitted variables. 
Furthermore, Jiraporn et al. (2011) suggest that a common method to deal 
with simultaneity is a fixed-effects regression, which takes into account the 
unobservable firm-specific characteristics that remain constant through time. 
The results of the fixed-effects model are reported in Panel B of Table 5.6. 
The results confirm the results of both our main model as well as the change-
in-variables model in Panel A. The stock price informativeness coefficient is 
negative 0.0010) and significant (t=4.72).  
Finally, to further address the issue of the potential endogeneity between 
stock price informativeness and amount of dividends, we use the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) system two-step method developed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998). This method is 
proper in cases where it is difficult to find instruments to alleviate such a 
problem (Arellano and Bover 1995; Blundell and Bond 1998; Wintoki et al. 
2012; Abdallah et al. 2015). According to Wintoki et al. (2012), given panel 
data, the dynamic GMM can improve OLS and fixed-effects estimates in 
three different ways. First, it can include firm fixed effects to address 
unobservable heterogeneity, which OLS, in particular, does not do. Second, 
it allows the stock price informativeness to be influenced by previous 
realizations of, or shocks to, dividends. Third, it may be possible to use some 
combination of variables from the firm’s history as a set of valid instruments 
to account for simultaneity (assuming that the underlying economic process 
is dynamic), for instance, if the stock price informativeness is related to past 
dividends. Thus, an important feature of this method is that it depends on a 
set of instruments that are contained within the panel itself; previous values 
of stock price informativeness and dividends can be used as instruments for 
current realizations of stock price informativeness. This eliminates the need 
for external instruments. 
We estimate our model using the dynamic panel GMM following Wintoki et 
al. (2012) to address the endogeneity concerns related to unobserved 
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heterogeneity, simultaneity, and reverse causality.96 This estimator consists 
of a system of two sets of equations. The first set of equations is expressed 
in levels and uses the lagged first differences of the dependent variable and 
the independent variables as instruments. The second set consists of the 
equations in first differences with the lagged levels of the dependent variable 
and the independent variables as instruments. For simplicity, it is assumed 
that the stock price informativeness and control variables are all potentially 
endogenous. The dynamic GMM method uses lagged levels of the 
explanatory and dependent values as instruments to control for both dynamic 
and simultaneous endogeneity; thus, we consider all explanatory variables 
as endogenous and use their lags of two or more periods as instruments. We 
consider year and industry dummies as exogenous variables. Moreover, the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable in the GMM system estimator is 
also worthy from a dividend dynamics perspective since it allows for the 
consideration of the partial adjustment of dividend payments in relation to 
earnings and past dividends which is suggested by Lintner (1956) (see, e.g., 
Henry 2011)  . 
The results from the estimation of this model are provided in Panel C of 
Table 5.6.97 Stock price informativeness continues to be significantly related 
to level of dividends (DY). The coefficient on ߖ is a significantly negative -
0.0012 (t=2.90). To check the consistency of the estimators derived from 
GMM we validate the assumption that the error terms do not show serial 
correlation and further validate the instruments. For this purpose we use two 
specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998).  The first is to check if the error term is not serially correlated 
and the second test is the Sargan test of over-identifying restriction. The 
estimated models all meet these requirements. As can be observed, the AR 
(1) displays a p-value of 0.000, suggesting that the null hypothesis of no first-
order serial correlation is strongly rejected. However, The AR (2) test yields a 
p-value of 0.809, which means that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no 
                                                             
96 A similar model is used to address the issue of potential endogeneity by Henry (2011) 
between ownership structure and dividend policy and Ben-Nasr and Alshwer (2016) 
between stock price informativeness and labour investments. 
97 We estimate the GMM model using the xtabond2 command in Stata. 
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second-order serial correlation. The results in Panel C of Table 5.6 also 
reveal that the Sargan test has a p-value of 0.106 and as such, we cannot 
reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid.  
Overall, our finding that firms with high stock price informativeness pay a low 
level of dividends is robust to accounting for endogeneity concerns related to 
simultaneity, unobservable heterogeneity, and the reverse causality.  
5.5.3. The role of stock liquidity 
In this section, we present our results on the impact of stock liquidity on the 
relationship between firm dividend policy and stock price informativeness. 
The results are reported in Table 5.7. Column (1) reports the regression 
results for Equation (5.4) where we add an interaction term between liquidity 
with stock price informativeness (ߖ). The results show that the effect of price 
informativeness on dividend yield remains negative and statistically 
significant even after controlling for the effect of stock liquidity and its 
interaction with price informativeness. This result lends further support for 
our earlier finding that high levels of price informativeness are associated 
with better informed investors and better monitoring and thus less need for 
dividends. In addition, the coefficients on the liquidity variable (Amihud) is 
positive and significant, suggesting that firms with illiquid stock pay a higher 
amount of dividends. This evidence is consistent with Banerjee et al. (2007), 
Griffin (2010), and Kuo et al. (2013). More importantly is the coefficients on 
the interaction of price informativeness and the liquidity measure. We find 
that the negative relationship between dividend payment and price stock 
informativeness is more pronounced in firms with higher illiquidity ratios 
(illiquid stocks) (coefficient of ߖ*Liquidity=-0.0010 with a t-statistic=-3.81). 
Because DY and ߖ are negatively related, this suggests that the effect of 
price informativeness on DY is stronger (weaker) in firms with illiquid (liquid) 
stocks. In other words, investors in firms with less informative prices are 
more likely to receive a higher dividend payment when the liquidity of their 
stocks is low, confirming our H6.  
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Table 5.6 Dividends and stock price informativeness: endogeneity issue 
This table reports the results regarding the effect of stock price informativeness on amount of dividend payment while controlling for endogeneity. Panel A represents the 
results of the change model and Panel B represents the results of the fixed-effects model. Panel C represents the results of the GMM model. The dependent variable is DY 
measured by the. 	ߖ = ݈݊	((1− ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ is from a regression of the daily stock returns on daily market and industry returns. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities 
and long-term debt over total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets.. Growth is the percentage change in total assets. T-
statistics are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan test of over-
identification is under the null that all instruments are valid. 
Panel A: Change-in-variables Model Panel B: Fixed-effects Model Panel C: GMM Model 
Δߖ -0.0002** ߖ -0.0010*** ߖ -0.0012*** 
 (-2.48)  (-4.72)  (-2.90) 
ΔLeverage -0.0022194** Leverage -0.0039*** Leverage 0.0008 
 (-2.42)  (-1.76)  (0.31) 
ΔProfitability 0.0016*** Profitability 0.0085*** Profitability 0.0050 
 (2.98)  (5.54)  (0.96) 
ΔGrowth 0.0006477*** Growth 0.0021*** Growth -0.0437 
 (2.76)  (3.96)  (-0.65) 
Intercept 0.0008 Intercept 0.0150*** Lagged DY 0.8884*** 
 (1.54)  (14.55)  (22.32) 
Year effects Yes Year effects Yes Year effects Yes 
Industry effects Yes Industry effects No Industry effects Yes 
Observations 5995 Observations 6980 Observations 6955 
F-statistic 5.41*** F-statistic 7.47*** F-statistic 905.41*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.0232 Adj. R-squared 0.0660 AR(1) test (p-value) 0.000 
AR(2) test (p-value) 0.809 
    Sargan test (p-value) 0.106 
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We follow another way to test H6 by repeating the estimation of equation 
(5.1) on two sub-samples of firms with high and low stock liquidity. Two sub-
samples are firstly formed based on the median value of illiquidity ratio where 
the sub-sample with a value of illiquidity ratio above the median value of the 
full sample is considered as illiquid stocks, and the others are liquid stocks. 
As H6 conjectures that the relationship between stock price informativeness 
and the amount of dividend payment is likely to be stronger for illiquid stocks 
(stocks with high illiquidity ratio), the significance level of coefficient of stock 
price informativeness for illiquid stocks is predicted to be greater than the 
significance level of coefficient of stock price informativeness for liquid 
stocks. The results are reported in Column (2)-(3) of Table 5.7. We split the 
sample into two groups, one for firms with liquid stocks (Column 2) and the 
other for firms with illiquid stocks (Column 3) according to the median of the 
liquidity variable (Amihud). We find a significant negative association 
between stock price informativeness and dividend yield in firms with a high 
Amihud ratio (illiquid stocks) but no material relationship is found in firms with 
a low Amihud ratio (liquid stocks), providing further support for H6. This 
suggests that firms with illiquid stock are more likely to pay higher dividends 
in firms with illiquid stocks. Both the split sample design and the interaction 
term support our second hypothesis that a firm’s stock liquidity can affect the 
dividend–price informativeness relationship.  
As a robustness check, we use alternative measures of stock liquidity, 
namely bid–ask spread (Spread) and turnover ratio (Turnover). Table 5.8 
presents the results where Panel (A) reports the results for Spread and 
Panel (B) reports the results for Turnover. Consistent with the notion that 
lower stock liquidity are expected to affect the relationship between dividend 
and price informativeness, Column (1) of Panel (A) shows a negative and 
significant relation (coefficient=-0.0012with a t-statistic=-4.89) between DY 
and ߖ*Liquidity, suggesting that the effect of price informativeness on DY is 
stronger (weaker) in firms with illiquid (liquid) stocks. Using the split sample 
design confirms our results. Columns (2) and (3) of Panel (A) of Table 5.8 
show a significant negative association between stock price informativeness 
and dividend yield in firms with high bid–ask spread (illiquid stocks) but no 
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material relationship is found in firms with low bid–ask spread (liquid stocks). 
Column (4) of Panel (B) of Table 5.8 shows a positive and significant relation 
(coefficient = 0.0.0006 with a t-statistic =2.12) between DY and ߖ*Liquidity. 
Because DY and ߖ are negatively related, this suggests that higher stock 
liquidity can reduce the effect of stock price informativeness on dividends. 
Columns (5) and (6) shows that, while there is a significantly negative effect 
of stock price informativeness on dividend yield for firms in both sub-
samples, the effect is more significant in firms with low turnover ratio (illiquid 
stocks). 
Taken together, the results in Tables 5.7 and 5.8 support H6, which suggests 
that the negative effect of stock price informativeness on dividends is 
stronger in firms with illiquid stocks. This result is in line with the view that 
dividends are more important in illiquid stocks that are associated with more 
trading frictions (Banerjee et al. 2007) and more asymmetric information 
(Welker 1995; Richardson 2000) than liquid stocks.  
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Table 5.7 Dividends and stock price informativeness: the role of stock 
liquidity 
The table reports the regression results regarding the role of stock liquidity in the effect of 
stock price informativeness on amount of dividend payment. Stock liquidity is measured 
using theAmihud illiquidity ratio. Column (1) presents the results based on the interaction 
term. Columns (2) and (3) present the models for the two sub-samples of firms with below 
and above the median of Amihud. The dependent variable is DY measured by the. 	ߖ =
݈݊	((1 − ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ is from a regression of the daily stock returns on daily market 
and industry returns. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt over total 
book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. 
Growth is the percentage change in total assets. T-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
  (1) 
High Liquidity 
(Low Amihud) 
(2) 
Low Liquidity 
(High Amihud) 
(3) 
ߖ -0.0008*** -0.0015*** -0.0006*** 
(-6.31) (-6.59) (-5.00) 
Liquidity 0.0103** 
(14.06) 
ߖ *Liquidity -0.0010*** 
(-3.81) 
Leverage 0.0011 0.0045*** -0.0025** 
(1.14) (2.90) (-2.22) 
Profitability 0.0215*** 0.0350*** 0.0150*** 
(20.54) (14.82) (16.87) 
Growth -0.0041*** -0.0077*** -0.0008 
(-6.05) (-6.46) (-1.15) 
Intercept 0.0106*** 0.0184**** 0.0082*** 
(10.48) (11.72) (9.14) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6623 3325 3298 
F-statistic 88.28 29.33 41.45 
Adj. R-squared 0.2348 0.1469 0.1741 
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Table 5.8 Robustness check for the role of stock liquidity: alternative liquidity measures 
The table reports the regression results regarding the role of stock liquidity in the effect of stock price informativeness on amount of dividend payment using two alternative 
liquidity measures: bid–ask spread (Spread) and turnover ratio (Turnover). Panel A reports the results for Spread and Panel B reports the results for Turnover. Column (1) and 
(4) presents the results based on the interaction term. Columns (2)-(3) present the models for the two sub-samples of firms with a bid–ask spread below and above the median, 
and Columns (5)-(6) present the models for the two sub-samples of firms with a turnover ratio above and below the median. The dependent variable is DY measured by the. 
	ߖ = ݈݊	((1− ܴଶ) ܴଶ⁄ ), where ܴଶ is from a regression of the daily stock returns on daily market and industry returns. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term debt 
over total book assets. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Growth is the percentage change in total assets. T-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Panel A: Spread Panel B: Turnover 
  (1) 
High Liquidity 
Low Spread 
(2) 
Low Liquidity 
(High Spread) 
(3)  4 
High Liquidity 
High Turnover 
(5) 
Low Liquidity 
Low Turnover 
(6) 
ߖ -0.0008*** -0.0018 -0.0005***  -0.0024*** -0.0019** -0.0023*** (-5.84) (-0.87) (-3.63)  (-12.92) (-2.02) (-12.44) Liquidity 0.0107*** 0.0001*** 
(14.04) (0.12) 
ߖ *Liquidity -0.0012*** 0.0006** 
(-4.89) (2.12) 
Leverage 0.0013 0.0049*** -0.0017  0.0034** (0.0057)*** 0.0000 
(1.38) (3.28) (-1.50)  (3.42) 4.14 (0.02) 
Profitability 0.0210*** 0.0401*** 0.0149***  0.0251*** 0.0244*** 0.0256*** 
(20.69) (14.14) (16.17)  (22.92) (17.31) (14.40) 
Growth -0.0040*** -0.0074*** -0.0009  -0.0037*** -0.0051*** -0.0015 
(-6.05) (-5.93) (-1.22)  (-5.41) (-5.98) (-1.29) 
Intercept 0.0107*** 0.0184*** 0.0078  0.0174*** 0.0204*** 0.0145*** 
(10.80) (12.60) (8.46)  (16.21) (13.16) (11.41) 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6931 3461 3470  6609 3353 3256 
F-statistic 100.21*** 22.74*** 41.65***  69.49*** 49.8*** 31.32*** 
Adj. R-squared 0.2252 0.1355 0.1456 0.1912 0.1977 0.1987 
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5.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we add a new and essential element to the literature on the 
determinants of amount of dividend paid, which is stock price 
informativeness. In the context of signalling theory and agency theory, we 
develop and test the hypothesis that the amount of information incorporated 
into stock prices affects the amount of dividend paid by the firm. 
We conjecture that if stock prices are informative and investors are already 
well informed about a firm’s prospectus, managers are less likely to pay high 
dividends to signal information. In this sense, stock markets are able to 
perform an informational role normally associated with dividends. Likewise, 
when prices are informative, it is more likely that informed investors are able 
to directly intervene and monitor the management team (e.g., via takeovers). 
For this reason, an informed stock market can also play a role in monitoring 
managers. 
We predict that more informative prices lead to a lower level of dividends. 
Using a sample of UK firms over the period 1996-2013, we find strong 
evidence to support this prediction. We show that a higher level of stock 
price informativeness (measured by firm-specific return variation) is 
associated with a lower level of dividends. This result is robust to using other 
models to estimate firm-specific return variation and to controlling for 
endogeneity issues. We also find that the effect of price informativeness on 
dividends is only observed in small firms, which is consistent with the 
argument based on the signalling model. Small firms typically face greater 
asymmetric information and hence are more likely to use dividends for 
signalling purposes in order to reduce information asymmetries. Moreover, 
there is evidence to support the argument based on the agency costs, as the 
effect of price informativeness on dividends is only seen in low-growth firms 
and those with low leverage. Low-growth firms and less-levered firms face 
high agency costs due to more excess cash in the firm, which they should 
mitigate by paying higher dividends.  
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We further examine the role of the stock liquidity informativeness–dividend 
relationship. Our findings show that the negative effect of stock price 
informativeness on dividends is stronger in firms with illiquid stocks. This in 
line with the view that firms with illiquid stocks are associated with higher 
trading frictions and asymmetric information, and hence there is more need 
for dividends to reduce such problems.  
Stock prices informativeness has been documented to be of vital importance 
to the functional efficiency of the stock markets (Durnev et al. 2003) and to 
play a significant role in determining different corporate decisions (Chen et 
al. 2007a; Frésard 2012; Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 2016). Given the 
significance of stock price informativeness, the findings of this chapter have 
important implications for firms and investors. This study provides meaningful 
insights into the role of stock price informativeness in determining the 
amount of dividends paid by a firm and how the firm’s stock liquidity affects 
this role. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1. Introduction 
This thesis examines the possible links between dividend policy, various 
aspects of stock liquidity, and price informativeness. In particular, the three 
empirical issues examined in each empirical chapter of the thesis are as 
follows. First, Chapter 3 analyzes the effect of dividend payment decisions 
on various aspects of stock liquidity. Second, Chapter 4 examines the impact 
of a firm’s dividend payment decisions on systematic liquidity risk. Third, 
Chapter 5 investigates the impact of stock price informativeness on dividend 
policy and how stock liquidity can influence this relationship. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 outlines 
the findings and the contributions of the first empirical chapter, Chapter 3, 
which examines the relationship between dividend policy decisions and stock 
liquidity. Section 6.3 summarizes the findings and the contributions of the 
second empirical chapter, Chapter 4, which examines the effects of dividend 
policy decisions on systematic liquidity risk. Section 6.4 summarizes the 
findings and the contributions of the third empirical chapter, Chapter 5, which 
investigates the relationship between dividend policy and stock price 
informativeness. Section 6.5 discusses the research implications, limitations, 
and future research. 
6.2. Dividend policy and stock liquidity 
Chapter 3 analyzes empirically the impact of dividend policy decisions on 
stock liquidity. Different aspects of stock liquidity are captured by bid–ask 
spread, turnover ratios and illiquidity ratio. This chapter makes several 
contributions. 
First, we contribute to the literature linking stock liquidity to different areas of 
corporate finance (Rubin 2007; Gopalan et al. 2012; Poon et al. 2013; 
Prommin et al. 2014; Huang et al. 2015; Hillert et al. 2016) by identifying 
dividend policy as another influential determinant of stock liquidity. Given the 
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few prior studies that examine the liquidity impact of dividend policy and their 
conflicting results, more empirical studies are warranted. Unlike previous 
studies that mostly investigate the relationship between dividend policy and 
stock liquidity by examining the changes in a certain measure of stock 
liquidity following dividend announcements (Richardson et al. 1986; Mitra 
and Rashid 1997; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011), we 
consider regression analysis. This analysis enables us to test how a firm’s 
dividend policy decisions determine its stock liquidity while controlling for 
other variables that might affect this relationship. More specifically, we take 
into account various market- and accounting-based control variables, which 
the literature has identified as important determinants of stock liquidity. 
Furthermore, in order to control for possible endogeneity bias due to 
unobservable heterogeneity, this study includes year and industry dummies 
in all the model specifications. Additionally, we use lagged independent 
variables to control for simultaneity. Second, previous studies focus mostly 
on the effect of dividend policy on a single aspect of stock liquidity, such as 
the trading costs aspect that is measured by bid–ask spread (Howe and Lin 
1992; Mitra and Rashid 1997) or trading activity measured by trading volume 
(Richardson et al. 1986; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011). 
However, stock liquidity reflects several aspects. Kyle (1985) and Lesmond 
(2005) argue that because liquidity is very difficult to define and even more 
difficult to estimate, a list of measures is required to capture the different 
aspects of liquidity. Due to the uncertainties associated with liquidity 
estimation, we use proportional bid–ask spread, turnover ratio and Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity ratio to capture the impact of dividend policy on trading 
costs, trading quantity and price impact dimensions of liquidity, respectively. 
Third, our study complements earlier studies of the impact of dividend policy 
on firm value. Higher stock liquidity that is associated with dividend payments 
can result in a lower rate of return and higher firm valuation. Finally, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first of its kind that examines 
the role of dividend policy decisions in determining stock liquidity in the UK. 
We argue that due to the differences in market structure and liquidity 
characteristics of the UK market compared to the US market, this study adds 
further insights to the current literature. It is vital that we research this area 
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given that UK equity markets are the most heavily traded in the world, with 
the exception of the USA. 
The findings of this chapter can be briefly summarized as follows. First, we 
report significant differences in trading costs and trading activity between 
dividend payers and non-payers as well as between high-dividend payers 
and low-dividend payers. For example, we report a negative relationship 
between dividend policy decisions and both proportional bid–ask spread and 
price impact ratio. These findings are consistent with the predictions of 
Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985), who suggest that dividend 
payments result in a lower level of information asymmetry, leading to higher 
stock liquidity. The use of dividends as a monitoring role also provides further 
support to our findings. Dividend-paying firms are more likely to visit the 
capital market, leading to more monitoring and hence more information being 
released to the market (Easterbrook 1984). However, stock turnover ratio is 
found to be affected negatively by whether or not a firm pays dividends. This 
result is maybe due to investors’ tendency to buy and hold stocks with high 
dividends (Hotchkiss and Lawrence 2007; IOSCO Emerging Markets 
Committee December 2007).  
To validate the results, we perform a number of robustness tests and model 
specifications. First, the use of a two-stage regression approach further 
confirms that our results are not biased due to endogeneity issues. Second, 
we find that the positive relationship between dividend policy and stock 
liquidity is supported across time and cross-sectionally through using two 
panel-data regression methods, fixed effect and between estimator. Finally, 
we address the possibility that the relationship between dividend policy and 
stock liquidity is affected by the size of the firm. We find that compared to 
non-dividend-paying (low-dividend paying) firms, dividend-paying (high-
dividend paying) firms are more liquid, especially when they are larger. 
These findings are again consistent with our main argument based on 
information asymmetry and agency costs problems since large firms often 
face lower degrees of asymmetric information and agency costs, which may 
explain their greater level of stock liquidity.  
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6.3. Dividend policy and systematic liquidity risk 
Chapter 4 examines the impact of firms’ dividend payment decisions on 
systematic liquidity risk. This chapter applies a liquidity-augmented asset 
pricing model (LCAPM) to examine the impact of dividend payment decisions 
on the liquidity risk. In this chapter, we hypothesize that a higher (lower) 
liquidity associated with a firm’s decision to pay dividends induces a lower 
(higher) liquidity risk,. By examining this hypothesis we make several 
contributions.  
First, we contribute to the growing literature on the effects of several 
corporate finance areas on systematic liquidity risk (e.g., Lin et al. 2009; Ng 
2011; Cao and Petrasek 2014; Mazouz et al. 2014) by investigating the 
impact of dividend policy decisions on the systematic liquidity risk. Second, 
we contribute to the literature on the valuation effects of dividend policy (Al-
Yahyaee et al. 2011; Bozos et al. 2011; Dasilas and Leventis 2011; Liu and 
Chen 2015). Recent literature in finance suggests that liquidity risk is a non-
diversifiable systematic risk that affects stock returns.  Many studies find that 
expected stock returns are positively related to the sensitivities of returns to 
fluctuations in aggregate liquidity (Pástor and Stambaugh 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen 2005; Liu 2006) Liquidity risk is also significant and priced in 
different  markets, suggesting that it is a persistent risk that affects firm value 
(Lee 2011).To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce 
systematic liquidity risk as an important factor by which dividend policy can 
affect firm value. 
In a related study, Banerjee et al. (2007) show that systematic liquidity risk 
declines following dividend initiations. We, however, differ from their study in 
two ways. First, their empirical analysis focuses on only dividend initiations, 
i.e., the decision as to whether the firm pays a dividend (and not how much 
to pay). The empirical research on dividend decisions suggests that firm 
managers are more likely to face decisions related to the level of dividends 
than decisions to either introduce dividends for the first time or eliminate 
existing dividends (Li and Lie 2006). Therefore, we study also the effect of 
dividend levels. Second, the results of Banerjee et al. (2007) are based on a 
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univariate analysis. However, we argue that the firm’s return sensitivity to 
market liquidity might depend on other factors such as firm-specific variables. 
Thus, a univariate analysis may not reveal the true effect of dividend policy 
on systematic liquidity risk. A multivariate analysis is necessary to 
understand whether, and why, individual firms with different characteristics 
display varying sensitivity to market liquidity. 
Our findings from the analysis of the impact of the firm’s dividend policy 
decisions on the liquidity risk are as follows. First, we document a negative 
relationship between dividend policy decisions and systematic liquidity risk. 
Specifically, we find that non-dividend-paying firms exhibit significantly higher 
systematic liquidity risk than their dividend-paying counterparts. We also find 
that the systematic liquidity risk of dividend payers is significantly negatively 
associated with the amount of dividend payments. These findings remain 
robust after controlling for other determinants of liquidity risk.  
Overall, the findings of this chapter are consistent with the arguments of 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Pástor and Stambaugh (2003), and Liu 
(2006), who suggest that given that liquidity is priced, any increase in liquidity 
would lead to lower liquidity risk and, hence, lower expected returns. The 
increase in stock liquidity associated with dividend policy is in line with the 
asymmetric information theory of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock 
(1985), which suggests that dividend payments are associated with lower 
asymmetric information and hence higher liquidity. These findings are also 
consistent with the flight-to-quality phenomenon (Acharya and Pedersen 
2005; Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009) in which adverse liquidity shocks 
force investors to sell off assets that are associated with higher uncertainty, 
asymmetric information, and trading costs, leading to a decline in asset 
prices. Banerjee et al. (2007) argue that during periods of low market 
liquidity, investors’ demand for dividend-paying stocks, and thus the value of 
such stocks relative to non-paying stocks, is higher.  
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6.4. Dividend policy, price informativeness, and stock 
liquidity 
Chapter 5 investigates the relationship between stock price informativeness 
and amount of dividend paid and how stock liquidity can influence this 
relationship. In doing this, we make several contributions. 
First, while previous literature has significantly increased our understanding 
of the determinants of dividend policy, little attention has been paid to 
whether and how capital markets affect dividends. By focusing on the role of 
stock prices on amount of dividend paid, this chapter helps to fill part of this 
gap by adding stock price informativeness to the list of the determinants of 
dividend amount. Second, it adds to the growing literature on the 
informational content of market prices and the real effects of financial 
markets (e.g., Bond et al. 2012). Some existing studies highlight the 
existence of an informative feedback going from the stock market to different 
corporate decisions such as investments (Chen et al. 2007a; Bakke and 
Whited 2010), cash savings (Frésard 2012), mergers and acquisitions (Luo 
2005), and labour investments (Ben-Nasr and Alshwer 2016). This chapter 
identifies a new channel through which stock prices affect corporate 
decisions. Specifically, it argues that stock prices contain a variety of 
valuable information that can help managers in their decision making 
regarding amount of dividends. We build on the work of De Cesari and 
Huang-Meier (2015) who focus on how the sensitivity of dividend changes to 
abnormal returns varies with information in stock prices. Specifically, we 
study the direct effect of information in stock prices on dividend policy by 
studying its effects on amount of dividend paid. Based on asymmetric 
information and agency costs models, we propose that the amount of 
information incorporated into prices affects firms’ choice of dividends as a 
signalling device and as a monitoring mechanism. This adds a new 
explanation for use of payout policies for signalling purposes (Bernheim and 
Wantz 1995; DeAngelo et al. 2000; Grullon et al. 2002; Hail et al. 2014) as 
well as contributes to the literature on the interaction between dividends and 
other monitoring mechanisms (Grinstein and Michaely 2005; Grullon and 
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Michaely 2012; Al-Najjar and Belghitar 2014; Hoberg et al. 2014; Chang et 
al. 2016). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine 
whether the role of dividends as signalling and discipline mechanisms is 
affected by the level of stock price informativeness. Finally, we argue that 
stock liquidity may play a role in the impact of stock price informativeness on 
amount of dividend paid. More specifically, the association between stock 
price informativeness and amount of dividend paid is likely to be stronger in 
illiquid firms. Our argument is motivated by the evidence of the greater 
importance of dividends for firms with illiquid stocks than those with liquid 
stocks. Firms with illiquid stocks are more likely to pay dividends than those 
with liquid stocks (Banerjee et al. 2007, Kuo et al. 2013). Moreover, firms 
with illiquid stocks are associated with a higher level of asymmetric 
information (Welker 1995; Richardson 2000), and hence the need for 
dividends to reduce it are more valuable in these firms. Therefore, we further 
contribute to the literature by examining the effect of stock liquidity on the 
price informativeness–dividend relationship. 
The main findings of this chapter are as follows. First, we report a negative 
relationship between stock price and amount of dividend paid. This finding is 
consistent with the view that firm managers pay high dividends with the 
intension to convey positive signals to the capital markets about firms’ 
potential cash flows and earnings, thereby increasing investors’ confidence 
in respect of firms’ future performance. Therefore, firm managers are more 
likely to maintain a relatively low level of dividends when the stock price 
informativeness is at a high level. This finding is also consistent with the view 
that stock prices serve as a disciplinary means. Particularly more informative 
stock prices lead to a better monitoring of managers (Ferreira et al. 2011), 
which mitigates the agency-related problems. Consequently, managers are 
less likely to use dividends as a mechanism to reduce agency costs, leading 
to a lower dividend payment. We also find that the effect of price 
informativeness on dividends is only observed in small firms, which is 
consistent with the argument based on the signalling model. Further, the 
negative relation price informativeness and dividends is only seen in firms 
with low growth and those with low leverage ratio, consistent with the 
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argument based on the agency costs. Second, we find that the negative 
relationship between stock price informativeness and amount of dividend 
paid is stronger for firms with illiquid stocks, confirming our conjecture that 
stock price informativeness has a stronger effect on amount of dividend paid 
in firms when their investors are exposed to more trading frictions and 
asymmetric information. 
To ensure the validity of our results, we carry out a number of robustness 
checks. First, we find that our results are robust to the use of alternative 
estimates of firm-specific return variations as measures of stock price 
informativeness by re-estimating firm-specific return variation using two 
alternative models: (i) Brockman and Yan’s (2009) model and (ii) Fama and 
French’s (1993) three-factor model. Second, the application of several 
models such as the firm fixed-effects model, change-in-variables approach 
and dynamic GMM model confirms that our findings are not affected by 
endogeneity bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity, and 
reverse causality.   
6.5. Research implications, limitations, and future research 
The empirical findings of this thesis should be of particular interest to 
academics, investors, and company managers. From an academic 
perspective, we study areas that were recently highly researched. First, the 
results provide new insights in the area which cover the implications of 
corporate finance on stock liquidity. Second, we shed some light on the 
importance of the stock price informativeness in determining dividends. We 
show that stock price informativeness is amongst the important determinants 
of the amount of dividends. Moreover, these results should be beneficial to 
researchers in understanding dividend differences among firms, even in the 
same industry. That is, the level of stock price informativeness may propose 
a further explanation for these differences. 
Furthermore, the evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4 should be of 
considerable importance to both companies and investors. From a firm’s 
perspective, stock liquidity and systematic liquidity risk have a direct effect on 
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transaction costs and the perceived risk of the stock, which, consequently, 
have an effect on the firm’s CEC. The results suggest that when companies 
pay dividends, this results in a significant increase in stock liquidity and a 
reduction in stock return sensitivity. From the investors’ perspective, these 
findings would help them in the formation of their investment strategies, to 
match their trading with those firms where stock liquidity is expected to be 
high. The findings would also help them to realize higher gains by avoiding 
high transaction costs, which may result when the market becomes illiquid in 
adverse conditions. In addition, the findings of Chapter 5 show that stock 
price informativeness has significantly negative effects on dividend 
payments. This would help firms to gain a further insight into choosing their 
dividend policies. Specifically, to the extent that stock prices incorporate 
more information about the firm fundamentals, the need for dividends as a 
signalling mechanism becomes less. Additionally, firms with higher stock 
price informativeness are more subject to the scrutiny and monitoring of the 
capital markets, hence they have less need to use dividends as a discipline 
mechanism. 
On the limitations side of our study, we may point out the following 
limitations. First, the study is limited to a sample of non-financial and non-
utilities firms. Financial and utilities firms are excluded because they follow 
different financial policies and are governed by different regulations. 
Therefore, it may also be worth conducting further research by focusing on 
financial and utilities firms in order to provide a more comprehensive picture 
of dividend policy behaviour and implications of all firms. Second, dividend 
policy literature mostly focuses on studying cash dividend payments 
behaviour of firms, because cash dividends are the most common form to 
distribute profits to shareholders. We also limit our analysis to cash dividend 
payments. Dividend policy, however, involves other types of payouts, such 
as stock dividends or share repurchases. Further research, therefore, could 
be conducted on whether different payout mechanisms such as stock 
dividends and repurchase have different effects on systematic liquidity risk 
and how they are affected by stock price informativeness. Third, stock 
liquidity is a broad concept and difficult to be captured by a single measure. 
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Given that the literature on stock liquidity suggests an enormous number of 
liquidity measures, we limit our study to the most commonly used measures 
such as bid–ask spread, turnover ratio, and Amihud’s illiquidity ratio. 
Furthermore, given that our measure of systematic liquidity risk is estimated 
from a regression model, one can argue that systematic risk is not observed 
and hence the results may be affected by the error in variable problem. 
However, it is common for regressions to be run in which observations on the 
dependent variable are estimated in another analysis (Lewis and Linzer 
2005). Therefore, we use liquidity beta as a measure for liquidity risk using a 
similar procedure applied widely by previous studies (e.g., Cao et al. 2014; 
Ng 2011). Also, in this study and following most of the previous theoretical 
and empirical literature (Durnev et al. 2004; Jin and Myers 2006; Ferreira 
and Laux 2007; Frésard 2012), we measure stock price informativeness by 
firm-specific return variations. Although the literature has proposed different 
justifications for using firm-specific return variation as a proxy for stock price 
informativeness, this measure has been a subject for some debate. For 
example, Dasgupta et al. (2010) suggest that the relation between stock 
price informativeness and firm-specific return variation is unclear. However, 
to alleviate this concern, robustness tests are carried out by using alternative 
measures of firm-specific return variations estimating using different models. 
However, the measure of stock price informativeness is acknowledged as 
one of the major limitations of this study. 
Our results also open the doors to at least four interesting issues for future 
research. First, while the present thesis highlights the role of information 
included in stock prices for the dividend determination, future research can 
be conducted to understand of the importance of stock price informativeness 
in determining other corporate decisions by examining whether it affects 
other corporate decisions, such as corporate advertising and innovation. 
Future research could also examine how dividend policy affects changes in 
stock liquidity in response to changes in market liquidity, as opposed to stock 
returns in response to changes in market liquidity as studied in this thesis. 
Third, one possible direction of future research is to re-examine the 
interrelations between dividends, stock liquidity, and stock price 
 209 
 
informativeness in markets other than the UK. This may also be a valuable 
area for research given that dividend policies and financial markets in 
different countries may have different characteristics and may be subject to 
different regulations. Finally, although this study has totally relied on 
secondary data to investigate the research questions, further research using 
primary data, such as questionnaire surveys and interviews conducted with 
firm management and market investors, may enhance the current findings 
and therefore would be useful in understanding their perceptions about 
interaction of dividend policy, stock liquidity, and stock price informativeness. 
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Appendix A 
 
Pooled data regression with year and industry dummies 
As stated in the main body of the thesis, the relationships between a firm’s 
dividend policy and stock liquidity, liquidity risk and price informativeness can 
be driven by many factors, some of which may not be observable. Omitted 
variables refer to those variables that are not in a model or an analysis that 
influences both the cause and effect and so may cause bias (Shadish et al., 
2002). In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we use pooled data 
and control for fixed effects using time and industry dummies. Dummy 
variables are variables that take on the value 0 or 1 to indicate the absence 
or presence of some categorical effect that may be expected to shift the 
outcome (Wooldridge 2010). Due to the time series dimension, a different 
time intercept is allowed. Using time dummy variables can allow the intercept 
to differ across periods. Moreover, industry dummies are included to control 
for industry-specific factors.  
Pooled data 
The models that are employed in this thesis are tested using pooled data 
analysis which contains pooling of time series and cross-sectional 
observations (combination of time series and cross-section data) (Gujarati 
2004). The pooled data analysis is employed because of its several 
advantages. Pooling data produces more informative data, more variability, 
less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom, and more 
efficiency. Furthermore, pooling data of many observations minimises the 
bias that might result if we aggregate individuals or firms into broad 
aggregates (Gujarati 2004). The pooled data analysis has the capability to 
capture the effect of time-varying factors on response variables and can be 
estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. The OLS method of 
estimation is very popular and common in linking cause and effect in a 
regression model. However, in order for the OLS to be the best choice in the 
estimation, the errors in the model are assumed to have the same variance 
(i.e., homoscedasticity) and also be independent from each other. However, 
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(Gujarati 2004) contends that these assumptions are highly restricted. Hicks 
(1994) states that OLS assumptions may be violated due to following 
reasons. First, errors might be serially correlated, i.e., they are not 
independent from one period to another and hence the errors from pooled 
regressions are considered autocorrelated. Second, errors tend to have 
different variances across units and hence considered heteroscedastic. 
Third, errors might be non-random across spatial and/or temporal units since 
parameters are heterogonous across subsets of units. Therefore, despite the 
simplicity and the advantages of using the pooled model, pooled OLS can be 
inconsistent if we have unobserved individual-specific effects that cause the 
error term to correlate over time for a given individual.  
Fixed-Effect vs. Random-Effect 
The fixed and random effects models relax the assumption that the intercept 
coefficients are constant across firms. The fixed-effect model is used to 
estimate the effect of predictors on the dependent variables by controlling for 
the constant variations arising from the omitted variables and for unobserved 
heterogeneity between groups over time. The assumption of this model is 
that the individual-specific effect is related to the regressors. The fixed-effect 
approach works by removing much of the error variance that arises due to 
the misrepresentations resulting from the individual differences between 
groups that come from the omitted variables or the unobserved 
heterogeneity that is correlated with the regressors. Nevertheless, this model 
permits for correlations between the unobserved individual effects with the 
model’s variables (Greene 2008). That is, problems of autocorrelation or 
heteroscedasticity that affect estimation arise from time or group-specific 
variations and cannot be handled using the fixed- effect model. However, 
random-effect models assume no individual or fixed effects, and thus 
consider the individual-specific constant terms as being randomly distributed 
within or between the cross-sectional groups (Greene 2003).  
To determine which model – pooling, fixed effects, or random effects is most 
appropriate, we need some statistical tests. First of all, to test whether the 
panel data support the fixed effects model we can conduct F-test which is 
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computed from the loss of goodness-of-fit between the pooled OLS model 
and the fixed effects model (Baltagi 2005). This test tests for the null 
hypothesis that there are no firm-specific effects. If the null hypothesis is 
rejected, it means that the fixed effects model is favourable over the pooled 
OLS model. We perform this test and the statistic is highly significant, 
suggesting that there are firm-specific effects. The second stage is to choose 
between the fixed effects model and random effects model and therefore we 
use the Hausman specification test (Hausman 1978). The null hypothesis 
states that the individual-specific effects are uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables. If the null hypothesis is rejected, i.e. the individual 
specific effects are correlated with explanatory variables then the fixed 
effects model is consistent and efficient but the random effects model is 
inconsistent (Greene 2003). However, if we fail to reject the null hypothesis 
i.e. if the individual specific effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables, then the random effects model is consistent and efficient, the fixed 
effects estimator is consistent, but not efficient. The chi-square statistic from 
the Hausman test is highly significant in all our models, suggesting a firm 
fixed effect model is preferred to a random effects model. 
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Appendix B Dividend paying firms only: descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of yearly observations of the main variables of the study. Panel B reports the correlation coefficients among the 
dependent and independent variables. Spread denotes the proportional quoted bid-ask spread, Turnover is the turnover ratio,  Amihud is the Amihud's (2002) 
illiquidity ratio, all of these variables are calculated as the averages of daily values over a particular year. Size is the firm size, Growth is the growth 
opportunities. Profitability is the firm profitability. Return is the average of daily returns over a year. Volatility is the standard deviation of daily returns over a 
year. DPS is the dividend per share. HighDPS is a dummy variable which equals 1 for observations with above the median DPS and 0 otherwise.  See Table 
3.2 for variables measurement. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics         
  DPS HighDPS Turnover Spread Amihud Size Growth Profitability Return Volatility 
Observations 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 6596 
Mean     0.1224 0.5028 0.003 0.021 0.001 12.9141 0.075 0.102 0.000 0.0190 
Median 0.072 1 0.003 0.016 0.000 12.7323 0.060 0.096 0.000 0.0177 
SD 0.1657 0.5000 0.003 0.021 0.002 1.7487 0.193 0.091 0.002 0.0159 
Min 0.003 0 0.000 0.001 0.000 7.4899 -0.602 -0.214 -0.008 0.0000 
Max 1.075 1 0.016 0.104 0.012 19.2410 0.674 0.391 0.005 0.0850 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix       
  DPS HighDPS Turnover Spread Amihud Size Growth Profitability Return Volatility 
DPS 1 
HighDPS 0.5245*** 1 
Turnover 0.0972*** 0.1237*** 1 
Spread -0.2572*** -0.3468*** -0.3186*** 1 
Amihud -0.1644*** -0.2214*** -0.2421*** 0.5807*** 1 
Size 0.3775*** 0.3741*** 0.3735*** -0.6272*** -0.3635*** 1 
Growth -0.0086 (-0.0278)** -0.0622*** -0.0958*** -0.1265*** (-0.0213)* 1 
Profitability 0.1295*** 0.1605* -0.0429*** -0.2133*** -0.1861*** -0.0792*** 0.2481*** 1 
Return 0.0036 0.0200 (-0.0306)** -0.0636*** -0.0717*** 0.028** 0.0132 0.0478*** 1 
Volatility (-0.0244)** -0.0554*** 0.0563*** 0.0670*** 0.0584*** -0.0360*** 0.0272** (-0.0216)* -0.3084*** 1 
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Appendix C  
Appendix C.1: Descriptive statistics and Correlation matrix of variables 
used in LCAPM 
LIQAmihud, LIQspread, LIQturnover are mimicking liquidity factors. We construct these 
mimicking liquidity factors in a way similar to Liu (2006). At the beginning of each month 
from January and July 1996 to July 2013, all FTSE ALL SHARES ordinary common stocks 
are sorted in ascending order based on their liquidity measures resulting in two independent 
portfolios, low-liquidity portfolio (LL) consists of contains the 35% lowest-liquidity FTSE ALL 
SHARES stocks and high-liquidity (HL) consists of the 35% highest-liquidity FTSE ALL 
SHARES stocks. These two portfolios are held for six months after the formation of portfolio. 
According to Liu (2006), this six-month holding period is selected because it gives a 
moderate liquidity premium compared with the 1- and 12-month holding period which looks 
plausible for estimating the liquidity factor. Then, the liquidity factors are constructed as the 
monthly profits from buying one dollar of equally weighted (LL) and selling one dollar of 
equally weighted (HL). ݎ௙ is the risk-free rate in month t, ݎ௠ is the market return in month t 
and they are obtained from DataStream. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
ݎ௠ − ݎ௙ LIQAmihud LIQspread LIQturnover ݎ௙ 
Mean 0.0017 0.0002 0.0021 0.0030 0.0026 
Median 0.0085 0.0008 0.0002 0.0021 0.0033 
Min -0.1367 -0.0861 -0.1150 -0.0885 0.0002 
Max 0.0989 0.1012 0.0875 0.0668 0.0054 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
ݎ௠ − ݎ௙ LIQAmihud LIQspread LIQturnover ݎ௙ 
ݎ௠ − ݎ௙ 1 
LIQAmihud -0.0495 1 
LIQspread 0.0869 0.8493*** 1 
LIQturnover -0.4401*** 0.3987*** 0.0767 1 
ݎ௙ -0.1950** 0.0390 -0.0554 0.1026 1 
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Appendix C.2: Descriptive Statistics of Dividend-paying Stocks Sample 
This table reports summary statistics of the variables under consideration for a sample of 
dividend-paying stocks. At each December between 2000 and 2013, the liquidity beta for 
each stock is computed. The liquidity beta is estimated as the slope coefficient on LIQ while 
controlling for market returns. The regressions are estimated using the past five years of 
monthly data (with a minimum of 36 months). Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity 
ratio (Amihud), bid-ask spread (Spread) and turnover ratio (Turnover). DPS is the amount of 
dividend paid per share. HighDPS is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for high-
dividend-payers, and 0 otherwise. Leverage is the sum of current liabilities and long-term 
debt over total book assets. The return is based on daily stock returns. The volatility is the 
standard deviations of daily returns. Book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of 
total shareholder equity divided by the market value of equity. Profitability is the ratio of 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets. Firm size is the market capitalisation in 
millions of Pounds. 
Mean SD Median Min Max 
Liquidity beta (Amihud) 0.589 0.830 0.439 -0.995 3.338 
Liquidity beta (Spread) 0.602 0.853 0.427 -0.894 3.474 
Liquidity beta (Turnover) 0.673 0.737 0.447 0.000 3.901 
Amihud 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.012 
Spread 0.021 0.022 0.015 0.000 0.109 
Turnover 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.016 
DPS 0.131 0.173 0.078 0.004 1.106 
HighDPS 0.496 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Leverage 0.199 0.158 0.185 0.000 0.672 
Return -0.001% 0.179% 0.000% -0.761% 0.407% 
Volatility 1.822% 1.535% 1.739% 0.000% 7.887% 
Book-to-Market 0.606 0.487 0.485 -0.172 2.564 
Profitability 0.094 0.088 0.089 -0.228 0.359 
Firm size (£ millions) 3.268 11.800 0.277 0.008 87.300 
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Appendix C.3: Differences in Other Characteristics 
This table reports the differences in firm characteristics between (1) dividend payers and non-dividend payers and (2) high-dividend payers and low-dividend 
payers. Liquidity is measured by the Amihud illiquidity ratio (Amihud), bid-ask spread (Spread) and turnover ratio (Turnover). Leverage is the sum of current 
liabilities and long-term debt over total book assets. The return is the average on daily stock returns. The volatility is the standard deviations of daily returns. 
Book-to-market ratio is defined as the book value of total shareholder equity divided by the market value of equity. Profitability is the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets. Firm size is the market capitalisation in millions of Pounds. 
(1) (2) 
  Dividend payers Dividends nonpayers 
t-statistics   
High dividend payers Low dividend payers 
t-statistics   
(Mann Whitney) (Mann Whitney) 
Leverage 0.1999 0.1909 -1.687* 0.2148 0.1835 -7.291*** 
(0.1845) (0.1302) (-7.685***) (0.2041) (0.1633) (-8.795***) 
Amihud 0.0009 0.0052 16.409*** 0.0003 0.0012 16.999*** 
(0.0000) (0.0005) (27.312***) (0.0000) (0.0002) (27.957***) 
Spread 0.0212 0.0523 28.7017*** 0.0138 0.0280 25.115*** 
(0.0153) (0.0408) (31.24***) (0.0069) (0.0233) (28.319***) 
Turnover 0.0036 0.0038 1.414 0.0039 0.0033 -7.568*** 
(0.0028) (0.0027) (-0.678) ( 0.0030) (0.0025) (-7.635***) 
Profitability 0.0919 -0.0874 -31.437*** 0.1123 0.0768 -15.077*** 
(0.0892) (-0.0164) (-39.423***) (0.1027) (0.0753) (-15.516***) 
Volatility 1.832% 2.411% 10.428*** 1.761% 1.882% 2.7975*** 
(1.739%) (2.174%) (9.754***) (1.692%) (1.802%) (2.670***) 
Return -0.002% -0.044% -6.681*** 0.007% -0.009% -3.107*** 
(0.000%) (0.000%) (-6.388***) (0.000%) (0.000%) (-2.803***) 
Market Beta 0.8675 1.0467 8.304*** 0.8449 0.8869 2.3858** 
 (0.8099) (0.9657) (6.404***) (0.7983) (0.8289) (1.763*) 
Firm size (£ millions) 3.0977 0.5448 -14.165*** 5.2323 1.2998 -11.007*** 
(0.2769) (0.0873) (-20.597***) (0.5510) (0.1596) (-20.111***) 
Book-to-Market 0.6099 0.8008 8.284*** 0.5040 0.7075 15.603*** 
  (0.4854) (0.5747) (6.471***) (0.4237) (0.5650) (13.710***) 
 
